Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT805
2009-07-17 06:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: HARIRI TELLS PETRAEUS ASSISTANCE FOR LAF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ECON OVIP MASS MCAP LE SY SA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9778
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0805/01 1980641
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170641Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5338
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3460
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3987
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 4011
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000805 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
PARIS FOR RWALLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON OVIP MASS MCAP LE SY SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI TELLS PETRAEUS ASSISTANCE FOR LAF
CRUCIAL TO COUNTERING HIZBALLAH

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
----------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000805

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
PARIS FOR RWALLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON OVIP MASS MCAP LE SY SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI TELLS PETRAEUS ASSISTANCE FOR LAF
CRUCIAL TO COUNTERING HIZBALLAH

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a June 30 meeting with Commanding General U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) General David Petraeus, Prime
Minister-Designate Saad Hariri said he had begun
consultations on government formation, and though the
opposition and the Syrians would make the process difficult,
he was confident he would succeed. He stressed that his
government would be committed to strengthening state
institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
the Internal Security Forces (ISF),in an effort to counter
Hizballah, and said he planned to work with Arab partners, in
addition to the United States, to equip the security forces
quickly. General Petraeus highlighted the continued U.S.
commitment to assisting the LAF, and outlined his ideas on
ways to move the military-to-military relationship forward.
He encouraged Hariri to work in close consultation with the
U.S. on military planning, particularly with respect to
equipment procurement. Hariri noted that he intended to
pursue economic reforms in parallel to his work on the
military and police. He said the June 28 Sunni-Shia clashes
in West Beirut were not isolated incidents, but were intended
to send a political message to his political coalition. End
summary.

HARIRI WANTS TO EQUIP THE ARMY,
PETRAEUS PUSHES FOR REALISM
--------------


2. (C) U.S. CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus,
accompanied by the Ambassador, the CENTCOM delegation, and

Embassy staff, called on Prime Minister-Designate Saad Hariri
at Qoreitem June 30. Hariri advisors Nader Hariri and Amal
Mudallali also attended the meeting. Hariri noted he had had
22 consultation meetings to discuss government formation on
June 29, and heard many different visions of how the next
government should take shape. He said his objective is to
form a national unity government, but without a blocking
minority for the opposition. He relayed that the Saudis had
been actively engaging the Syrians, both before and after the
elections, to keep things calm in Lebanon. According to
Hariri, however, the Syrians and their Lebanese allies were
still a problem, and would make impossible demands to
complicate the cabinet formation process. Despite this, he
was confident he would succeed.


3. (C) Hariri posited that the issue of Hizballah's weapons
was not one that could be solved internally in Lebanon,
because of its "regional dimension." He praised President
Obama's appointment of Senator Mitchell as Special Envoy for
Middle East Peace, saying, "The closer we come to peace, the
less Hizballah will be able to do." While awaiting progress
toward peace among Lebanon's neighbors, Hariri believed the
best strategy for Lebanon was to strengthen the central
government and state institutions, particularly the security
services. He noted that Hizballah often justifies its
weapons by claiming the LAF and ISF are not strong enough to
defend Lebanese sovereignty, and in fact, said Hariri, the
claims are correct. For this reason, he insisted he would
dedicate significant time and effort as head of the next
government to "beef up" the LAF and the ISF and equip the LAF
with small tanks, vehicles, helicopters, and other equipment
crucial to their response capabilities. He also expressed
his desire to acquire fixed-wing aircraft for the LAF.


4. (C) While he appreciated ongoing U.S. assistance to the
LAF, Hariri noted that the problem with the U.S. procurement
process was that it was slow, and he expected further delays
because of the need to gain congressional approval for the
transfer of certain technologies to Lebanon, to ensure that
Israel's qualitative military advantage is not threatened.
In any event, said Hariri, his government plans to ask Arab

BEIRUT 00000805 002 OF 003


nations to provide Lebanon with funds. Lebanon would, he
suggested, procure equipment elsewhere if the U.S. system was
not responsive. He looked to the U.S. administration to
defend Lebanon's equipment purchases with those in Washington
and elsewhere who might object. Hariri stated that he was
"planning to move quite fast" and added that the way he saw
it, Lebanon needs a Marshall Plan for all of its equipment,
including uniforms and replacement carbines for the circa
1960s M16s in use by the LAF.


5. (C) General Petraeus affirmed the U.S. commitment to
continued and increased assistance to the LAF, and stressed
that multiple U.S. agencies were working together on a
careful examination of how to move the program forward. He
said he understood the Lebanese request for close air
support, and the U.S. was looking closely at what options
presented the best combination of capability and
affordability, both in terms of the equipment price and
operational costs. He revealed that he planned to discuss
with interim Defense Minister Murr and LAF Commander General
Kahwagi the possibility of Lebanon acquiring OV-10 aircraft
for close air support. The dozen OV-10 aircraft (which had
been used by the Deparatment of State in counternarcotics
operations) provided a practical, inexpensive option for
close air support in counterterrorism and internal security
operations (such as the LAF's 2007 engagement at Nahr
al-Barid). General Petraeus also put forth possible options
for adding light attack helicopters to Lebanon's fleet.

PETRAEUS: CONSULT WITH US BEFORE OBTAINING NON-USG EQUIPMENT
--------------


6. (C) General Petraeus told Hariri he was enthusiastic that
Hariri may be able to generate funding from certain of his
"Arab brothers" for equipment purchases, but underscored the
importance of a realistic procurement plan, based on
Lebanon's needs. He advised Hariri to consult closely with
the United States on compatibility with U.S.-procured
equipment, and encouraged him to examine fully the
maintenance and operating expenses of equipment offered by
other countries, particularly given Lebanon's infrastructure
and resource constraints. He pointed specifically to the 10
MIG-29 aircraft Russia offered to the LAF in December 2008,
saying they are so expensive to operate that the Lebanese
would likely only be able to fl them a few hours per year --
"enough for a parae." He emphasized that the Lebanese
needed to esure they considered the costs of military
hardware, maintenance, repair parts, tools, and diagnostic
equipment. Although Hariri stated that he wanted to acquire
small tanks, Petraeus told him he should take a hard look at
wheeled armored behicles with a vee-shaped hull, a lesson the
U.S. Armed Forces had learned over the previous seven years
of combat. Meanwhile, Petraeus stressed, the LAF was
particularly in need of good training, in all aspects of
military operation, since high-tech equipment is only as good
as the people running it. Because of the training
requirement, Petraeus noted that he wanted to construct a
small compound which would allow Central Command to expand
training for the LAF. The Ambassador also noted the
importance of strengthening the ISF so that, over time, it
would assume the policing tasks being performed by the
Lebanese Army.

PLANS FOR THE ECONOMY
--------------


7. (SBU) Hariri stated that in parallel with his efforts to
build up the security services, he plans to pursue economic
reforms, streamline business procedures, and improve the
investment climate. He stressed the need for investment in
electricity and water, and noted that $3.3 billion in money
pledged for infrastructure investment at the 2007 Paris III
donor conference was still not disbursed, pending reforms by
the government. To follow the Paris III portfolio, Hariri
said he would insist that the new Finance Minister come from

BEIRUT 00000805 003 OF 003


his own Future Movement.

SUNNI-SHIA CLASHES
--------------


8. (C) Hariri assessed that the violent clashes June 28 in
West Beirut between members of his Future Movement and Nabih
Berri's Amal party were not "isolated incidents," but in fact
reflected a targeted political decision. Fortunately, he
added, the army responded strongly, ordering its soldiers to
shoot any armed men they spotted in the streets, and the
situation calmed. Nonetheless, he believed the clashes were
unacceptable, saying, "I won't start my watch with things
like this."


9. (U) General Petraeus has cleared this cable.
SISON