LEBANON: MARCH 14 FIGURES STILL CAUTIOUSLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000809

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 FIGURES STILL CAUTIOUSLY
OPTIMISTIC CABINET FORMATION POSSIBLE "IN A FEW WEEKS"

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) March 14 contacts this week were cautiously optimistic
that Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri would ultimately
come to agreement with Hizballah and opposition Christian
leader Michel Aoun on the formation of a government.
However, they said, it was unrealistic to expect a new
cabinet before the end of July due to ongoing negotiations on
the cabinet formulation and criteria for the ministers. The
delay has not weakened Saad Hariri's position (yet),they
say, but conceding on the blocking third would. March 14
contacts were concerned, however, that the longer the process
took, the more difficult it would become to overcome
sectarian equities. Presidential Advisor Naji Abi Assi
confirmed that President Michel Sleiman did not yet feel a
"sense of urgency" to intervene. Names of potential
candidates for certain ministries, including current
caretaker Ministers Elias Murr (Defense) and Ziad Baroud
(Interior) retaining their positions, have begun to emerge,
although nothing is final. Our interlocutors were waiting to
hear Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's speech the evening of
July 17 (septel) for clues about the position of Hizballah,
and its allies Iran and Syria, on the government formation
process. The greatest worry expressed by our interlocutors
was the negative impact on Lebanon if any regional
instability, involving Israel, Hizballah or Syria, developed.
Although negotiations seem to be moving forward -- albeit
slowly -- our interlocutors are resigned to saying that
Hariri's credibility and swiftness of government formation
are directly linked, for better or worse, to the Syrian-Saudi
relationship and the actions of Hizballah. End summary.

DELAY DOESN'T WEAKEN SAAD
BUT CONCEDING ON "BLOCKING
THIRD" WILL
--------------


2. (C) Advisor to PM-designate Saad Hariri, Nader Hariri
reported to the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief July 17 that
none of the March 8 parties had yet presented lists of
ministerial candidates or desired ministries to Hariri.
Gebran Bassil (of Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement)
continues in a vicious circle of discussing proportional
representation, while Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri has
relayed that he will accept "whatever Syria tells him."
Hizballah, Nader said, has remained consistent on the need
for a blocking third, although the new concept of a "king
minister" (an "eleventh minister" who would fall under
President Sleiman's ministerial bloc) is now being discussed.
Saad Hariri has pushed March 8 to agree on ten ministers now
and hold the issue of the eleventh minister until the end,
but his interlocutors have resisted this tactic. In the end,
the acceptability of the "king minister" concept depends on
who the candidate would be ("a credible Shia"). As for
internal negotiations with the March 14 coalition, Saad
Hariri is pushing for new faces such as young professionals
or women instead of the MPs who "already got their reward."
Saad had patience, Nader emphasized. Hariri is not "squeezed
on time" and will lose face only by conceding to the blocking
third, not by taking his time in negotiations with the
opposition, Nader commented.


3. (C) According to his March 14 allies, Hariri could not
(and should not) back down on his insistence that the
majority would obtain 16 seats in a 30-seat cabinet; of the
remainder, 10 seats would go to the opposition and four to
President Michel Sleiman. March 14 allies allege that
opposition Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri's July 15
meeting with Saad Hariri was a publicity ploy to pressure
Hariri to form a government before the end of July.


4. (C) At a luncheon hosted by the Ambassador on July 16,
several March 14 coalition notables, including MP Marwan

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Hamadeh (PSP),Fares Souaid and Michel Mecateff (March 14
Secretariat),Elie Khoury (Lebanese Forces),and Future Party
activist Moustafa Allouch (Tripoli),were cautiously
optimistic that a new government would be formed in a few
weeks, although unlikely before the end of July. Saad
Hariri, they agreed, was making slow, but steady progress in
his consultations with the Hizballah-led opposition.
However, there were complications, they admitted. March 14
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's statements and overtures to
Syrian allies and opposition Druze figures were not helpful,
they claimed. MP Dory Chamoun commented July 15 that
Jumblatt was making calculations based on the "need to
protect his Druze constituency." Despite Jumblatt's actions
to protect what he perceives as Druze strategic interests,
our March 14 contacts believed Jumblatt remained part of the
coalition (a view Nader Hariri shared).


5. (C) Marwan Hamadeh and others at the luncheon asserted
that although both the March 14 majority and the opposition
parties were holding on to their negotiating positions, the
general public was not particularly interested in the
government formation process, although they would bear the
consequences in terms of lack of infrastructure and services
the longer the process took. Our March 14 contacts said they
would listen carefully to Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah's
speech the evening of July 17 (septel) for clues about the
positions of Hizballah and its allies, Iran and Syria, about
the government formation process. They also relayed that any
signs of regional instability involving Hizballah, Israel, or
Syria would "bring calamity" to Lebanon.

SAUDI-SYRIAN TRACK FROZEN
PENDING SYRIAN CONCESSIONS
--------------


6. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador July 17, Samir Geagea
confidant Elie Khoury presented Geagea's proposal to
encourage the Saudis to slow their dtente with Syria at any
sign of Syrian intransigence. He asserted that Saudi
miscalculations with regard to Syria had cost PM-designate
Hariri momentum and status. Any Saudi sticks applied to the
Syrians should be indirect, Khoury advised. The Syrian-Saudi
track was frozen, in Nader Hariri's view. Saad Hariri's
possible visit to Syria would depend on Syrian agreement on
border demarcation, detainees, the elimination of the
Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council, eliminating weapons at
Palestinian military bases along the border, and no Syrian
political interference in Lebanese cabinet formation. The
Saudis had conveyed this message to the Syrians, and "the
ball is in the Syrians' court," Nader said. Saad Hariri
could be flexible on the timing of a visit to Damascus if the
Syrians concede enough, he added. If there is no deal, there
will be no visit.

SLEIMAN DOESN'T FEEL SENSE
OF URGENCY -- YET
--------------


7. (C) Presidential Advisor Naji Abi Assi told us July 13
that President Michel Sleiman did not feel a "sense of
urgency" to intervene in the cabinet formation process yet.
Sleiman's priority was an agreement between the two
coalitions that would be good for Lebanon's stability, Abi
Assi reported. He added that Sleiman was less inclined to
argue for a certain number of cabinet ministers for himself
or the distribution of seats between the two sides. However,
Abi Assi was advising Sleiman to establish criteria with Saad
Hariri for who would qualify as a minister. For example, he
said, Sleiman and Hariri might agree that if a ministerial
candidate lost his parliamentary electoral race, then he
would be ineligible for a cabinet position. (Note: This
proposal directly targets keeping Michel Aoun's son-in-law
and current caretaker Minister of Telecommunications, Gebran
Bassil, who lost his electoral race, out of the cabinet. End
note.) Sleiman and Hariri had not yet agreed to specific
criteria, Abi Assi insisted.

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COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Michel Aoun's demands for a blocking third and
Hizballah's calls for a "true partnership" have slowed the
process considerably. It may be a positive sign, however,
that names of candidates for specific ministerial positions
are emerging. Some of the more serious names of candidates
we have heard include current Ministers Elias Murr (Defense)
and Ziad Baroud (Interior) retaining their positions. Others
include opposition-aligned Mahmoud Berri (brother of Nabih
Berri) as potential Minister of Foreign Affairs and Nadim
Munlah (aligned with Hariri's Future Movement) as a Minister
of Finance.


9. (C) While the numbers game continues, and it is far from
decided who the ministers will be, our interlocutors insist
that the decision on Lebanon's government formation will be
decided by external factors, such as the Syrian-Saudi
relationship, for better or for worse. Until that element
crystallizes, they say, then the numbers game will continue.
We are reminded of the long summer weeks in 2008 when Aoun's
and Hizballah's demands were stalling cabinet formation. At
nearly three weeks, it is important to note that cabinet
formation in 2008 lasted seven weeks after the Doha agreement
had already determined the cabinet distribution. End comment.
SISON