Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT496
2009-04-30 16:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: DDEFMIN MURR ON FOUR GENERALS, MARCH 14

Tags:  PREL MCAP PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY 
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0496/01 1201657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301657Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4795
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3722
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000496 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR PM - RUGGIERO
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019
TAGS: PREL MCAP PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DDEFMIN MURR ON FOUR GENERALS, MARCH 14

REF: A. 131443Z APR 09

B. BEIRUT 00490

C. BEIRUT 00285

D. 2008 BEIRUT 1780

E. BEIRUT 00108

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000496

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR PM - RUGGIERO
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019
TAGS: PREL MCAP PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DDEFMIN MURR ON FOUR GENERALS, MARCH 14

REF: A. 131443Z APR 09

B. BEIRUT 00490

C. BEIRUT 00285

D. 2008 BEIRUT 1780

E. BEIRUT 00108

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Defense Minister Elias Murr told the Ambassador April
30 that the release of the four generals held in connection
with the assination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
would provide the opposition with ammunition against March

14. Murr assessed the Christian community was especially
vulnerable to opposition propaganda about the generals and
said March 14 should focus its efforts on that community. In
particular, said Murr, March 14 leaders should highlight
Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun's ties to Hizballah
and "scare" the Christians away from voting for the
Hizballah-Aoun alliance.


2. (C) According to Murr, security for the June 7
parliamentary elections is advancing on schedule. Murr
re-deployed eleven brigades and seven commando battalions in
preparation for the event. Murr was pleased with the
messages he received during his early April trip to the
United States and also expressed satisfaction with Secretary
Clinton's recent trip to Lebanon. Based on his recent
conversation with KSA Minister of State Khoja, Murr expected
that Saudi money for support to March 14 would re-start three
weeks before the June 7 parliamentary elections. He planned
to continue his dialogue with Saudi King Abdullah after the
elections regarding funding for the LAF. Murr also is
working to turn away the Russian offer of MiG-29 aircraft,

and, separately, pursue helicopters from the UAE, he said.
End summary.

RELEASE OF FOUR GENERALS
A BLOW TO MARCH 14
--------------


3. (C) Meeting April 30 with the Ambassador, accompanied by
PolEconOff, Defense Minister Elias Murr said the previous
day's decision by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to
release the four generals held in connection with the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was a
blow to March 14. Nonetheless, Murr assessed that Sunni
leader Saad Hariri's public statement following the generals'
release was "fair," given the circumstances of Rafiq Hariri's
death. Murr acknowledged that the release of the generals
showed that the STL was not politicized, a factor that would
be important if Lebanese actors, especially Hizballah, were
implicated by the court in the future.


4. (C) Murr assessed that opinions in the Sunni and Shia
communities would not change following the generals' release,
but expressed concern about attitudes in Lebanon's Christian
community. Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun will take
advantage of the release of the generals to highlight
corruption in March 14 and the judiciary as a whole, for
keeping the generals in jail without charges, Murr said.
(Note: Aoun and his allies in local press have already
started to emphasize judicial accountability. End note.)
Murr assessed that this opposition argument was gaining
traction among Christians.


5. (C) Among the four generals, former LAF G-2 intelligence
chief Raymond Azar, former head of the presidential guard
yMustafa Hamdan, and former Internal Security Services (ISF)
chief Ali Hajj were "out of the game," Murr said. Azar
reached retirement age six months ago and Hamdan, now the
same rank as LAF Commander General Kahwagi, is unable to
return to the army under LAF regulations. As a Sunni, Hajj
will flounder without the support of Sunni leader Hariri,
added Murr.


6. (C) However, he continued, Former Director of General
Security General Jamil Sayyed would continue to be a threat

BEIRUT 00000496 002 OF 004


to March 14. Murr opined that Hizballah could even propose
Sayyed as a minister in the new cabinet, perhaps even
nominating Sayyed as Foreign Minister. In Murr's opinion,
Hizballah would push for the foreign, defense, or interior
portfolios to make a point against March 14, even though
President Sleiman would likely refuse to sign such
nominations. Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, however,
could serve as a potential opposition naysayer to this plan,
as Sayyed is a rival in the Shia community, said Murr. Murr
also noted that Berri had been absent at Sayyed's home the
night before, where many Hizballah an$ opposition figures had
gathered after the generals' release, and has been quiet on
the topic of the release.

ELECTION SECURITY
--------------


7. (C) Expressing confidence about the LAF's ability to
provide security for June 7 election, Murr told the
Ambassador he had five days ago rearranged all eleven LAF
brigades and seven commando battalions to prepare for the
election. In both Sidon and Tripoli, Murr deployed a
brigade, led by a Sunni commander, and also the two commando
battalions -- to include the Ranger Regiment, Marine
Commandos, and Air Assault Regiment. Two Ranger Regiment
companies will remain in Roumieh as backup, and Murr noted
that these companies would have easy access to Beirut in case
of violence there.


8. (C) Murr planned to visit the brigades and the special
operation units soon to boost morale and urge soldiers to
remain neutral in the run-up to elections (something LAF
Commander General Jean Kahwagi is already doing). Murr told
the Ambassador that LAF Commander Kahwagi was doing an
excellent job. Murr had passed Kahwagi a list of the names
of "troublemakers" in vulnerable areas in Lebanon, such as
the Bekaa, Sidon, and Tripoli, and Kahwagi was contacting
each individual cited to warn them against causing problems
with the election. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud was
scheduled to present Murr's election security plan at the
April 30 cabinet session (which is set to begin at 1800),
Murr added.

SATISFIED WITH US MESSAGE
--------------


9. (C) Murr said he was pleased with his early April meetings
in Washington, especially with Defense Secretary Gates (Ref
A) and Secretary Clinton. Murr appreciated Secretary Gates'
letter of support and planned to translate and distribute it
to his soldiers. He assessed that the letter would reach
more than 60,000 LAF. He particularly appreciated Secretary
Gate's strong commitment to assisting Lebanon in building the
capabilities of the LAF to extend GOL control over Lebanon's
territory and in counter-terror efforts.

THREE THEMES FOR MARCH 14
--------------


10. (C) March 14 should stick to three main themes from now
until the elections, Murr said. First, the coalition should
highlight the arms of Hizballah and the group's "goal of
acting as a state within the state." Second, March 14
leaders should remind the Lebanese people of the incidents of
May 7, 2008, when Hizballah turned its arms against them.
Third, March 14 should stress the many assassinations and
attempts that occurred over the last several years.


11. (C) March 14 needs to "scare the Christians," Murr said,
and to show them that a vote for Aoun equals a vote for
Hizballah. Leaders should point to Hizballah and Iran as the
enemies. Criticism of Syria only gains traction in Lebanon's
Sunni community, in which the votes are already decided.
Christians no longer fear Syria but are still threatened by
Iran and Hizballah, Murr (a Greek Orthodox) judged. Gemayel
and Geagea need to attack Aoun "in the headlines," and equate
a vote for Aoun as a vote for Hizballah. Murr asked the U.S.
to encourage March 14 coalition leaders to stress these
points in their campaigning.


BEIRUT 00000496 003 OF 004



12. (C) The coalition had suffered four shocks recently, Murr
said: (a) the release of the four generals; (b) Druze leader
Walid Jumblatt's leaked statements against the Sunnis and
Christians; (c) the general atmosphere within March 14; and
(d) the nomination of "nobody" Eli Karame in the Metn. On
Jumblatt, Murr assessed that if Jumblatt failed to criticize
Hizballah's arms strongly, he would lose the Christians in
the Chouf. Kataeb head Amine Gemayel and Lebanese Forces
(LF) Samir Geagea were picking "names for names," not with
the intention of winning the majority in the next cabinet,
Murr complained. (Note: Ambassador has a meeting scheduled
with Geagea on Monday, May 4 to urge once again March 14
unity, particularly with regard to the Christian March 14
population. End note.)

METN
--------------


13. (C) Murr, who comes from a dynasty of Metn political
heavyweights, criticized Kataeb's selection of Eli Karame,
who is not from the Metn, as a candidate in the district.
Murr also bemoaned LF's selection of Eddy Abillamaa, who in
Murr's opinion, had no chance to win. March 14 will lose two
MPs from the Metn "for nothing," he said heatedly. Aoun's
candidate, FPM Ibrahim Kenaan, is well-liked and will
probably win. Despite these issue, Murr will back the March
14 list and expressed satisfaction with campaign efforts by
Geagea, Gemayel, and his father, who is a long-time Metn MP.


14. (C) Murr said he had tried to prevent Minister of State
Nassib Lahoud from withdrawing his candidacy in the Metn.
According to Murr, Lahoud had been concerned that Gemayel did
not support his candidacy and, after meeting with both Murr
and the President, had made up his mind to withdraw.

SAUDI MONEY
WILL START SOON
--------------


15. (C) Ambassador asked about any recent March 14
interaction with the KSA. In a meeting with former Saudi
Ambassador to Lebanon Khoja during the latter's recent secret
visit (Ref B),Murr reported. Murr had asked about Saudi
intentions to restart funding to March 14 leaders. According
to Murr, Khoja said KSA would send money three weeks before
the June 7 election. Riyadh was concerned that if March 14
leaders received money farther in advance, they would seek to
"buy out" electoral slots from their allies, fingering in
particular Jumblatt and Geagea. Murr guessed, however, that
the Saudis had made a deal with Hariri that he would spend
from his own bank account now, and KSA would reimburse him
later.


16. (C) Riyadh, according to Murr, would push for Hariri to
become Prime Minister if March 14 won the majority in the
upcoming election. Murr believed the Saudis would "open a
highway for the LAF" and give Hariri whatever he asked for in
terms of funding for military assistance. Khoja told Murr
that Saudi King Abdullah welcomed a visit by Murr to the
Kingdom following the June 7 election to continue the
conversation about defense money (Ref C). Separately, Murr
said the UAE had not been unduly upset by General Kahwagi's
premature announcement in the media that the UAE was funding
the transfer of ten M-60 tanks to Lebanon.


17. (C) Murr also expressed his intention to stay on as
Minister of Defense in the new cabinet, "if" the majority,
whichever side that may be, agreed. (Note: Although he was
not explicit, he intimated that President Sleiman was on
board with this plan. End note.) Murr expected, however,
that Aoun would try to veto his selection. Murr told the
Ambassador that General Kahwagi had paid him a visit because
he had worried that Murr may not accept the position.
Kahwagi told Murr that soldiers, including Kahwagi and the
LAF Chief of Intelligence (G-2 General Edmond Fadel),would
leave en masse if Murr were replaced.

PLAYING DOWN RUSSIAN MIGS
--------------


BEIRUT 00000496 004 OF 004



18. (C) The Russian Ministry of Defense April 27 approved the
agreement to release the MiG-29s it offered in December (Ref
D),Murr said, but he said he was still working to turn the
issue off. He told Russian President Putin that he could not
visit Moscow now as he was focused on elections. When Hariri
followed up with Murr on the issue, Murr told Hariri to "stay
quiet" while Murr worked on procuring alternative aircraft
from elsewhere. On this issue, Murr expressed interest in
traveling to the Abu Dhabi soon for meetings and a media
blitz about UAE equipment, including the ten PUMA transport
helicopters the UAE has offered to donate (Ref E). Murr also
hoped to sign a primary accord on the purchase of ten Hawk
aircraft from the UAE during this planned visit.

COMMENT
--------------

19.(C) Murr's assessment of the STL's release of the four
generals matches what we have been hearing elsewhere. His
and Hariri's emphasis on the neutrality of the STL is the
best counter to opposition slogans of corruption in March 14
and the judiciary. The possibility that Hizballah would
nominate Sayyed as Foreign Minister is just plain awful. It
is unlikely to gain traction, however, and would at a minimum
delay the formation of the cabinet after the June 7
parliamentary elections.


20. (C) Murr's confidence in the LAF's ability to maintain
security on election day is reassuring. He is taking
important steps, such as repositioning the battalions and
commando brigades, far in advance of June 7. As far as unity
among March 14 Christians goes, Murr's clear talking points
on Hizballah could help get all the leaders back on the same
page. End comment.

SISON