Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT904
2009-08-12 16:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

JUMBLATT ASSURES HARIRI HE WILL SUPPORT THE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR LE IS SA 
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0904/01 2241638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121638Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5513
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3526
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4057
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000904 

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DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
PARIS FOR JMILLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE IS SA
SUBJECT: JUMBLATT ASSURES HARIRI HE WILL SUPPORT THE
MAJORITY

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000904

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
PARIS FOR JMILLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE IS SA
SUBJECT: JUMBLATT ASSURES HARIRI HE WILL SUPPORT THE
MAJORITY

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt on
August 12 confirmed that his bloc remains within the "15"
(majority) in the 15-10-5 Cabinet formula, reiterating what
he told Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri the night
before. Both Siniora and caretaker Minister of State Nassib
Lahoud admitted separately that Jumblatt's actions further
complicated the already byzantine government formation
process. Siniora worried that forming a government quickly
would be to Hizballah's advantage, and he remained concerned
that in doing so Hariri might make too many concessions.
Siniora did not believe Jumblatt had put the final nail in
the March 14 Coalition's coffin, and asserted that March 14
still had a role to play in Lebanon's crowded political
arena. However, both Siniora and Lahoud fretted that the
protracted government formation process was providing an
opening for Syria to regain its footing in Lebanon. End
summary.

JUMBLATT: 15-10-5
FORMULA STILL HOLDS
--------------


2. (C) Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt
confirmed in an August 12 meeting with the Ambassador and
PolOff the 15-10-5 Cabinet formula remains unchanged-- and
that his bloc remains within the majority 15 --reiterating
what he told Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri the night
before. A visibly tired and chastened Jumblatt said Free
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun remains the sole
obstacle to Cabinet formation. "We are now back to square
one." Jumblatt also confirmed his plan to meet with March 14
Secretariat Secretary General Faris Souaid soon. Jumblatt
seemed relieved to be over the tumult of the last nine days
and was reluctant to discuss the issue in any detail.
Instead, he focused on Aoun's obstructionism. "Aoun has lost

the election, but he doesn't realize it." Jumblatt
speculated that either Hizballah or Syria was at the root of
Aoun's intransigence, but he admitted that Hariri was not
willing to meet Aoun's central demand and concede the
Telecommunications Ministry to the FPM leader's son-in-law
Gebran Bassil.


3. (C) Jumblatt had assured Hariri the evening before that he
would respect the results of the June 2009 National Assembly
election and will support the majority in the next cabinet,
according to Hariri's chief of staff Nader Hariri. Saad also
asserted that Hizballah and its allies need to approach
Cabinet negotiations with a unified strategy and not in a
piecemeal manner, referring to his ongoing battle over
portfolio distribution with Aoun. According to Nader, Aoun's
repeated demands for the Ministry of Interior was "off the
table." (Note: Saad Hariri met with Hizballah political
advisor Hussein Khalil August 11 evening, following his
meeting with Jumblatt. End note.)


4. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora told Ambassador
and Poloff in a separate meeting August 12 that Hariri must
be firm in offering Hizballah and its allies a group of
portfolios that they can divide among themselves.
"Otherwise, he is between a rock and a hard place."
However, both Siniora and caretaker Minister Nassib Lahoud
insisted it was impossible to consider Jumblatt a part of the
majority bloc, with Siniora cautioning against "pushing him
further toward March 8." Siniora remarked bleakly that
although Hariri had weathered the recent storm, he is still
in a precarious position.

JUMBLATT'S DEFECTION WEAKENS THE PRESIDENT
--------------


5. (C) Siniora admitted that Jumblatt's actions had surprised

BEIRUT 00000904 002 OF 003


him and further complicated the already byzantine government
formation process. Not only had Jumblatt delayed the Cabinet
formation, but he also undermined the role of President
Michel Sleiman. "(Sleiman) is no longer the man that can tip
the balance," Siniora said. He argued that Jumblatt had done
more damage than was readily apparent and complained the
Druze leader was being typically unpredictable. Siniora
believed Jumblatt's actions stemmed from his frustration with
a diminished role within the March 14 Coalition. "He is no
longer the sole decision maker, and he's frustrated. He wants
to be the force that tips the balance." According to Siniora,
March 14 no longer held a parliamentary majority, and Sleiman
was not in a position to exercise a swing vote. "Now Walid
Jumblatt can play that role."


6. (C) For his part, Presidential advisor Nazem Khoury agreed
that Jumblatt is now the "guarantor" who effectively replaces
the role imagined for the presidential bloc. In reality,
Khoury told PolChief on August 12, the government will "make
ends meet" by avoiding all controversial issues. Khoury
defended President Sleiman's passive posture in government
formation by saying the he would step in if there were a
"crisis" and seeks to avoid impinging on the role of the
PM-designate.

SINIORA: HASTE IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION
WILL MAKE HARIRI A "SITTING DUCK"
--------------


7. (C) Opinions vary on the wisdom of accelrating the pace of
cabinet negotiations. Siniora insisted that Hizballah is
eager to form a government quickly to its advantage, and he
remained concerned that in doing so Hariri would make too
many concessions, thereby negating March 14's electoral
success. Siniora was worried Hariri would become a "sitting
duck" in the next cabinet. Nader Hariri agreed with
Siniora's assessment of Hizballah's motives, although he did
not see a quick end to the government formation process as
detrimental to Hariri's premiership. Lahoud argued Hariri had
more to lose the longer the process took.


8. (C) Siniora conceded that there has been little progress
on the distribution of portfolios. He endorsed the promotion
of technocratic ministers and warned Hizballah would attempt
to appoint ministers who were technocrats but also "highly
politicized." Siniora argued that Hariri should retain the
Ministries of Energy and Water and Telecommunications for his
bloc, the former because any incremental success will be
perceived as a victory for the Prime Minister, the latter for
security purposes. Lahoud agreed that Hariri should push for
the Energy and Water portfolio, and he said all Cabinet
decisions had been settled with the exception of Aoun's
demands. According to both Jumblatt and Lahoud, Hariri would
attempt to offer Aoun the Education Ministry in exchange for
the Telecommunications portfolio. Lahoud added that Bassil
will almost certainly be in the next Cabinet, and he said
former Minister of Economy and Trade (1995-98) and Transport
and Public Works (2004-05) Yasin Jaber could resurface as the
Minister of Foreign Affairs.


9. (C) Siniora did not believe Jumblatt had put the final
nail in March 14's coffin, and he argued the March 14
Coalition still had a role to play in Lebanon's crowded
political arena. "It's a way of reconciling Christians with
the Arab Cause and Muslims with the Lebanese cause," Siniora
argued. However, he admitted all Lebanese confessional groups
were taking more "offensive" positions. He also worried that
Jumblatt's contribution to the protracted government
formation process would provide an opening for Syria to
regain its footing in Lebanon, a sentiment that Lahoud
echoed. Siniora maintained that he hoped to have strong
relationship with Syria, but one based on respect that
recognizes Lebanon's sovereignty. "Syria always has to be
reminded that Lebanon is an independent state." According to
Siniora all other issues -- including the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) mandate and a

BEIRUT 00000904 003 OF 003


reexamination of the President's powers -- would take a back
seat to government formation.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) In the wake of Jumblatt's return to the fold, both
Siniora and Lahoud seem to be taking a darker view than
Hariri of the long-term impact of the Druze leader's recent
machinations. For its part, Hizballah has raised public
calls for immediate government formation while as yet
declining to offer names for its ministerial portfolios. The
President, meanwhile, appears to have stepped back from
active participation in the process. Despite ongoing
speculation and rumor mongering about when a government will
take shape and who will be in it, hopes for the quick
formation of an effective government are waning as the
process enters its second month. End comment.
SISON