LEBANON: JUMBLATT REMAINS WITH MARCH 14 DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000490

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IS SA LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT REMAINS WITH MARCH 14 DESPITE
TALKS WITH BERRI, WHILE HARIRI REPORTEDLY MEETS WITH
HIZBALLAH

REF: A. SECTO 00001 270050Z APR 09

B. BEIRUT 470

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with Ambassador April 29, Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt gave no indication he is planning to abandon the
March 14 ship, despite recent overtures to opposition Speaker
Nabih Berri. March 14 had much work to do to win the June 7
parliamentary elections, he admitted, listing several problem
areas. However, the March 14 coalition intended to present a
unified front and message via a joint meeting and statement
prior to the elections. Meanwhile, majority leader Saad
Hariri was meeting with Hizballah, Jumblatt revealed, a move
Jumblatt deemed useful for reducing Sunni/Shia tensions.


2. (C) Jumblatt had no immediate plans to visit Patriarch
Sfeir to repair damage caused by his leaked comments
criticizing the Maronites, believing the issue to be passe.
Jumblatt wondered when the Saudis would turn the tap back on
for funding, noting that this could be helpful in key
electoral districts. Just minutes before the Special
Tribunal announced its decision to recommend the release of
the four generals, Jumblatt confirmed March 14 would accept
the Tribunal's verdict. End summary.

STILL ON BOARD WITH MARCH 14
--------------


3. (C) A relaxed and upbeat Jumblatt greeted the Ambassador,
accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, at his Beirut home in
Clemenceau on April 29. He praised the Secretary's June 26
visit to Lebanon (Ref A),stating it was very effective in
conveying the message (of supporting the moderate March 14
coalition) without appearing "political." March 14 still had
outstanding problems to fix, he admitted. Jumblatt, who had
met with coalition leader Saad Hariri one-on-one on April 26
and then shared dinner with Saad on April 27 at the home of
Druze Transport Minister Ghazi Aridi, said March 14 leaders
(including Nassib Lahoud, Nayla Mouawad, Boutros Harb and
others) planned to meet soon. They would also issue a
10-point statement shortly before the elections to reiterate
the coalition's position on various issues and to promote an
image of unity.

NO PLANS TO SEE PATRIARCH
--------------


4. (C) Jumblatt believed that the incident surrounding his
leaked remarks criticizing his coalition partners and
Maronite Christians had blown over. Asked whether he
intended to visit Patriarch Sfeir soon to soothe ruffled
Christian feathers, Jumblatt said he had not decided whether
to visit him before or after the June 7 parliamentary
elections. The Ambassador asked what the downside to a
pre-election visit to Sfeir would be, to which Jumblatt had
no response. It would not help or matter to March 14
Christians if he went, he later explained, citing his recent
condolence calls on five Christian families in his Chouf
district who were largely unconcerned with his statement. He
had dispatched fellow Druze MP and Minister of State Wael Abu
Four to meet with the Patriarch, who told Abu Four March 14
should do its best to make sure opposition Christian leader
Michel Aoun does not win, Jumblatt reported.

SOOTHING MORE RUFFLED FEATHERS...
--------------


5. (C) Jumblatt deemed the decision not to include March 14
stalwart Nassib Lahoud on the Metn list as "stupid," blaming
Kataeb leader Amine Gemayel, Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea, and independent Michel Murr. "Everyone is looking to

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see what are the advantages of Sarkis Sarkis," he asked
sarcastically, referring to the April 27 announcement of
Murr's "Salvation List" for Metn, which included Sarkis as
the Maronite candidate. He further criticized Geagea's
insistence on naming Lebanese Forces candidate Eddy Abillamaa
to the list. (Note: The Metn list includes Kataeb
candidates Sami Gemayel and Elie Karame, Abillamaa, and
independents Murr, Sarkis, Elias Mukheiber, and Emile Kanaan.
End note.)


6. (C) Jumblatt praised Lahoud's gracious reaction in stating
that while he would fight his enemies, he would not turn
against his friends. Nevertheless, March 14 needed to
compensate Lahoud, perhaps by having Lahoud host a meeting of
the four coalition leaders (Hariri, Geagea, Jumblatt and
Gemayel) to demonstrate coalition unity. (Note: The four
have not met as a group since April 9. End note.)


7. (C) As for Tripoli MP Mosbah Ahdab (also omitted from the
March 14 list but running independently),Jumblatt attributed
the decision to oust him to an agreement between Hariri and
former PM Najib Mikati. Jumblatt had argued in favor of Jean
Obeid (also close to Mikati),citing his 2004 refusal to
participate in the cabinet decision to renew the extension of
then-President Emile Lahoud, but neither Obeid nor Ahdab made
the cut. Instead, he complained, they chose a "nobody" like
Ahmed Karame (cousin of former PM Omar Karame and a former MP
in Tripoli). Jumblatt believed Ahdab, however, could still
play a role in March 14 if "somewhere behind the curtain"
Hariri and Mikati decided to pursue this.


8. (C) As for Hariri's failure to reach an agreement with
Jemaa Islamiya, Jumblatt argued that the Sunni group should
accept Hariri's offer of one seat in Beirut with the promise
of a cabinet seat following the elections. (Note: This is
unlikely at this point. End note.)

...AND DEALING WITH TROUBLEMAKERS
--------------


9. (C) When asked about former Hariri advisor Ghattas Khoury
(who defied his boss by running against his wishes in
Jumblatt's Chouf district, pitting himself against Geagea's
George Adwan and Jumblatt's Dory Chamoun),Jumblatt simply
said, "Saad doesn't need him any more." During their April
27 meeting, Saad had promised to do his best to convince
Khoury not to run, he said.


10. (C) Jumblatt cited Beirut I and Zahle as problematic
districts. In Beirut I, Geagea insisted on running an
unknown Armenian candidate (Richard Kouyoumjian -- an Amcit)
against incumbent Serge Torsarkissian. In Zahle, March 14
needed to decide between two Shia candidates (Okab Sakr,
favored by Hariri, and Mohsen Dalloul, more popular locally,
with Dalloul threatening to form a competing list with
independent Paul Charbel, already passed over by March 14 in
favor of Elie Marouni). Hariri had promised to resolve both
the Shia and Charbel problems, Jumblatt said. Jumblatt also
cited "coordination problems" in Baabda, citing Bassen Shab
by name and accusing independent (and son-in-law of Michel
Murr) Edmond Ghorios of working on his own -- a bad sign, he
said. Batroun and Jbeil would fall to March 8, he predicted.


JUMBLATT MEETS WITH BERRI...
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador asked about the prospects for a middle
bloc aligned with President Sleiman (which some speculate
would include both Jumblatt and Berri). Jumblatt said
Sleiman was frustrated with both March 8 and March 14.
Jumblatt favored enhancing the role of the president, but
added that this would make Lebanon's Sunnis and Shias nervous.


12. (C) Noting he would meet with Speaker Berri the following
day (April 30),Jumblatt admitted that Hariri had been

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nervous about his rapprochement with the Speaker. Hariri, he
explained, was not "keen to fix up a deal" with Berri at this
time, preferring to wait until after the elections. Nor was
Hizballah "keen on rapprochement" between the two. Jumblatt
believed Berri would remain Speaker after the elections.

...WHILE HARIRI MEETS WITH HIZBALLAH
--------------


13. (C) Jumblatt revealed that Hariri had been meeting with
Hizballah's Hassan Khalil, which he praised as a way to
reduce tensions and tone down political rhetoric. (Comment:
This is a bit of news Hariri has refrained from sharing with
us; we will pursue. End comment.) Jumblatt deemed
Hizballah's activities in Egypt a mistake, declaring this was
the second time Hizballah had helped March 14, following its
appeal to the Egyptian army revolt against the government
during the January Gaza crisis. The military side of
Hizballah was dominating the political side, he said. MP
Mohamad Raad's recent statement calling for the "abolishment
of the state but not the sects" was yet another mistake, he
said. Jumblatt believed Hizballah would seek to hold on to
key service ministries such as Health and Labor after the
elections.

ALL AGREE: KEEP THINGS CALM
--------------


14. (C) Jumblatt did not believe there would be serious
incidents of violence in the run-up to the elections, noting
that his Chouf and Aley districts were calm following his
agreement with opposition Druze leader Talal Arslan to give
Arslan a seat in Aley. Tripoli had the most potential for
security problems, he said, adding that Internal Security
Forces chief General Ashraf Rifi needed to do more to protect
the Sunnis there. Jumblatt agreed that the April 28 National
Dialogue's reiteration of the need for calm during the
electoral period was an indication that it was in no one's
interest to stir up trouble.

SAUDI INTENTIONS UNCLEAR
--------------


15. (C) Jumblatt again confirmed reports we have been hearing
for months that the Saudis have stopped providing funding to
assist March 14 in its election campaign. Noting that former
Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon (now Saudi's Minister of State)
Abdulaziz Khoja had recently made a 24-hour visit to Lebanon,
during which he met with both Hariri and Speaker Berri,
Jumblatt wondered when the Saudis would again "turn on the
faucet." The Saudis could help make a difference especially
in Zahle and Beirut I, he said. Asked whether Hariri would
be the next Prime Minister in the event of a March 14
victory, Jumblatt said this was up to Saudi King Abdullah.

RESIGNATION REGARDING
RELEASE OF FOUR GENERALS
--------------


16. (C) Regarding the imminent decision by the Special
Tribunal on whether to release the four generals in Lebanese
custody, Jumblatt, citing Hariri, said March 14 must accept
whatever verdict the court hands down. The Ambassador
sugested that whatever the decision, March 14 should stress
the Tribunal's adherence to the rule of law and
non-politicization. (Note: The Tribunal's announcement came
just after we left Jumblatt's home; Hariri held a press
conference at 6 pm the same evening, in which he welcomed the
decision as proof the Tribunal was not politicized and was
effective in starting its work. End note.)

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Jumblatt's nonchalance regarding a visit to the
Maronite Patriarch surprised us. Nonetheless, the Patriarch

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has said publicly (on new MTV-Murr Television station) in an
April 26 interview that Jumblatt had personally justified his
statements, adding that Jumblatt "also clarified the matter
to us through delegating Minister of State Wael Abu Faour,
who told us that the PSP and its leader respect the
patriarchy." "In any case, we respect MP Jumblatt, and I do
not think that what he said has greatly affected the
historical 2001 reconciliation in the Mountain (between the
Druze and the Maronites) especially since he clarified what
he wanted to say," Sfeir added. Nonetheless, Jumblatt's
slamming of the Sunnis and calling the Maronites "a bad
breed" continues to rankle many we talk to. Finally, while a
March 14 meeting and statement of unity prior to the
elections will help the coalition's image with the voting
public, March 14 candidate problems in Baabda, Beirut I,
Zahle, the Chouf, Jbeil, and elsewhere have yet to be
resolved. End comment.

SISON