Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT887
2009-08-06 15:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

WILL HARIRI HEAD A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT?

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR PTER MARR MOPS LE SY 
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VZCZCXRO6516
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0887/01 2181540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061540Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5486
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3517
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4048
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000887 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
PARIS FOR JMILLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: WILL HARIRI HEAD A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT?

REF: BEIRUT 874

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000887

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
PARIS FOR JMILLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: WILL HARIRI HEAD A MAJORITY GOVERNMENT?

REF: BEIRUT 874

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Despite Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid
Jumblatt's August 5 comments pledging he would stand by Saad
Hariri in the government formation process, Hariri will not
in the end head a majority government, predicted caretaker
Ministers Mohammed Chatah (Finance) and Ziad Baroud
(Interior) and former Hariri confidant Ghattas Khoury. Chatah
characterized Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid
Jumblatt's perceived defection as the second biggest
strategic loss suffered by March 14 after Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun's split with the alliance
in 2005. Chatah and Baroud warned of Lebanon's current tense
climate, with the latter concerned the country could not meet
future challenges if it continued to adopt the same
short-sighted policies. Both Chatah and Baroud expressed
appreciation for USG support to Lebanon. End summary.

HARIRI'S MINISTERS
DWINDLE TO TWELVE
--------------


2. (C) Despite Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader Walid
Jumblatt's loudly-stated insistence that he is neither
leaving the March 14 Coalition nor obstructing government
formation, Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri will not head
a majority government, predicted both caretaker Finance
Minister Mohammed Chatah and caretaker Interior Minister Ziad
Baroud, who met separately with the Ambassador and PolOff
August 6. Former Hariri confidant Ghattas Khoury echoed a
similar sentiment in a meeting with PolChief. Although the
15-10-5 formula (majority-opposition-presidential bloc) is

still being discussed, Hariri is likely to control only 12
ministers, Chatah, Baroud, and Khoury agreed. Khoury believes
that the three Druze ministers will vote with Hizballah on
all issues related to the group's concerns and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).


3. (C) Chatah believes that not only is Hariri going to lead
a minority in the cabinet but also fears the tumult of the
past week has turned the Prime Minister-designate's June 2009
electoral victory into a defeat. Baroud said the big question
would be whether or not PSP leader Walid Jumblatt's three
Druze ministers joined President Michel Sleiman's bloc or the
opposition. He noted the cold comfort that Hizballah and its
allies had failed to gain a blocking minority, and he was
appreciative that at least Jumblatt had switched sides before
the cabinet ministers had been chosen.

JUMBLATT FAILS
TO SURPRISE
--------------


4. (C) When the Ambassador queried Chatah about Jumblatt's
recent comments about the March 14 Coalition and the ensuing
scuffle (reftel),Chatah maintained that he had anticipated
Jumblatt's actions. Chatah observed that Jumblatt had
reverted to his 2004 position with his recent comments. "He's
gone back to the warmth of his old cage," he quipped. Chatah
characterized Jumblatt's perceived defection as the second
major strategic loss suffered by the March 14 Coalition after
FPM leader Michel Aoun split from the alliance in 2005.
Chatah insisted that the majority of Lebanese still endorsed
March 14's objectives.


5. (C) Khoury, who had spoken to Jumblatt the previous
evening, assessed that the Druze leader's obsessive fear of
the impact of the STL's proceedings as an "overreaction," but
one reinforced by Jumblatt's fear of a roader Sunni-Shia
conflict. Jumblatt remained dstrustful of the USG after his
May 7, 2008 brinksmanship was not reinforced by the U.S.,

BEIRUT 00000887 002 OF 002


Khoury asserted, so Jumblatt is casting about for other
foreign alliances. His desire to be included as part of any
U.S.-Syria deal is evidence of that. Jumblatt "intended to
hint" at his gradual move to an independent political
position in his controversial comments, but "Saad got angry
and kicked him straight out of March 14." Now Hariri must
"handle" Jumblatt in order to moderate his future
misbehavior. However, despite Hariri's troubles with
Jumblatt, a period of regional stability over the next few
years will open the way for Hariri to achieve tangible
improvements in Lebanon, Khoury declared.

STABILITY REMAINS
A CONSTANT CONCERN
--------------


6. (C) Chatah warned the current situation in Lebanon is
tense and unstable, and he did not rule out the possibility
that another war could consume the country. Baroud echoed
Chatah's assessment of the current climate, and he cautioned
that Lebanon would be unable to face future challenges if it
continued to adopt short-sighted policies. Baroud
characterized last month's incident in Kherbit Selim as a
"disaster" and warned the situation could deteriorate
quickly.

USG SUPPORT WELCOME,
BUT KEEP IT QUIET
--------------


7. (C) Baroud expressed to the Ambassador his appreciation
for USG assistance through the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems for preparations for the 2010 municipal
elections, and Chatah for his part commented that, at
present, USG support should be from the sidelines. "Too close
of an embrace becomes a burden," he observed. According to
both Baroud and Chatah, there are several urgent problems the
next government must confront, including decentralization and
municipal reform. Chatah said that although many of Hariri's
advisers supported decentralization, the Prime
Minister-designate had not yet formed an opinion and he will
be able to bring a fresh perspective to the issue.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) While almost none of our interlocutors were surprised
by Jumblatt's actions over the past week, the realization is
growing that the Prime Minister-designate faces a very
difficult road ahead. Both Chatah and Baroud seemed convinced
that government formation will proceed despite Jumblatt's
stance and Hariri's trip to the South of France. Across the
board, the Lebanese political class is obsessed by chatter of
a coming conflagration, either internal or regional, that
will consume Lebanon. Jumblatt's destabilization of the
status quo has only exacerbated those fears, especially among
those who buy into his persona as a strategic seer. End
comment.

SISON