Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT535
2009-05-14 08:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE 
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PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLB #0535/01 1340810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140810Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4869
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3761
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3943
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000535 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS
PROSPECTS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000535

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI CONFIDENT ON ELECTIONS
PROSPECTS

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In his May 8 meeting with March 14 coalition leader
Saad Hariri, visiting NEA DAS David Hale assured Hariri that
the U.S. has not and will not sacrifice Lebanese sovereignty
as it engages Syria. Hariri expressed confidence in the
March 14 coalition's election prospects. Complaining that he
has had to work tirelessly over the past few months to
mediate the infighting among his Christian allies, Hariri
said all of March 14 members are now focused on winning the
elections. DAS Hale noted that part of the reason for his
visit was to urge March 14 coalition partners to sacrifice
their own interests for the greater good of the coalition.
Hale also discussed Hizballah's possible strategies
post-election, the appeal of opposition Christian leader
Michel Aoun, the Middle East peace process, engagement with
Iran, and strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces. End
summary.

U.S. AND SYRIAN MEETINGS
--------------


2. (C) On May 8, NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) David
Hale, accompanied by the Ambassador, had lunch with March 14
coalition leader Saad Hariri at his residence in Qoreitem.
DCM, ConOff, and Hariri advisors Hani Hammoud and Nader
Hariri also attended. Hariri opened the meeting by asking
about the outcome of NEA Acting A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC
Senior Advisor Dan Shapiro's visit to Syria the day before.


3. (C) DAS Hale reported that Feltman and Shapiro had met
with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, Presidential
Advisor Shabaan, and Dr. Mikad. He characterized the

sessions as "constructive" but broke no new ground. He
underscored the administration's intent to pursue
Arab-Israeli peace on all tracks, including the
Syrian-Israeli track. In response to a question, Hale
assured Hariri that no more high-level meetings with Syria
would occur prior to the elections and that the U.S.
sanctions against Syria would be renewed (the public
announcement of the renewal occrred later that day). DAS
Hale and the Ambassadr emphasized that in all dealing with
the Syrians, in public and in private, the U.S. has stressed
that there will be no "deal" regarding Lebanese sovereignty.

ELECTIONS
--------------


4. (C) Hariri said that if he were asked about his
predictions on the elections three weeks ago, he would have
lamented the infighting in March 14, with Lebanese Forces
leader Samir Geagea "wanting this and wanting that." While
Hariri decried his having to "always sacrifice for the
coalition," he noted that there was recently more
cohesiveness in March 14 and a better appreciation of where
the real battles needed to be fought. He said that Walid
Jumblatt would not have any problems in the areas in which
Jumblatt is contending. While Hariri at first did not offer
overall election predictions, he later said that March 14
would keep its majority if certain qualifications were
achieved as he expected: March 14 winning seven of the eight
seats in Metn, keeping three seats in Baabda, and taking
Zahle's seven seats. (Comment: Given election polls and our
conversations with other political analysts, we believe these
election predictions are optimistic. End comment).


5. (C ) DAS Hale asked about certain districts, and Hariri
provided the following analysis:

Zahle: Hariri said that Zahle was "okay." The only
arguments in that district were over the location of where
the March 14 candidates list would be announced. Hariri
added that he was confident his Future Movement could deliver

BEIRUT 00000535 002 OF 003


20,000 votes in Zahle (in an area where 35,000 are need to
win).

Jbeil: Hariri commented that President Sleiman had not been
very cooperative in coming up with a March 14-leaning
independent list in this Christian district. Hammoud said in
his view the President's analysis was that a list of
"independent" candidates in Jbeil that included persons seen
as too close to March 14 would push Christian votes to Michel
Aoun's list while an independent list with less partisan
candidates would gather more support.

Beirut One: Hariri lamented unhappiness by independent
Armenian voters against March 14 over Samir Geagea's
insistence on pushing a candidate for one of the Armenian
seats who is allied with him but seen as very weak by the
electorate. Hariri also spoke out against the Armenian
Tashnaq party, allied with the opposition, which he said was
in the hands of Syria and Iran because of the influence of
Armenia's president. He seemed confident he would persuade
Geagea to withdraw his Armenian candidate.

Metn: Hariri felt the Metn was looking good. "Nobody does
elections better than Murr," he said, referring to March 14's
independent ally in the Metn, Michel Murr. One possible
issue in the Metn, however, was irritation on the part of
Armenian voters who are also upset about the weak Armenian
candidate that Geagea is pushing in Beirut. Hammoud
speculated that these independent voters, who normally would
be loyal to Michel Murr, might not vote for him out of spite
over the squabble in Beirut.


6. (C) Hariri said his Future Movement had reached an
agreement with Sunni Islamist party Jamaa Islamiya, which
will not pursue having candidates in Sidon or anywhere
besides Tripoli. The party would keep its candidates there
in order to draw away voters from other Islamist parties.

HIZBALLAH'S MOVES POST ELECTION
--------------


7. (C) In response to DAS Hale's question, Hariri said that
if Hizballah lost the elections, Hizballah would become much
more flexible when it came to political negotiations and that
it would rely more on the president to mediate political
disagreements. If Hizballah won the elections, however,
Hariri portended the next phase of "Tehran's takeover of
Lebanon." The missiles Iran now smuggles to Hizballah
secretly over the border would start coming "through Beirut's
Rafiq Hariri International Airport," he said. DAS Hale
speculated that if the Hizballah-led opposition won,
Hizballah might not seek more powerful government portfolios
as the number of Hizballah parliamentarians would not
increase. Hizballah would refrain from demanding more for
itself (as opposed to March 8 allies),and select a
well-known Sunni politician to serve as Prime Minister, as a
means of encouraging international legitimacy for a new
Hizballah-dominated Lebanese government. The problem, then,
would be dealing with insidious Hizballah influence. Hariri
agreed.


8. (C) Both Saad and Nader Hariri said the European
governments were already signaling full acceptance of a
possible Hizballah-led government. Hariri added that because
of the close U.S. and British relationship, the public
perception was that the British/Hizballah meetings were with
U.S. acquiescence. DAS Hale responded that the U.S. opposed
these contacts, in part for that very reason of the public
message.

APPEAL OF AOUN
--------------


9. (C) Responding to a question as to why Michel Aoun, who is
allied with Hizballah, has appeal among the Christian
electorate, Hariri and his advisors gave two reasons. The

BEIRUT 00000535 003 OF 003


first was that in the mind of Aoun supporters, it was a smart
strategic move to align with the rising Shiite power, not
only in Lebanon but in the region, in order to protect the
Christian minority in Lebanon. According to Hariri's
assessment, Aoun views the U.S. as a declining power and a
fair-weather friend, and Iran as a rising power. Hammoud
retold a quote from Aoun when Hariri met him in Paris: "The
Americans will let you down, like they did to me." The
second reason for Aoun's appeal was that he was an
alternative to March 14 Christian leaders Geagea and Amine
Gemayel. Nader Hariri said Aoun gets many votes from the
anti-Geagea segment, who recalls Lebanese Forces civil war
baggage.


MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND IRAN
--------------


10. (C) DAS Hale discussed Special Envoy for Middle East
Peace George Mitchell's efforts to bring peace to the region.
DAS Hale said that Special Envoy Mitchell would like to
visit Lebanon eventually, and discuss how to bring Lebanon
into comprehensive peace talks.


11. (C) After much mulling over U.S. engagement, and Hale's
replies on U.S. thinking, Hariri said at the end of lunch
that if he had to engage Syria or Iran, he would not have
done it any differently than the way the U.S. is approaching
Syria. He advised that during this election season if there
were any assassinations or other disturbances orchestrated by
Syria or Iran then there must be a response. He described
the Syrians and Iranians as thugs who only understand the
language of force.

"MARSHALL PLAN" FOR LEBANESE ARMED FORCES
--------------


12. (C) Hariri said that if March 14 wins the election it
would work to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and
that he wanted to develop a new Marshall Plan for the army.
He said he understood the political difficulties of the U.S.
government directly supplying LAF with advanced weapons, but
urged that Washington work with Russia and regional allies to
have them supply Lebanon with non-U.S. advanced weapons.


13. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.
SISON