Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT539
2009-05-14 11:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS AIR FRUSTRATIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4235
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLB #0539/01 1341119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141119Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4878
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3770
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3950
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000539 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS AIR FRUSTRATIONS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000539

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS AIR FRUSTRATIONS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) At a May 9 dinner hosted by March 14 MP Nayla Mouawad,
visiting NEA DAS David Hale discussed June 7 parliamentary
election outcomes and consequences. Minister of State Nassib
Lahoud critiqued March 14 campaign failings and adamantly
denied any possibility he would participate in March 14 photo
ops or the election. Lahoud and Druze MP Marwan Hamadeh also
offered guidance on what to expect from a potential March 8
majority in the new government.


2. (C) Mouawad stated that Maronite Christians were still
angry at Druze leader Walid Jumblatt for his publicly leaked
criticisms in April against the Maronites. Several
interlocutors assessed that March 14 leader Saad Hariri
lacked political experience and might be distracted by
financial problems in his family business. End Summary.

NATURE OF THE BATTLE
--------------


3. (C) On May 9, MP and former Social Affairs Minister Nayla
Mouawad hosted a dinner at her residence for visiting NEA DAS
David Hale and the Ambassador. Guests included National
Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun, Democratic Renewal
Movement leader and Minister of State Nassib Lahoud, Druze MP
Marwan Hamadeh, and Dr. Pierre Zalloua of the
Lebanese-American University.


4. (C) Lahoud, who was cajoled by his fellow March 14 leaders
at dinner to lend his support to March 14, despite his
exclusion from their list, explained that March 14 had erred
through its recent candidate selection process and lost some
of its credibility with voters. Lahoud advised that

elections are won by "movements," rather than deal-making,
and that March 14 was perceived by many voters as "seat
traders." He opined that the proper tactic in March 14's
campaign should be to allude to, through campaign literature,
the consequences of a March 8 majority by depicting March 8,
namely, Hizballah, as the perpetrators of the May 7, 2008
violent takeover of Beirut. "You must show the public the
real consequences of the alliance," he remarked. After
hearing several exhortations to rejoin the elections, Lahoud
defiantly said "No way," and added, "If I had known these
comments were coming, I might not have arrived for dinner."

ELECTIONS: THE DAY AFTER
--------------


5. (C) Hamadeh, referred to by Mouawad as "the most popular
Druze," was dire in his predictions for a post-election March
8 majority. He declared if March 8 won, there would be
another war with Israel. Hamadeh sarcastically commented
that the country would need to be destroyed (to rid itself of
Hizballah) in order to rebuild it.


6. (C) Lahoud believed a March 8 majority would not lead to
quick, overt GOL policy changes. Rather, he speculated,
Hizballah would be content with one or two ministers, and
would work "under the table" to manipulate the direction of
government. Chamoun added that Hizballah had time on its
side. Lahoud discerned that President Sleiman could not
withstand the pressure of a Hizballah-controlled agenda.
According to Lahoud, Sleiman is best leading as he does now
as a consensus leader, not rocking the boat. Sleiman cannot
serve the government as a leader of a centrist bloc, he
noted, adding that Sleiman was not forceful enough to "tip" a
balance.

HARIRI: MISSING IN ACTION
--------------


7. (C) Chamoun noted some of March 14,s failings were due to

BEIRUT 00000539 002 OF 002


Hariri's political inexperience. Hariri is not used to the
demands of Lebanese politics, he said. Others asserted that
Hariri has been distracted for several months by financial
losses occurred in the family businesses.


8. (C) Mouawad added that she was perplexed by the absence of
a Saudi ambassador to Lebanon. The previous Ambassador,
Khoja, returned to Riyadh to serve as a Minister of State and
his named replacement is currently serving in Pakistan.

MARONITES STILL MAD
ABOUT JUMBLATT
--------------


9. (C) Mouawad and Hamadeh engaged Hale on his May 6 trip to
Riyadh. Hamadeh remarked that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt
was traveling to Saudi Arabia on May 9 in the hope of
obtaining more money. Mouawad remarked that Christians were
still upset at Jumblatt about his recent derogatory comments
concerning Maronites. Chamoun insisted Jumblatt should have
apologized sooner than he did and should have visited
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, which he has yet to do, noting
Sfeir was very gracious to Walid. (Note: As of May 11,
Jumblatt remains in KSA; Ambassador will meet with him upon
his return. End note.)


10. (C) Comment: Interlocutors were tepid in their
predictions of a March 14 election victory. Most of the
conversations centered on what had gone wrong, and what might
yet be done to fix the situation. End comment.


11. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.
SISON