LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, GEAGEA FEARS HIZBALLAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000517

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC KPAL IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, GEAGEA FEARS HIZBALLAH
WILL USE VIOLENCE TO GET VETO POWER

REF: BEIRUT 500

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On May 8, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea proposed
to visiting NEA DAS David Hale that the U.S. lend "silent
support" to March 14 in the weeks before the June 7
parliamentary elections. He specifically advised us to stop
expressing support for "moderates." Admitting the March 14
coalition made mistakes in the selection of its candidates,
Geagea expressed his belief that March 14 would win a
majority in parliament. He declared that March 14 must
prevent Hizballah from achieving its demand of a blocking
third because Hizballah would use it to destroy the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. He feared Hizballah would resort to
violence in order to secure veto power.


2. (C) Geagea suggested the U.S. wait until after a new
government is formed in Lebanon before moving ahead with
Syria, and that we wait on appointing an Ambassador to Syria
until the next Lebanese government had been formed. Geagea
said he did not support direct or indirect Israeli-Lebanese
talks, believing Hizballah would launch a war in protest and
recommending instead that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from
Sheba'a Farms was the best tool to counter Hizballah. Geagea
assessed that March 14 suffered minimal residual damage
following the recent release of the four generals detained in
connection with former PM Rafiq Hariri's assassination. End
summary.

DESPITE MARCH 14'S MISTAKES,
IT WILL WIN THE MAJORITY
--------------


3. (C) Visiting NEA DAS David Hale, accompanied by Ambassador
and PolOff, met with Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea
and his advisors Elie Khoury and Joseph Nehme at Geagea's
residence in Maarab on May 8. Hale informed Geagea that he
was interested in hearing how the U.S. can most wisely
support March 14 in the weeks before the June 7 parliamentary
elections. Geagea proposed that the U.S. lend silent support
to March 14, and refrain from using the phrase "support for
moderates," explaining that the term referred to independent
candidates, not March 14.


4. (C) Geagea identified March 14's biggest challenge as the
absence of a leader to run the coalition. He complained that
March 14 and Future Movement leader Saad Hariri acted as the
chairman of his own political party at the expense of the
greater coalition. Weighing the alternatives, Geagea said
that March 14 Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was ineffective
because of recently leaked criticisms he made about the March
14 Sunnis and Christians. Geagea said he tried to lead the
coalition himself, but noted that his LF capabilities were
"limited." Geagea concluded that Saad was the best choice as
the March 14 coalition leader because Future has the most
number of deputies, but that until now, he has not delivered.


5. (C) Geagea was confident that the majority will retain its
majority position in the government, but lamented that the
coalition made many mistakes, costing what he believed was
the potential for a seven or eight seat gain. According to
Geagea, March 14 would win all seven seats in Zahle, thanks
to Saad's decision to put Geagea in charge of determining the
candidate list. Though March 14's leader on its Zahle list,
current MP Nicolas Fattouch, was a "lame horse," Geagea was
certain March 14 would win in Zahle, notably because of other
locally strong candidates and a shift in public opinion away
from March 8.


6. (C) "President Sleiman failed us in Jbeil," Geagea
declared, assessing that independent candidate and former
advisor to Sleiman, Nazem Khoury, formed a "weak" list.

BEIRUT 00000517 002 OF 003


(Note: Khoury's list is firmly independent and excludes
March 14 SYG Fares Suaid. End note.) Geagea quoted Sleiman
as saying, "It is better for Khoury to lose in Jbeil than win
with Suaid."


7. (C) Geagea predicted that Free Patriotic Movement leader
Michel Aoun's decision to form a list in Jezzine that will
compete against his March 8 ally, Parliament Speaker Nabih
Berri, cost him Shia votes in Baabda and Jbeil. According to
Geagea, the emergence of competing lists was a failure on
Hizballah's part to mediate between its Christian ally, Aoun,
and its Shia ally, Berri. Geagea relayed that he recently
joked with Hizballah MP Mohammed Raad, asking him if he was
ready to "give Aoun to March 14." Raad reportedly laughed
and answered in the affirmative.

PREVENTING HIZBALLAH FROM
ACQUIRING A BLOCKING THIRD
--------------


8. (C) If March 14 wins the majority in the next parliament,
Geagea posited, Hizballah will insist on "full power." He
suggested that March 14 give Shia deputies "full
representation, but no veto power." He said he feared
Hizballah would resort to violence in order to secure the
blocking third. Hizballah intended to destroy the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL),and needed the veto power in
order to kill the STL. Referencing Hizballah SYG Hassan
Nasrallah's speech the previous week (reftel),Geagea said
that the STL threatened Hizballah's existence, and it would
do anything to disrupt the proceedings.


9. (C) Agreeing, Hale said that March 14's ability to counter
Hizballah's actions against the STL depended on the size of
March 14's victory in the elections. He added that March 14
needed to develop multiple strategies to challenge
Hizballah's weapons. Hale proposed that U.S. engagement with
Syria was one way to make Hizballah nervous, as was Special
Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell's efforts to
achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace.

PROCEED WITH CAUTION
ON SYRIA...
--------------


10. (C) Geagea pleaded for the U.S. to refrain from even
announcing a decision to reappoint an ambassador to Syria.
He suggested that the U.S. hold off until after the elections
and Lebanon had formed a new government because he feared
Syrian intervention in the process. Responding to Hale's
inquiry on the benefits to resolving Ghajar, Geagea
downplayed the significance of Ghajar and pointed to Sheba'a
Farms as the stronger tool to put Hizballah on the offensive.

...AND RED LIGHT WITH
ISRAELI-LEBANESE TRACK
--------------


11. (C) Geagea discouraged even an exploratory visit by
Special Envoy Mitchell to evaluate prospects for an
Israeli-Lebanese track. He believed any effort in this
direction, even an indirect one, could give a pretext to
Hizballah to destabilize Lebanon. He added that an
Israeli-Lebanese track would not benefit the
Israeli-Palestinian track, and that this was the most
important track and required a tremendous amount of U.S.
pressure. Hale assured Geagea of President Obama's
commitment to achieving peace and that the U.S. planned to
integrate the Arab Peace Initiative into its efforts.


12. (C) Geagea acknowledged that framing Israeli-Lebanese
talks in the context of implementing UN Security Council
Resolution 1701 had a better chance at success, but added
that Hizballah demanded Israel's unilateral withdrawal from
Sheba'a, a move that required no discussions between the two
countries. Hale suggested that an Israeli-Lebanese track

BEIRUT 00000517 003 OF 003


potentially could corner Hizballah by eliminating its role as
the resistance. Disagreeing, Geagea said Hizballah would
"make a huge war" if Lebanon appeared to be on a path to
opening talks with Israel. He proposed that Mitchell worked
on convincing the Israelis to withdraw unilaterally from
Sheba'a.

MINIMAL RESIDUAL DAMAGE
FROM RELEASE OF FOUR GENERALS
--------------


13. (C) Referring to the April 29 release of the four
generals detained in connection with Hariri's assassination,
Geagea declared that March 14 had turned a defeat into a
victory. He explained that March 14 suffered immediately
after their release, but the media campaign by the generals
and their opposition allies backfired because the public did
not like to be reminded of what the generals had represented
prior to their detention. Geagea took credit in mitigating
the damage by attacking Nasrallah's speech on the generals'
release.


14. (C) Nevertheless, he said, Hizballah was preparing former
General Security chief Jamil Sayyed for a "bigger role," such
as become a cabinet minister or a deputy. (Note: Sayyed
missed the deadline to register for the June 7 elections, but
there are rumors that Hizballah would ask one of its deputies
in Baalbeck-Hermel to resign and hold by-elections to elect
Sayyed. End note.)


15. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.
SISON