LEBANON: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN MEETS MARCH 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000592

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2019
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC LE SY IS IR
SUBJECT: LEBANON: VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN MEETS MARCH 14
LEADERS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with visiting Vice President Joe Biden,
senior March 14 leaders thanked the United States for its
continuing strong support for Lebanese sovereignty and
institutions, especially the Lebanese Armed Forces. They
welcomed U.S. efforts to stem the flow of weapons to
Hizballah and said internal Lebanese dialogue about
Hizballah's arms would continue. The Vice President outlined
four steps the United States might take to weaken Hizballah:
continue support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, seek to
exploit signs of Syrian discomfort with Iran, look for
opportunities to weaken Iran's support for Hizballah, and
urge Israel to take steps to improve its relations with
Lebanon. The Lebanese guests welcomed the Vice President's
ideas and expressions of support to strengthen the Lebanese
state.


2. (C) March 14 leaders acknowledged that their coalition
represented disparate, sometimes feuding parts, but declared
that their shared experiences of assassinations and common
values held the group together. On the upcoming
parliamentary election, they asserted that the political mood
was beginning to change in favor of March 14. They cited the
need for U.S. assistance in solving regional issues to help
Lebanon, saying they could handle the work to gain political
success domestically. End summary.


3. (SBU) During his May 22 visit to Beirut, Vice President
Joe Biden met with March 14 coalition leaders Saad Hariri
(Future),Walid Jumblatt (PSP),Samir Geagea (Lebanese
Forces),Amine Gemayel (Kataeb),Nayla Mouawad (MP and former
minister),Boutros Harb (MP and former minister),and Dory
Chamoun (National Liberal Party),for tea at the Mouawad
residence in the Beirut suburb of Brasilia. On the U.S.
side, the Ambassador, National Security Advisor to the Vice
President Antony Blinken, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Joseph McMillan, Senior Advisor to the Vice President
for the Middle East and South Asia Herro Mustafa, National
Security Council Director for Syria, Lebanon and North Africa
Meaghen McDermott, and Embassy notetaker attended the meeting.

STALWART SUPPORT
--------------


4. (C) The Vice President reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to
Lebanese independence and sovereignty. Lebanon was
intentionally his first and only stop in the Middle East,
Biden noted, to illustrate to the world that the United
States believed a strong Lebanese state was key to broader
regional peace. A Middle East peace settlement was difficult
to picture, Biden told the guests, with a fractured Lebanese
state. A strong Lebanese army was critical to enable a
strong Lebanese state to maintain sovereignty over all its
land. The March 14 leaders thanked the Vice President for
the strong U.S. support to Lebanon, and affirmed the key role
that U.S. assistance and political support played in
strengthening the Lebanese state.


5. (C) The Vice President reaffirmed that the U.S. would not
deal with Syria at Lebanon's expense. He noted, however,
that while the United States did not back any particular
political party, it would be difficult to continue the same
level of strong U.S. support to the Lebanese police, army,
and state institutions if Hizballah dominated the June 7
elections.

ELECTIONS: CREATE A NEW BLOCKING THIRD
FOR THE PRESIDENT
--------------


6. (C) Expressing his desire for a March 14 election victory,
Hariri focused on government formation following elections.

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March 14, if the coalition won a majority on June 7, would
propose a "blocking third" of cabinet ministers for the
president, as an alternative to the "blocking third" demanded
by opposition Hizballah and Christian leader Michel Aoun.
Hariri explained, however, that a presidential "blocking
third" would need support from the U.S. and the Arab world.
(Note: Hariri also stressed this presidential "veto power"
in a separate pull-aside with the Vice President. Under this
scenario, President Sleiman would nominate a "swing number"
of four or five cabinet members in the next government,
including key portfolios such as Defense, Interior, and
Justice. This way, neither majority nor opposition would be
able to block government decisions; President Sleiman's
cabinet "bloc" would be able to prevail. Hariri described
this as a "veto within the veto." See paras 16-17. End
note.)


7. (C) March 14 leaders differed on whether Nasrallah's
speeches had provided any electoral boost for March 14.
Mouawad assessed that everyone had "gone a bit too far" in
recent speeches and increased political rhetoric. Harb and
Mouawad opined that the political mood in Lebanon was
changing in March 14's favor, partly because of negative
reaction to the speeches. For his part, Jumblatt said the
impact of Nasrallah's speech on the Christian population was
still unclear.


8. (C) Noting the unlikely collection of figures that
comprised the March 14 coalition, Mouawad pointed to the
shared values, such as democracy and independence, among
them. She noted that the "main cement" that united the
various March 14 leaders assembled in the room, however, was
the common legacy of martyrdom. Each had lost a member of
his/her family in sacrifice for Lebanon. Lebanon relied on
the United States, Mouawad said, to champion these shared
values. Gemayel also noted the shared values and principles
among March 14 leaders.

FACTORS AT PLAY FOR LEBANON:
MILITARY SUPPORT, SYRIA, IRAN, ISRAEL
--------------


9. (C) The Vice President described four actions that the
U.S. hoped to pursue in order to weaken Hizballah. First,
continue to provide military equipment to the Lebanese Army.
This was a necessary defensive measure, although not the
solution by itself, Biden said. Second, continue to urge our
allies in Europe to join us in pressuring Syria to stop
support to Hizballah. This had potential because the Syrians
seemed increasingly uncomfortable with Iran, the Vice
President said. Third, exploit fractures within the Iranian
leadership through U.S. engagement with Tehran. The Vice
President noted that Iran's interest in dialogue with the
U.S. might encourage Tehran to reduce support for Hizballah.
Fourth, encourage the Israeli government to take steps to
help March 14.


10. (C) Lebanese Forces head Samir Geagea agreed that
Hizballah's arms were "the real problem" in Lebanon.
Nasrallah's May 15 and 18 speeches indicated that Hizbalah
viewed as a natural right its ability to "go o the streets"
if the group felt challenged or dsapproved of any action
taken against it. Lebanon would "lose everything" if the
group resorted again to armed violence. MP Boutros Harb said
that Nasrallah's recent speeches had been a "provocation" and
had exposed the "ugly face" of the resistance.


11. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt stressed the importance
of dialogue as the only way to address Hizballah's arms.
Noting that Shebaa Farms was still officially considered
Syrian territory, he argued that the United Nations must
ratify Shebaa as Lebanese land to move the process of
disarming Hizballah forward.


12. (C) Sunni leader Saad Hariri argued that the enemy of any
army is a militia. Lebanon needed a strong security force to
eventually confront Hizballah. In the meantime, Hariri noted
that dialogue with the group would continue -- most likely in
the form of the National Dialogue on the defense strategy --

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while the institution of the Lebanese Army grew stronger.


13. (C) On Syria engagement, Hariri noted the need for a
"plan B" so U.S.-Syrian dialogue would not continue solely
for the sake of dialogue. He stressed that the Syrians
needed to understand that the United States was serious in
its unwillingness to accept current Syrian behavior. Hariri
noted that all regional players would benefit from a
Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. The problem of Hizballah's
arms had international aspects, such as the group's
relationship with Syria and Iran, that required U.S.
assistance, Geagea opined. Harb welcomed U.S. efforts to
curb the flow of arms through Syria to Hizballah. Jumblatt
suggested that Turkey and Saudi Arabia also should engage
Damascus. He supported continuing the normalization of
relations between Lebanon and its Syrian neighbor.

REDUCING ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS
--------------


14. (C) The Vice President noted, and all participants
agreed, that the path to peace in the Middle East centered on
Jerusalem. For Jumblatt, Harb, Mouawad, Geagea, and Gemayel,
the Palestinian-Israeli issue was the biggest issue for
Lebanon. Biden opined that while Lebanon did not need to be
the first country to sit at a negotiation table with Israel,
Beirut must eventually open dialogue with Tel Aviv. Eventual
negotiations with Israel would require a solid and stable
government in Beirut able to maintain sovereignty and control
over the country, Biden reiterated. Harb stressed that a
solution to the Palestinian issue must exclude "tawteen," the
resettlement of Palestinians, in Lebanon.


15. (C) Chamoun told the Vice President that in order to make
Lebanon a valid player in the peace process, the United
States needed to help diminish the influence of regional
leaders, such as Iran, Syria, and Israel, on the Lebanese
domestic situation. Gemayel thanked Biden for the U.S. role
in pressuring Syria to remove its troops from Lebanon in
2005, but remarked that the Syrians were still active in the
country. Jumblatt also expressed concern about Israel,
asking the Vice President to send a message to the Israelis
to "stop meddling in Lebanon." Mentioning the recent spate
of arrests of suspected Israeli spies in Lebanon, Jumblatt
said Israel could cause civil strife with its intelligence
operations on Lebanese soil.

PULL-ASIDE WITH SAAD HARIRI
--------------


16. (C) In a short pull-aside with the Vice President, Saad
Hariri focused on the importance of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. He also declared that both Syria and Iran were
"using engagement" to buy time, hoping they would be able to
control Lebanon through their proxies in the Lebanese
Parliament. Hariri voiced confidence that March 14 would
return as the majority in the next Parliament. The
government would be a national unity government, he
predicted, bringing in all major political parties, but would
not give Hizballah the power of the veto (blocking minority).
It would be best if President Sleiman was given the "veto,"
or by distributing the blocking minority between March 8 and
the President. This way, said Hariri, President Sleiman
would have a "veto on the veto."


17. (C) Hizballah might well refuse such a scenario,
however, said Hariri, which ould then create a vacuum in
Lebanon's executivebranch. Hizballah might then attempt to
repeat te scenario of 2007-2008, which led to the May 7,
2008 Hizballah invasion of Beirut. Such a scenario could
only be averted through concerted Arab and international
pressure on Syria. If March 14 heard that such Arab and
international pressure was not possible, Hariri continued,
this would mean that Lebanese were being asked to "turn over
their country" to Syria and Iran. If this is the case, he
said, "we can not be expected to pay the price of defending
democracy, moderation and peace" while the world had decided
to allow Iran a free hand in Lebanon. In the unlikely event
March 8 wins a majority in parliament, Hariri concluded, Iran

BEIRUT 00000592 004 OF 004


and Syria would take over the country "through constitutional
means." How would the world deal with such a development,
he wondered aloud We have heard worrying statements from
France, the U.K. and others that "nothing will change and
that they will continue to deal normally with the elected
government, even if it is Hizballah-led. "What is Plan B?" he
queried. The Vice President strongly and repeatedly voiced
U.S. support for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence.


18. (U) The Office of the Vice President has cleared this
message.

SISON