LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS TO MEET IN DAMASCUS ONLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000746

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR UNSC SA SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS TO MEET IN DAMASCUS ONLY
AFTER AGREEMENT ON NEW GOVERNMENT

REF: BEIRUT 724

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) PM-designate Saad Hariri has been under
(well-intentioned) pressure from the Saudi leadership for a
week to agree to participate in an as-yet unscheduled
Saudi-Syria summit in Damascus. He told the Ambassador July
6 that he is willing to do so, along with President Sliman,
to support Saudi-Syrian reconciliation andimproving
Lebanese-Syrian relations, but would prefer to wait until
after the Lebanese government is agreed. There has also been
discussion of Saad possibly travelling to Damascus after an
agreement on government formation is reached but before the
government has actually been formed.


2. (C) Saad's March 14 allies tell us they have no problem
with the Saudi efforts, but are urging Saad to avoid a
meeting in Damascus before cabinet formation. Meeting in
Saudi Arabia or elsewhere would be better, they say, to avoid
sending a signal that agreement on a new Lebanese cabinet
must pass through Damascus. End summary.

SAAD WILLING TO GO TO DAMASCUS,
ATTEMPTING TO DELINK CABINET FORMATION
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador met with PM-designate Saad Hariri July
1 and again on July 6 to discuss the question of Saad
travelling to Damascus prior to formation of a new Lebanese
cabinet to participate in a summit involving Saudi King
Abdullah, Syrian president Asad and President Sleiman.
Hariri told Ambassador that he was "under pressure" to attend
such a meeting in Damascus. The Saudi intent was a
well-intentioned one, Saad and his supporters note, although
the optic of the PM-designate travelling to Damascus has
upset many in Lebanon's Sunni and Christian communities.


4. (C) On July 6, Hariri noted to Ambassador that the Saudi
pressure had eased compared to a few days before and
confirmed that he committed "in principle" to go to Damascus.
While there is no doubt Hariri would attend if asked to by
the King, he told the Ambassador that his Sunni supporters
would react negatively to a visit whether he goes to Damascus
"in two days or in two months."


5. (C) The recent flurry of activity began June 29 when
former Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon and current Saudi Minister
of State for Information Abdelaziz Khoja came to Beirut to
deliver the message from Saudi King Abdullah that Hariri
should join the King's upcoming (but yet-to-be scheduled)
meeting with Asad in Damascus. During his July 1 meeting
with the Ambassador, Hariri was visibly stressed by the
messages he had received and traveled to Jeddah the evening
of July 1-2 to meet King Abdullah. Following his return to
Beirut, Hariri's public statements emphasized that the
formation of the next government was "strictly a Lebanese
affair." He did, however, note that he hoped for "the best
ties" with Syria "when the time was right." A more relaxed
Saad noted to Ambassador on July 6 that President Sleiman and
his March 14 allies were being helpful and supportive. He
continues to negotiate with Lebanese political leaders on
government formation and is scheduled to meet with Aoun
son-in-law Gibran Bassil July 7. Another meeting will occur
soon with Hizballah, Saad said, although not at the Nasrallah
level. The issue of the blocking third remains problematic.


6. (C) Nader Hariri, advisor to Saad, disclosed to DCM on
July 3 that Saad would seek agreement from the Syrians on
eliminating the Higher Lebanese-Syrian Commission, removing
the weapons in Palestinian military bases, demarcating the
Syrian-Lebanese border, and not imposing the "blocking third"
veto in Lebanon's cabinet.

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MARCH 14 CHRISTIANS OPPOSE ANY
MEETING BEFORE CABINET FORMATION
--------------


7. (C) The activity with the Saudis has kept Saad from moving
ahead more quickly on cabinet formation negotiations. While
Saad is meeting with parliamentary bloc leaders, as well as
with President Sleiman, no agreement on distribution of
cabinet seats or particular ministers has yet been reached.
There is much speculation on 16-10-4 and other cabinet
scenarios. Local media have widely covered the story of a
possible Saudi-Syrian-Lebanese summit, and many political
observers believe Hariri will need to obtain Syrian
concurrence before all sides in Lebanon will agree on a
cabinet.


8. (C) Hariri's March 14 Christian allies Amine Gemayel,
Samir Geagea, Boutros Harb, and Michel Pharaon separately
told the Ambassador on July 2 that they encouraged Saad to
convey to the Saudis that his Christian partners opposed a
Lebanese-Saudi-Syrian meeting in Damascus prior to cabinet
formation. "Blame it on the Christians," they urged, in
order that Hariri not be seen as stiffing the King's request.



9. (C) State Minister Nassib Lahoud, who has extensive
business contacts in Saudi Arabia, told the DCM on July 6 he
interprets the Saudi prodding with Hariri as an effort to
"create a good environment for Saad." He thought the Saudis
were pushing Saad to "normalize" Lebanon's relations with
Syria and view reconciliation with Syria as a way to reduce
Hizballah's demands for a blocking third in the cabinet and
other demands on the new Lebanese government. Separately,
local media reported on July 6 that Hizballah SYG Hassan
Nasrallah traveled to Damascus to discuss Saudi-Syrian
reconciliation.


10. (C) In July 3 and 4 meetings with the Ambassador, Samir
Geagea urged that the Saudis condition their reconciliation
with the Syrians on the completion of the formation of a
Lebanese government. "The Saudi goodwill effort -- asking
Syria to facilitate Lebanese government formation -- was
misguided," Geagea declared. He said that asking for any
Syrian input, positive or negative, was making life harder
for Hariri. The Saudi efforts to involve the Syrians "robs
March 14 of its victory."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) No one seems to doubt that the Saudis are
well-intentioned in this effort they have launched, even if
there is disagreement over the tactics. There is a strong
personal element to any contact by Hariri with Syria. He and
many of his supporters blame the Syrians for the 2005
assassination of Hariri's father and resent the Syrian
30-year occupation. The inclusion of President Sleiman in
such a reconciliation helps to focus the meeting on
Lebanese-Syrian official relations and moves the light off of
Hariri's personal stance against Syria. Hariri also needs to
watch out for any Syrian effort to bring the Special Tribunal
into the deal. The Syrian leverage is strongest if they
hinder cabinet formation until they feel comfortable with
Saad's approach on the Special Tribunal.


12. (C) Most Lebanese seem ambivalent about the blatant
meddling in Lebanese affairs by Syria and Saudi Arabia.
After 15 years of civil war 1975-1990, and 30 years of Syrian
occupation until 2005, many Lebanese seem to accept the idea
of a summit meeting of foreign powers at which Lebanon's fate
will be agreed as necessary for stability in the country.
While many would prefer that Hariri take steps to uphold
Lebanese sovereignty, such as not travel to Damascus to
discuss Lebanon's new government, they are willing to put
that on the back-burner in return for stability. In the

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meantime, Saad believes it important that the Saudis continue
to make clear to Bashar al Asad that Saudi-Syrian
reconciliation can only occur if Syria avoids interfering in
Lebanon. The problem, he complains, is that "Bashar is a
liar." Nonetheless, Saad appears resolute in his
determination to form a new government, in spite of the
difficult path ahead. End comment.

SISON