LEBANON: SOME GOL OFFICIALS ADMIT 1701 VIOLATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000859

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SOME GOL OFFICIALS ADMIT 1701 VIOLATION
TO NSC DIRECTOR, OTHERS PIN THE BLAME ON ISRAEL

REF: BEIRUT 819

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Denise Herbol for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Several GOL officials expressed their confidence July
24-25 to visiting National Security Council Senior Director
for Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro that the
opposition would drop its demand for a blocking third and
that the cabinet would be formed, though no one could commit
to a timeframe. While Pesident Sleiman, PM-designate Saad
Hariri, and Deense Minister Murr unequivocally denounced the
Jly 14 weapons cache explosion as a violation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1701, outgoing PM Fouad Siniora and
Speaker Nabih Berri's advisor demurred (primarily out of fear
of crossing Hizballah),and attempted to shift the focus to
Israeli violations. All but Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
believed Lebanon was prepared to assume membership to the
Security Council in 2010, despite the inevitable conflicts of
interest. End summary.


2. (C) Visiting National Security Council Senior Director for
Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro and the Ambassador,
accompanied by PolOff, met separately with President Michel
Sleiman, outgoing PM Fouad Siniora, PM-designate Saad Hariri,
Defense Minister Elias Murr, Speaker Nabih Berri's advisor
Ali Hamdan, and Druze leader and MP Walid Jumblatt on July
24-25.

SLEIMAN: GOL READY FOR UNSC
MEMBERSHIP DESPITE INTERNAL DIVISIONS
--------------


3. (C) At the presidential palace in Baabda, President
Sleiman expressed his opposition to the blocking third
concept, but emphasized that there are key topics that must
be agreed upon by consensus. Sleiman insisted that the
cabinet formation process be an internal, Lebanese effort and
rejected the idea of another Doha conference, even if that
meant it took more time to form a new cabinet.


4. (C) Stressing the GOL's full commitment to UN Security
Council Resolution 1701, President Sleiman acknowledged that
the weapons cache discovered after exploding July 14 (reftel)
was a violation and stated that the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) was doing its best to abide by the resolution.
However, he argued, the uncovering of the "Israeli spy ring"
constituted a more dangerous violation for Lebanese citizens
than the weapons cache violation because it has undermined
the credibility of the LAF. (Note: Several LAF officers
have been arrested on charges of espionage against Lebanon.
End note.)


5. (C) Shapiro expressed concern over the Lebanese Mission to
the UN's letter suggesting Israeli culpability for the
weapons cache explosion and inquired about Lebanon's possible
2010-2012 UN Security Council membership in view of probable
conflicts of interest. Sleiman responded that the GOL would
decide its position for new resolution "in accordance with
the Arab League." On resolutions pertaining to Lebanon, he
said the GOL would always act in the interest of Lebanon.
"It is not possible to be a part of the UNSC and not defend
Lebanon," Sleiman argued.

SINIORA: "RED LINE" TO FINGER
HIZBALLAH FOR WEAPONS CACHE
--------------


6. (C) Siniora justified the letter from the Lebanese Mission
to the UN as reasonable because it was a way to communicate
that there are many Israeli violations that do not receive
attention. According to Siniora, the Foreign Minister's
office drafted the letter, circulated it through the

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President's office, then to his office, at which point he
made "substantial" edits.


7. (C) Siniora indicated that the letter's acknowledgment of
the weapons cache "implies" GOL admission of a UNSCR
violation. However, he argued, the Israelis do not take
responsibility for their violations, so why should the
Lebanese be expected to take responsibility? Nevertheless,
he said that if the GOL did single out Hizballah, it would be
taking a great risk and crossing a line that could not be
crossed. He referred to the risks his government took in May
2008 that resulted in Hizballah's takeover of Beirut.


8. (C) Shapiro responded that the letter had not been warmly
received in Washington. He said it called into question what
kind of partner the United States had in Lebanon, if the GOL
could not even call a clear violation of UNSCR 1701 on its
territory by its name. This failure had potential
implications for the kind of assistance the USG and Congress
would support for Lebanon and the LAF. We need to know that
we have a reliable partner in confronting all violations,
including those by Hizballah, he said. The incident and the
letter also raised serious concerns about how the GOL would
deal with such difficult questions, as well as tough
decisions about Iran and other matters, when it takes its
seat on the UN Security Council. GOL decisions on the UNSC
could exacerbate tensions in U.S.-Lebanese relationship.
Shapiro repeated these concerns with all of his interlocutors.

HARIRI: HASTE MAKES WASTE IN
CABINET FORMATION;
JUMBLATT WON'T BOLT MARCH 14
--------------


9. (C) Hariri declared that it was more important to take his
time in forming the new cabinet to ensure that the victory
won by March 14 in the June 7 parliamentary elections was not
lost in the negotiation process. Initially declaring that he
"needed to be convinced" why to give the opposition a
blocking third in the cabinet, Hariri then asserted that he
would not agree to a blocking third because he did not see
the need for it, or a "king minister" (someone trusted by all
who would fall under the president bloc to resolve the
opposition's demand for more than ten ministerial seats).


10. (C) Hariri indicated that the opposition had "retracted a
lot" from its earlier positions on cabinet formation and
accused Syria of being the origin of the opposition's
demands. He said he understood that as painful as it would
be, he would need to speak to the Syrians at some point
(although not necessarily in Damascus),but certainly not
before the cabinet was formed and a vote of confidence held.


11. (C) Shapiro stated that cabinet formation was a Lebanese
decision, and that the United States supported a government
that represents the people's wishes, that can govern
effectively, and that allows a continuation of the USG's
assistance.


12. (C) Unaware of the Lebanese Mission's letter to the UN,
Hariri was surprised that no one had informed him, but not
surprised about the content. He flatly declared the weapons
cache a violation of UNSCR 1701 and added that the real
culprit for the violation was Syria, the origin of the
weapons. He disclosed that there had been unrest in northern
Lebanon, instigated by local Sunni "gangs" taking orders from
Hizballah and anticipated that Hizballah was "preparing
something."


13. (C) Addressing Jumblatt's June meeting with Hizballah SYG
Hassan Nasrallah, Hariri said he was unconcerned about
Jumblatt's loyalties. "For four years, people have been
questioning Walid's political allegiances, but no one has
attacked Hizballah effectively except for Walid," he
declared. He said that Jumblatt sees "everyone" going to
Syria and had determined that he should as well in order to

BEIRUT 00000859 003 OF 004


ensure his political survival.

MURR: JOINT UNIFIL/LAF REPORT
OFFERS POLITICAL COVER TO GOL
--------------


14. (C) Murr relayed that the LAF G-2 (intelligence bureau)
believes Hizballah and its Christian ally, Free Patriotic
Movement leader Michel Aoun, do not want the cabinet formed
before Ramadan (expected to begin after August 20). Murr
worried that the momentum of March 14's victory and Hariri's
credibility would both be lost if it took "too long."


15. (C) Mentioning that he would prefer to assume the Foreign
Minister's portfolio, he said he understood why President
Sleiman and Hariri were inclined to keep him as Defense
Minister. He said he wanted to focus on developing the LAF's
counter-terrorism capabilities, believing that it was
fruitless to build its defensive capabilities because "if
Israel wants to invade Lebanon, it will."


16. (C) Murr stated clearly that Kherbet Selim was an illegal
munitions depot in UNIFIL's Area of Responsibility and a
"huge" violation of UNSCR 1701. Revising his July 17 account
of the explosion (reftel),Murr said there were no Katyusha
rockets, only munitions left by the collaborator South
Lebanon Army in 2000, that killed between one and two
Hizballah operatives.


17. (C) Murr also said that UNIFIL and the LAF arrived on the
scene "together." Hizballah members drove a van containing
bombs away from the explosion, Murr disclosed, but were
intercepted by the LAF and UNIFIL and arrested.


18. (C) The LAF and UNIFIL were both conducting
investigations and would produce one report, due within days,
Murr said. Noting that LAF Commander General Jean Kahwagi
had departed minutes earlier, Murr said he had asked Kahwagi
for a commitment that the LAF would make it clear in the
report that there had been a violation of UNSCR 1701.
Reportedly, Kahwagi had readily agreed. Murr said that the
LAF is the only entity that could credibly call the incident
a "violation," and advised that Siniora refer to the LAF's
report if he chose to take a stand against Hizballah.


19. (C) Murr added that the LAF intends to continue searching
buildings in the area after the report's submission to
"support" UNIFIL. Murr criticized the French UNIFIL
contingent leadership and performance, saying they avoided
conducting searches in their area of responsibility. He
would like to mix French and other UNIFIL forces, to improve
performance. Murr was complimentary of UNIFIL Commander
General Claudio Graziano, supporting his extension from
January 2010 for another year. Murr said he was meeting
UNSCOL Michael Williams and Graziano on July 27; the next
tripartite meeting (UNIFIL-LAF-IDF) was scheduled for July

28.

BERRI NO LONGER DEMANDING
BLOCKING THIRD?
--------------


20. (C) Hamdan hinted that Speaker Berri had dropped his
demand for a blocking third and conveyed Berri's optimism
that there were "no obstacles" to cabinet formation. On the
incidents in the south, Hamdan parroted the Lebanese
Mission's letter, describing the weapons cache as
Hebrew-inscribed munitions dating back to the South Lebanon
Army in 2000. He added that Hizballah does not use the types
of weapons found in the cache.


21. (C) Hamdan affirmed Berri's support for UNSCR 1701, but
said that UNSCR 1559 was "in the past." He added that Berri
was still holding out for a ceasefire to the 2006
hostilities. Hamdan described that the protests against
UNIFIL (reftel) as out of the ordinary, characterizing the

BEIRUT 00000859 004 OF 004


residents' relations with UNIFIL as "very good."

JUMBLATT CONCERNED ABOUT
SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP,
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
--------------


22. (C) As the only interlocutor who recognized the dangers
of assuming a seat on the UNSC, Jumblatt said, "I wish we did
not have this poisoned gift, but Saad and the others really
want it." On the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),
Jumblatt repeated his fear that any indictments would cause a
civil war. He suggested the STL delay indictments or the
United States "quietly" use the indictments as a bargaining
chip with Syria. Shapiro assured Jumblatt that the USG would
not make any deals with Syria at Lebanon's expense, and that
the STL was non-negotiable.


23. (U) NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North
Africa Dan Shapiro has cleared this cable.
HERBOL