LEBANON: CHRISTIAN MINISTERS REJECT SAUDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000771

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC SA SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: CHRISTIAN MINISTERS REJECT SAUDI
INVOLVEMENT, ACCEPT IT WILL TAKE TIME TO FORM CABINET

REF: A. BEIRUT 768

B. BEIRUT 764

C. BEIRUT 746

D. BEIRUT 263

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar and Information
Minister Tarek Mitri, in separate meetings with the
Ambassador on July 9, criticized the Saudis for involving the
Syrians in the Lebanese political process. Mitri said he
believed the Saudis realized they made a mistake and that
they would stop pressuring Lebanon to participate in their
reconciliation efforts with Syria. Both Najjar and Mitri
expected it would take some time to form a cabinet, and that
this was preferable to a quick resolution which could trigger
violence in the streets. Asserting that Hizballah and the
Syrians were stalling the formation, they discussed the
possible guarantees Hizballah and the Syrians would look for
in order to allow the formation to proceed.


2. (C) Throughout the week, PM-designate Saad Hariri was busy
quietly consulting with various opposition groups and no
agreement for splitting the seats had been reached.
Meanwhile, there have been discussions among a few March 14
Christian members to form an independent Christian coalition
to counter the larger Christian parties. End summary.

SAUDIS MADE A BIG MISTAKE,
BUT IT'S OVER NOW
--------------


3. (C) On July 9, the Ambassador, accompanied by PolOff, met
Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar and Information Minister
Tarek Mitri -- both pro-March 14 Christians -- at their
respective ministries. In line with what several political
figures have been saying (Ref B),both ministers criticized
the Saudis for involving the Syrians in the Lebanese
political process (Ref C). Najjar accused the Saudis of
empowering the Syrians and insisted, "We won the elections,
but the Syrians are acting as if they are the victors."


4. (C) It would be very difficult for both the Sunnis and the
Christians to understand and accept Lebanese rapprochement,
and specifically a trip by PM-designate Saad Hariri to Syria,
before or immediately after cabinet formation, Najjar said.
Playing off of a popular campaign billboard during the
elections, he joked that the Saudis should "Be beautiful and
shut up," -- send money to Beirut but not meddle in the
politics.


5. (C) According to Mitri, the Saudis erred by not clarifying
to the Syrians what they could expect to receive in exchange
for a smooth premiership for Hariri, which he believed was
the Saudis' ultimate intention. He said it quickly became
clear that the Syrians were not prepared to concede anything,
such as demarcating the border with Lebanon. Mitri believed
the Saudis would stop pressuring Lebanon to participate, but
would continue to pursue its own reconciliation with Syria.

FORMING A CABINET WILL,
AND SHOULD, TAKE TIME
--------------


6. (C) Recounting his conversation with President Sleiman the
previous day, Najjar said that President Sleiman is "not
anxious to quickly form a new government." President Sleiman
reportedly warned, "If we move too fast, there would be
fighting in the streets." (Note: According to Najjar,
however, President Sleiman telephoned President Asad to
discuss government formation following Commanding General of
U.S. Central Command David Petraeus' June 30 trip to Beirut,
during which he said he hoped for a quick cabinet formation.

BEIRUT 00000771 002 OF 003


End note.)


7. (C) If guarantees were made to Syria and Hizballah, Najjar
predicted, then the door would be open to forming the
cabinet. He discounted any leniency for Syria by the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) as one such guarantee because the
STL is "out of Lebanese hands." He supposed that guarantees
could include a blocking third in the cabinet, the
appointment of a minister who has good relations with Syria,
a visit from Hariri to Damascus, or guarantees not to address
Hizballah's weapons.


8. (C) Acknowledging that President Sleiman was hoping to
expand his powers in part through naming five or six
ministers (compared to the three he named in the current
cabinet),Najjar assessed that the Sunnis would not accept a
president more powerful than the prime minister. He further
stated, "The Christians do not have the solution in their
hands -- it rests with the Muslims."


9. (C) In the meantime, Najjar said, everyone fears
Hizballah, even Speaker Nabih Berri (who he said would not
stray from his alliance with Hizballah) and Lebanese Armed
Forces Commander Jean Kahwagi. All it takes is one Hizballah
minister to derail government initiatives, Najjar complained,
and the instant he agrees to something, everything moves
forward immediately. (Note: Najjar was referring to Labor
Minister Mohammed Fneish, Hizballah's sole minister, who
turned off Najjar's attempts to sign an MOU with the STL with
a mere, "Let us study this further" statement, Ref D. End
note.)


10. (C) Expecting the cabinet formation process to continue
for a few more weeks, Mitri was unconcerned if the cabinet
was not formed immediately. Mitri noted that Hariri has kept
his cards close to his chest during the ongoing consultation
process, which he determined was a good approach. He noted
that Hariri has been in listening mode with the various
opposition groups, some of which are making "impossible"
demands, referring to Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel
Aoun's request for proportional representation in cabinet
that mirrors what his bloc holds in parliament.


11. (C) Hizballah is not insisting on a blocking third,
instead asking for a "blocking third or its equivalent," and
wants to be a part of the cabinet, Mitri surmised.
Attempting to define "its equivalent," Mitri suggested it
could refer to commitments from President Sleiman to refrain
from putting controversial issues to vote, such as
Hizballah's arms, foreign policy issues, or Lebanese
participation in Middle East peace. He expected the next
ministerial statement to resemble the statement issued in
July 2008.


12. (C) In a separate July 9 meeting, President Sleiman's
aide General Hannaoui said that President Sleiman was not
opposed to giving the opposition the blocking third, but that
he did not expect March 14 to accept this formula. Hannaoui
said a 10-5-15 split (10 for the opposition, 5 for the
President, and 15 for March 14) was "ideal," but that Hariri
was opposed.


13. (C) Hannoui added that President Sleiman refused the
proposal whereby two out of five ministers allocated to the
President would be one individual close to March 14, and one
close to March 8. According to Hannoui, March 8 opposes
Defense Minister Elias Murr staying on in his position.
Mitri said he believed President Sleiman would keep both Murr
and Interior Minister Ziad Baroud in their positions. (Note:
It is unclear whether Baroud would choose to remain, if
asked, Ref A. End note.)

SLEIMAN SERIOUS ABOUT
NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


BEIRUT 00000771 003 OF 003



14. (C) Minister Mitri relayed that President Sleiman is keen
on heading the National Dialogue and will continue to hold
sessions once the cabinet is formed. He said that the
President tasked experts to identify ways to move the
National Dialogue process along. If Hizballah sought
commitments from President Sleiman to keep controversial
issues out of the cabinet, Mitri proposed that the National
Dialogue would become the venue for these issues, but
Hizballah could still have a veto power.

FRENCH PROMISES TO SYRIA...
SUSPICION OF QATARI BEHAVIOR
--------------


15. (C) Minister Najjar was wary of Qatari support for Syria
at the expense of Lebanon, saying that the Qataris pay money
directly to Syrian President Bashar Asad and his family.
Both Najjar and Mitri wondered what the French were working
on with the Syrians and the Qataris believing the French
promised Syria and Qatar something before the parliamentary
elections in excange for stability in Lebanon.

LEBANON SHOULD BE A
SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER
--------------


16. (C) Without knowing who the next Foreign Minister will
be, Mitri said there could be challenges within the GOL
should it become a non-permanent member of the UN Security
Council in 2010. However, he said, Lebanon could not
withdraw its candidacy now because that would be "tantamount
to being a failed state." He explained that Lebanon's voting
decisions in the Security Council do not require cabinet
approval, but Hizballah could (and would) find a way to
impose its will on how Lebanon votes. (Note: Mitri
referenced the harsh criticism targeting him by the
opposition when he attended the Annapolis conference in 2007
as Acting FM, despite the resignation of FM and the absence
of any cabinet approval requirement for his attendance. End
note.)

INDEPENDENT CHRISTIAN COALITION?
--------------


17. (C) MP Dory Chamoun told us July 8 that several
independent figures, including MP Boutros Harb and head of
National Bloc party Carlos Edde approached him to form an
"independent Christian" coalition. Chamoun said that Harb
and the others felt threatened by larger Christian parties,
namely Lebanese Forces, Kataeb, and Free Patriotic Movement,
and are seeking to create a coalition to ensure their
survival.


18. (C) Mitri also told us that he expected some shifting
alliances, but not until the cabinet was formed. He
attributed some realignment among the blocs because of the
National Dialogue, as participation hinges on the size of the
parliamentary bloc.
SISON