LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, SLEIMAN LOOKS AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000515

C O R R E C T E D COPY (TEXT, PARA 4)

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS IS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH DAS HALE, SLEIMAN LOOKS AT
POST-ELECTION SCENARIOS, GHAJAR, UNSCR 1701 AND API

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Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a May 8 meeting with President Michel Sleiman,
visiting NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary David Hale reiterated
continuing U.S. support for Lebanese sovereignty and
independence and for the voices of moderation within Lebanon.
Sleiman predicted that the June 7 parliamentary elections
would result in a close contest, with neither the March 14
nor March 8 coalition winning a decisive victory. If
independent candidates did well, this could pave the way for
a consensus government in which the President would hold the
key to any efforts to block cabinet decisions, rather than
the current "blocking third" held by the opposition, he said.



2. (C) On U.S. efforts to reach a comprehensive peace in the
region, DAS Hale reassured the President that no deal would
be made at Lebanon's expense. Sleiman cited UNSCR 1701 and
the Arab Peace Initiative as the necessary framework for
Lebanon, and encouraged Special Envoy George Mitchell to
visit Lebanon soon to begin a dialogue. Sleiman expressed
doubts that Israeli would withdraw from Ghajar, and
complained about Israeli spy rings operating in Lebanon. He
agreed, however, to think about whether Lebanon could offer
reassurances to Israel that withdrawal from Ghajar would not
be manipulated by Hizballah or otherwise backfire. End
summary.

SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND VOICES OF MODERATIN
--------------


3. (C) Upon arriving in Beirut on May 8, NEA Deputy Assistant
Secretary (DAS) David Hale, accompanied by the Ambassador and
Pol/Econ Chief, met with President Michel Sleiman at his
office in Baabda Palace. DAS Hale began by stating that the
purpose of his visit was to follow up on the Secretary's
April 26 visit to Lebanon and thanked the President for
making that visit a success. Sleiman agreed that the
Secretary's visit was "very good," adding that "most" people
in Lebanon appreciated the visit because the Secretary had
limited her meetings to the President. If visitors see the
President and Prime Minister only, he explained, this was the
wrong message; either they should see the President only or a
broad range of leaders. He noted that some Lebanese had
objected to the Secretary's visit to the grave of former
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, but stressed that they were
mistaken, since Hariri had been a personal friend of the
Clintons.


4. (C) DAS Hale said his visit also aimed to take stock of
the situation in Lebanon, one month before the June 7
parliamentary elections, and to express continuing U.S.
strong support for the voices of moderation and independence
in Lebanon, a message he also conveyed publicly in a press
statement immediately following the meeting (see paragraph
20, below). He relayed that he had just come from Saudi
Arabia, where he held meetings with Minister of Information
Khoja, senior Foreign Ministry officials, and King Abdullah's
son and advisor Abdel Aziz bin Abdullah, all of whom
expressed their strong support for Lebanon, the Cedar
Revolution, March 14, and President Sleiman.


5. (C) Sleiman appreciaed the Saudi support, but cautioned
that it was not in their interest to publicly voice support
for March 14; rather, they should express support for all
parties in Lebanon, and not imply that President Sleiman was
part of March 14. He downplayed concerns about potential
election violence, saying he expected them to proceed without
problems.


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6. (C) Sleiman expected the race to be close, with the split
between the March 14 and March 8 blocs limited to two or
three seats. Neither side would have a clear-cut majority,
he predicted. If independent candidates are successful, they
could win six or seven seats between the two blocs, which
would help create consensus in the country and allow the
President to play a larger role in decision-making.

PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
OF BLOCKING THIRD?
--------------


7. (C) Asked about cabinet formation following the elections,
Sleiman suggested that the new majority should receive 16 or
17 seats (assuming the new government would retain the
current number of 30 ministerial postings),leaving 13 or 14
to be divided between the opposition's and President's
choices. This would maintain a consensus government, but
give the President a determining role in any attempts to form
a blocking third. DAS Hale asked whether, if the current
majority became the next minority, it would accept to be in
the government. Sleiman replied that he would ask people
close to March 14 but independent (like current Minister of
Culture Tamman Salam) or close to both him and March 14 (like
current Minister of State Nassib Lahoud) to represent him in
cabinet. The real question, he said, is whether the next
majority would let him control the blocking third.


8. (C) DAS Hale agreed that such a formula would lead to a
more functional government. The current formula (in which
the opposition has exclusive control over the blocking third)
has led to government paralysis, preventing the government
from moving forward with economic and other programs that can
improve people's daily lives, he said.

REASSURANCES ON SYRIA, IRAN
--------------

9, (C) DAS Hale relayed that he had spoken with NEA Acting
Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior Advisor
Dan Shapiro, following their May 7 meeting in Damascus with
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, Presidential Advisor
Shabaan and Dr. Mikad. The meeting had lasted four hours, he
said, and the atmospherics were good, although no new ground
was broken. Sleiman stressed that the U.S., as a major
power, had an obligation to continue using the path of
diplomacy.


10. (C) DAS Hale replied that there was a "sincere and strong
commitment by our President" to do so. However, some were
inclined to interpret U.S. engagement with Syria and Iran as
an indication of a U.S. realignment in the region that would
come at Lebanon's expense. The U.S. would continue, as the
Secretary did during her visit to Lebanon, to stress to the
Lebanese and others that the U.S. did not intend to use
Lebanon as a bargaining chip. (Note: DAS Hale reiterated
this message in his press statement after the meeting; the
press, however, was eager to hear what "guarantees" the U.S.
could offer, to which DAS Hale replied that this was the
policy of the "highest levels of the U.S. administration" as
well as the international community. End note.)


11. (C) DAS Hale stressed that the U.S. would continue to
consult closely with its allies in the region as we work
together to build a strategy toward Iran and Syria. This was
also a theme of Defense Secretary Gates' and Special Advisor
for the Gulf and Southwest Asia Dennis Ross' recent trips to
the region, he said, and we will continue to seek our
friends' advice. No deal would be done over Lebanon's head,
he repeated.

UNSCR 1701 AND ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE
BEST FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL PEACE
--------------


12. (C) DAS Hale, noting that he also was working for Special

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Envoy George Mitchell, with whom he already had made three
visits to the region, also asked for Sleiman's views on U.S.
efforts to reach a comprehensive peace agreement in the
Middle East. The U.S. was seeking a lasting peace, he said,
and understood that each country had its own context with
respect to Israel.


13. (C) Sleiman agreed that UNSCR 1701 provided the best
framework for Lebanon, but stressed the need to incorporate
the Arab Peace Initiative (API) as well. The API, he
explained, was perhaps the only issue on which all Lebanese
agreed, especially because it excluded the possibility of
Palestinian permanent resettlement ("tawteen") in Lebanon.
Lebanon could not engage in negotiations without progress on
the Syrian and Palestinian tracks. Sleiman encouraged
Special Envoy Mitchell to come to Lebanon to begin a dialogue
and hear views from all sides, including both the current
majority and opposition.


14. (C) DAS Hale acknowledged broad Arab support for the API,
calling it a key cornerstone of the U.S. approach. However,
the Arab states also needed to show their willingness to take
positive steps and contribute to a positive climate, he
stressed, in the context of Israeli steps.


15. (C) DAS Hale cited Netanyahu's May 18 meeting with
President Obama, followed by Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak's May 26 and Palestinian President Abu Mazen's May 28
visits to Washington, as key next steps. With the Israelis,
all issues were on the table. By the end of May, the U.S.
hoped to have a clearer sense of the way forward. DAS Hale
agreed with Sleiman that Jordanian King Abdullah also was
very positive about the prospects for peace after his
Washington visit.

DOUBTS ON GHAJAR WITHDRAWAL
--------------


16. (C) Sleiman expressed doubt that Israel would withdraw
its forces from Ghajar. DAS Hale responded that Special
Envoy Mitchell had raised this with Netanyahu during their
last meeting, and had been assured that the new Israeli
government was looking into the issue and taking it very
seriously. All indications were that they were ready to make
a decision to withdraw, but were still looking at two issues.
Internally, the GOI was thinking through the legal
implications of withdrawal in terms of the Israeli citizens
currently living in Ghajar, with evacuation potentially the
smoothest solution.


17. (C) Sleiman asked whether the Israelis planned to destroy
remaining infrastructure to prevent squatters or other
undesirable groups from moving in. Otherwise the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF),with UNIFIL, should stay to prevent this.
DAS Hale responded that he would look into the question, but
noted that the Israelis would need clarity regarding the
timing of any transfer of authority to the LAF, an issue that
was best left to the Tripartite talks to work out.


18. (C) Externally, DAS Hale continued, the Israelis needed
to have a better understanding of the Lebanese reaction:
would Hizballah use withdrawal as a propaganda victory or
would GOL officials discredit the move as unimportant? A
signal that Lebanon, perhaps in the form of a statement from
President Sleiman, would welcome this step as a victory for
diplomacy and the implementation of UNSCR 1701 would help
reassure the Israelis on this point, he said. Sleiman agreed
to "think about" the idea. DAS Hale added that the U.S.
hoped that Ghajar could be a step towards future indirect
dialogue between Lebanon and Israel, working with Special
Envoy Mitchell.


19. (C) Sleiman also complained about Israeli spy rings
operating in Lebanon, noting that the Internal Security
Forces (ISF) had just arrested six more networks in south
Lebanon. This was a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and

BEIRUT 00000515 004.2 OF 005


UNSCR 1701, he said, and gave the "resistance" an argument to
maintain its arms. This was not a wise move from Israel, he
commented. He believed the rings were real, he said, arguing
that the ISF had no reason to "invent stories" and that he
himself had seen the equipment used by the networks.


20. (U) Begin text of DAS Hale's press statement:

I just had the great honor of a meeting with President
Sleiman my first meeting during this short visit to Lebanon.
As always I am delighted to be back in a country that I spent
many years, many fond years living in, in the past. The
purpose of my visit here with the President was to echo the
message that Secretary Clinton delivered in recent days and
to state it succinctly: that is our support for Lebanon's
sovereignty and its independence. That support is
unwavering. And as we expand our regional engagement here in
the Middle East, I'd like to emphasize that there will be no
deals made at Lebanon's expense. There are no grand bargains
in mind. We have an independent policy for an independent
Lebanon, and we will never make any deals with the Syrians or
others that sells out Lebanon or the Lebanese people.

And specifically I'd like to address the issue of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon. The Tribunal, in our view, is not a
political bargaining chip, and no deals will be made at the
expense of seeing that justice is done.

The United States also remains very strongly committed to our
goals of helping the Lebanese, in Lebanese-designed and
Lebanese-led efforts, to help strengthen the institutions of
the Lebanese state, whether it is civil institutions,
political institutions, or defense and security institutions.
We are pleased with our robust support and hope it will
continue in the future.

We also, of course while I am here in Lebanon, will be
watching the election process as it unfolds, and I'd like
also to reiterate America's strong support for the Lebanese
Government in its efforts to ensure that the June 7
parliamentary elections are fair, free, and held without
violence or intimidation.

The shape of Lebanon's future, including a post election
government is for the people of Lebanon to choose. And for
our part, the United States will continue to support a strong
and independent Lebanon, and continue to contribute to
building the institutions of this country. That's the best
way to build peace and stability, as well as prosperity for
Lebanon and the region.

Thank you very much.

Question: Do you think that Special Envoy Mitchell has
succeeded in his efforts so far, and what is his efforts,
impact on Lebanon?

DAS Hale: The President of the United States is very
committed to doing everything we can to bring about peace in
the Middle East, comprehensive peace. And George Mitchell
was selected within days of the inauguration of the
President, and I think that reflected the sense of priority,
the sense of urgency, and the importance that the President
places on seeing that we do make this effort as quickly as
possible.

The focus of his efforts so far -- he's had three trips to
the region -- has been to create a context for negotiations
toward an early resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And
the immediate objective has been to work with Israeli and
Arab partners, and our allies throughout the international
community, to create the conditions for that resolution:
establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state,
a two-state outcome, which is so important. But we also are
focused on comprehensive peace, as the overarching goal for
our efforts in this connection.

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Question: You said that there is no deal concerning Lebanon,
so what are the guarantees you can give to the Lebanese
people especially that the parliamentary elections are so
close?

DAS Hale: Well, the parliamentary elections, of course, are
domestic elections. These are elections in which the
Lebanese people will be choosing their future and we wish
them well as they make those choices. On our part, the
United States will continue to be, I think, a strong
supporter for forces of moderation of peace and stability in
Lebanon because we believe Lebanon has so much to contribute
and benefit from those forces.

You know I've lived in Lebanon, as I mentioned in the
beginning, many years at times when Lebanon did not enjoy
that kind of peace and stability and that kind of support.
So I am very pleased to see today that the nature of the
international community's endorsement for what Lebanon has
achieved is unbelievably strong, and I believe it is
irreversible. I can only offer you the assurances from our
top elected officials that they will not be doing deals at
Lebanon's expense.

Thank you.

End text.


21. (U) DAS Hale has cleared this cable.
SISON