Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT647
2009-06-10 15:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR S/E GEORGE MITCHELL'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC MARR MOPS LE IS SY IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5467
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0647/01 1611501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101501Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5096
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3387
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3906
RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000647 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
PARIS FOR RWALLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MARR MOPS LE IS SY IR
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR S/E GEORGE MITCHELL'S
JUNE 12 VISIT

REF: A. BEIRUT 634

B. BEIRUT 627

C. BEIRUT 597

D. BEIRUT 596

E. BEIRUT 593

F. BEIRUT 570

G. ANKARA 633

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000647

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
PARIS FOR RWALLER
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC MARR MOPS LE IS SY IR
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR S/E GEORGE MITCHELL'S
JUNE 12 VISIT

REF: A. BEIRUT 634

B. BEIRUT 627

C. BEIRUT 597

D. BEIRUT 596

E. BEIRUT 593

F. BEIRUT 570

G. ANKARA 633

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Embassy Beirut welcomes your visit, which comes just
five days after Lebanon's June 7 parliamentary elections in
which the pro-western March 14 coalition won the majority by
an unexpected margin. Lebanese officials have eagerly
anticipated your trip to Beirut since your appointment was
announced on January 21. During your visit, you will meet
with President Michel Sleiman, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora,
March 14 majority leader Saad Hariri, and opposition-aligned
Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh.


2. (C) Officials and influential Lebanese opinion makers
single out the Arab-Israeli conflict as the biggest obstacle
to solving other regional issues, including disarming
Hizballah and halting the perceived expansion of Iranian
influence. The Lebanese argue that they are committed to the
Palestinian "right of return" and are opposed to any
resolution that would force the permanent resettlement
("tawteen") of Lebanon's 400,000 Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon, fearing that it would upset Lebanon's delicate
confessional balance. Lebanese interlocutors will likely
praise the constructive role of the UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL),most recently evidenced during the
2008/2009 Gaza conflict. Israel, however, is still
officially the GOL's enemy, with officials like PM Siniora
saying Lebanon will be the last in the region to sign a peace
agreement with Israel, especially while Israel occupies

northern Ghajar village and Shebaa Farms. President Sleiman
supports full implementation of 1701 and has hinted at the
possibility of indirect talks with Israel if certain
conditions are met, though probably "not now."
Lebanese-Syrian relations are in their nascent stages; first
ever diplomatic ties were established in October 2008.
Little progress has been made in the implementation of
relevant UNSCRs which call for the demarcation of the
Lebanon-Syria border and calls for an end to weapons
smuggling. End summary.

MARCH 14 WINS
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
--------------


3. (C) The March 14 coalition won an unexpected 71 out of 128
parliamentary seats in the June 7 elections (Ref A). Prior
to the elections, most political observers had forecast a
close race with a difference of no more than two to four
seats between the majority and the opposition. Although the
results handed a clear victory to the
pro-western/anti-Hizballah coalition, forming a government
will be the next hurdle. Cabinet formation cannot begin
until a new Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister are
selected, per constitutional procedures, but negotiations are
likely to begin soon. Opposition parties, including
Hizballah and its ally, Christian leader Michel Aoun's Free
Patriotic Movement, will likely insist on retaining a
"blocking third" in the cabinet. The opposition gained a
blocking third during negotiations for the May 2008 Doha
Agreement that ended an extended period of political
stalemate and violence. They may push hard to retain it.


4. (C) March 14 majority leader Saad Hariri wants to become
Prime Minister, and likely will. His coalition had a
challenging time during the campaign period keeping the March
14 infighting and disagreements out of public view. Although

BEIRUT 00000647 002 OF 003


Hariri has a cadre of advisors for political matters, he does
not have a team of strong advisors for policy matters such as
foreign affairs. Hariri maintains an anti-Syrian position and
often requests enhanced U.S. military assistance for the
Lebanese Armed Forces to be used as a deterrent to Syria. He
has rarely commented on the Arab-Israeli conflict, other than
to say that the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, proposed by
then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, should be used as a basis
to achieve regional peace. He also supports full
implementation of UNSCR 1701 and the UN Special Tribunal for
Lebanon (charged with investigating the 2005 assassination of
his father, former PM Rafiq Hariri).


5. (C) It is well known that Hariri inherited his position as
the Sunni leader in Lebanon with the backing of Saudi Arabia.
He is known to have close relations with Saudi royalty, who
could maintain a significant influence on Hariri in the next
government, especially regarding regional issues.

LEBANESE FOR
ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE...
--------------


6. (C) The GOL supports the Arab Peace Initiative and has a
vested interest in a peaceful outcome. Other Lebanese
interlocutors, including President Sleiman, current PM Fouad
Siniora, and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, raise the
need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in nearly
every meeting. During Vice President Biden's May 22 visit to
Beirut, the GOL's message was that the conflict must be
resolved immediately (Refs C-E). Vice President Biden
reaffirmed U.S. commitment to achieving Middle East peace,
but called on Lebanese and Arab interlocutors to play a
constructive role.


7. (C) Your appointment as Special Envoy was viewed here as a
positive signal that the Obama administration was focused on
the issue. Lebanese officials argue that Iran and its
allies, especially Hizballah and Hamas, have manipulated the
conflict for its own gain by claiming itself the "protector"
of the Palestinian people.


8. (C) President Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo was perceived
as a "good first step" (Ref B). Many Lebanese were
disappointed that the speech did not outline specific actions
or policy to achieve peace. However, the clear articulation
of the U.S. position on Israeli settlements and the call for
Arab responsibility resonated well in Lebanon. The specific
reference made to Lebanon's Maronite population in the speech
did not play particularly well here. (Several interlocutors
complained it compared the Maronites to Coptic Christians in
Egypt, a persecuted group. By contrast, Maronites are a part
of Lebanon's social fabric, they said to us.)

...BUT AGAINST "TAWTEEN"
--------------


9. (C) The GOL remains opposed to the permanent resettlement
("tawteen") of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon has
twelve Palestinian refugee camps with a population,
officially, of 400,000 Palestinians. It would be politically
unpalatable for the GOL to support such a position because of
sensitivities over the need for Lebanon preserve its
precariously constructed confessionally-balanced political
system. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not bestowed the
rights of Lebanese citizenship, including access to work and
education, as in Syria or Jordan.

PRAISE FOR UNIFIL, BUT
ISRAEL IS STILL THE "ENEMY"
--------------


10. (C) The presence of the UN Interim Force for Lebanon
(UNIFIL) has provided an indirect means of communication
between the LAF and the Israeli Defense Forces along the Blue
Line. The GOL has praised the positive role UNIFIL plays in

BEIRUT 00000647 003 OF 003


tripartite working meetings, especially during the 2008/2009
Gaza conflict. Political leaders condemned the rocket
attacks launched from Lebanon into Israel during that
conflict. Sleiman said "I will not allow southern Lebanon to
become a rocket launching pad."


11. (C) President Sleiman supports full implementation of
UNSCR 1701 and has said he would insist on including a
reference to it in the next government's policy statement
(Ref F). However, Israel is officially considered by Lebanon
to be "the enemy." Although 1701 outlines requirements for a
Lebanese-Israeli ceasefire, pending a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace, GOL interlocutors argue that continued
Israeli occupation of northern Ghajar village and Shebaa
Farms and regular Israeli overflights of Lebanon impinge on
Lebanese sovereignty and territory. In a more positive
development, Israel handed over cluster bomb strike data from
the 2006 war to UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities earlier
this year.


12. (C) In an interview aired June 10 on CNN, Saad Hariri
reaffirmed the GOL position that Lebanon would be the last
country in the region to sign a peace deal with Israel.
President Sleiman and PM Siniora have also said the same in
previous meetings, although Sleiman in recent months has
switched from "never" to "not now" when asked about the
possibility of a Lebanese-Israeli track. In meetings with
Turkish officials earlier this year (ref G),when asked if he
would support indirect talks with Israel, Sleiman spelled out
three conditions: that the Israeli government would need to
respect the 1949 armistice agreement, have no expectation of
permanent Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon, and agree to
withdraw from Shebaa Farms.

LEBANESE-SYRIAN RELATIONS
--------------


13. (C) After almost 30 years of Syrian presence in Lebanon,
the Syrian military withdrew in 2005 following Rafiq Hariri's
assassination. Lebanon and Syria formally established
diplomatic relations in October 2008. The two sides exchanged
ambassadors in the spring of 2009. Aside from these modest
steps at normalized relations, Lebanon and Syria have yet to
tackle the myriad bilateral agreements, covering a wide range
of defense, economic, and social issues, signed under the
auspices of the Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council during Syrian
occupation. The GOL, publicly and privately, calls on its
"sisterly neighbor" to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and
independence, while acknowledging the desire to maintain good
relations.


14. (C) On border issues, the GOL and the SARG have engaged
in modest cooperation to add more patrols to certain sections
of the border. However, the borders remain porous. Signs of
implementation of relevant UNSCRs which call for the
delineation of the Lebanon-Syria border, an end to weapons
smuggling, and the disarmament of armed groups in Lebanon,
are lacking. The SARG denies, and the GOL claims not to have
evidence, of weapons smuggling from Syria into Lebanon.
Other major issues the GOL has not tackled yet with Syria
include missing Lebanese detained in Syria and military camps
affiliated with Sunni extremists along the border.
SISON