LEBANON: PM SINIORA: MOVEMENT ON GHAJAR CAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000485

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
OVP FOR HMUSTAFA
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA: MOVEMENT ON GHAJAR CAN
STILL HELP MODERATES IN LEBANON

REF: A. SECTO 00001 270050Z APR 09

B. BEIRUT 466

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) PM Siniora told the Ambassador on April 27 that he
believed an Israeli announcement on withdrawal from Ghajar
could still have a positive impact on Lebanon's June 7
parliamentary elections. Praising the April 26 visit of
Secretary Clinton to Lebanon and the clear U.S. commitment to
Lebanon, Siniora also urged the U.S. to find a solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian problem as the key to eradicating the
roots of extremism in the Middle East. Concerned that the
imminent announcement by the Special Tribunal in The Hague on
the fate of the four generals currently in Lebanese custody
could have a negative impact, Siniora nevertheless
acknowledged the importance of the Tribunal's adherence to
the rule of law. Criticizing the ineffectiveness of the
national unity government, Siniora expressed pessimism that
the cabinet would achieve significant results before the
elections, including outstanding appointments. Clearly in
campaign mode, he outlined his electoral strategy for winning
a parliamentary seat in his hometown of Sidon. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with PM Siniora and his aide Rola Noureddine at his office in
the Grand Serail on April 27, one day after the Secretary's
visit to Lebanon (Ref A). Siniora praised the visit, stating
it "confirmed the established position of the U.S.
administration" vis-a-vis Lebanon. President Sleiman had
telephoned him the previous evening to give him a readout.
The messages all tracked with what the Secretary had told him
during their meeting at the Gaza donors' conference in Sharm
el-Sheikh, said Siniora.

NOT TOO LATE FOR GHAJAR
--------------


3. (C) Siniora said he believed that it was not too late for
an Israeli Defense Force withdrawal from Ghajar to have a
positive impact for the moderate March 14 coalition in the
upcoming elections. Even just an Israeli announcement that
it intended to withdraw would help the moderates in Lebanon,
he added. Siniora discounted the possibility of Hizballah
criticism that any movement on the issue would be too little
too late, noting that the group would spin any decision,
regardless of timing or content, to its advantage.


4. (C) Siniora and Noureddine both stressed vehemently,
however, that they believed the Israelis should not place any
conditions on withdrawal, which would only play into
Hizballah's hands. "Keep it clean," Siniora said. He also
argued that UNIFIL Commander General Claudio Graziano should
make any eventual announcement, rather than any other party.
This, he said, would be the best way to capitalize on the
results of indirect talks (referring to the UNIFIL-IDF-LAF
tripartite meetings on Ghajar technical issues). Putting the
UN at the forefront would avoid giving Hizballah additional
fuel to criticize the GOL.


5. (C) Comment: We recommend that we move to making
President Sleiman (rather than Siniora, a candidate in the
upcoming elections) the point person within the GOL on Ghajar
to avoid any perception that the issue is being manipulated
for political purposes. Dealing with Sleiman on Ghajar could
also enhance Sleiman's stature within Lebanon, and the role
of the presidency in general, if these efforts are
successful. End comment.

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE IS PARAMOUNT
--------------


6. (C) Siniora complained that there was no "clarity of

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vision" yet from the new Israeli government. The API was the
only acceptable proposal on the table, he said, but more
effort was needed to market the idea both in Israel and with
Arab states. There had been so many negotiations over the
years, leaving little doubt about what the end result would
be. Siniora wondered whether there was anything left to
negotiate.


7. (C) The real obstacle, Siniora continued, was that neither
Iran nor Israel had a real interest in finding a solution.
Iran is afraid of losing influence in the region and is
trying to trade its nuclear file for regional power, he said.
Iran is hijacking the Palestinian issue to boost its own
credentials in the region. It therefoe continues to support
groups like Hizballah, whch, he noted, citing its role in
Egypt, is not just a problem in Lebanon.


8. (C) Siniora repeated his common refrain that the real
issue "par excellence" was the Palestinian-Israeli problem.
Acknowledging that the new U.S. administration faced several
challenges, he nevertheless urged it to "spearhead" efforts
to find a solution. This would pull the carpet out from Iran
and other radicals in the Arab world, he said. The
Ambassador stressed the continuing U.S. commitment to a
comprehensive Middle East peace, including a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Siniora
countered that words were not enough; the Arab world was on
the "brink of radicalization"" because moderates have nothing
to show.

RELEASE OF FOUR GENERALS?
--------------


9. (C) Siniora opined that if the Special Tribunal decided to
release the four generals currently detained in Lebanese
prison, this would have a negative impact in Lebanon --
worse, he said, than Walid Jumblatt's criticisms of his March
14 allies (Ref B). However, Siniora noted that he had passed
the message to his colleagues that the Lebanese government
had decided to establish the Tribunal and therefore must
accept the consequences of its decisions. Siniora agreed
with the Ambassador that, either way, the decision reflected
the Tribunal's respect for the rule of law and was not an
indication of the generals' guilt or innocence. Ambassador
noted that, if anything, a recommendation for release would
show that the Tribunal's work was not politicized. The
Prosecutor's investigation is continuing and goes well beyond
the four generals.

LAME DUCK CABINET
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador, noting that the cabinet had discussed
security measures for the elections in its last (April 24)
cabinet meeting, asked whether Siniora expected Cabinet
progress on outstanding appointments. Siniora grimly replied
that all appointments were "stuck," complaining that "this
type of government" (i.e., a national unity government in
which the opposition holds a blocking third) cannot
accomplish anything. "I've lost hope," he said. He did not
expect anything to come out of the scheduled April 28 session
of the National Dialogue, but commented that it was not a bad
thing to keep talking. On the stalled 2009 budget and
Council of the South appropriation, Siniora merely criticized
Speaker Berri's lack of credibility, adding that no one in
Sidon (Siniora's district) cared about the Council of the
South. (Note: Cabinet will not meet this week because of
President Sleiman's trip to London. The April 28 session of
the National Dialogue was adjourned without fanfare;
participants agreed that the upcoming elections should be
conducted in a calm and democratic atmosphere. The next
Dialogue session has been scheduled for June 1. End note.)

ELECTIONS, ELECTIONS, ELECTIONS
--------------


11. (C) Asked what the U.S. could do to help support

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moderates in Lebanon in the 39 days remaining before the
elections, Siniora suggested avoiding public statements that
could be used by the opposition to discredit the March 14
coalition. He also cited the need to work on the Christians
by enhancing the position of the Patriarch and cultivating
Armenian voters, capitalizing on the Armenian community in
the United States. Agreeing with the Ambassador that
Armenian Tashnaq seemed firmly wedded to the Michel Aoun and
the opposition, he nevertheless argued there were still some
"borderline" Armenians who could be influenced.


12. (C) Siniora himself had been active on the campaign
trail, meeting personally with thousands of constituents in
his hometown of Sidon over the weekend. He freely admitted
to making up for lost time, not having lived in Sidon for
years and being cooped up in the Grand Serail during
Hizballah's year and half "tent city" protest outside his
Beirut office. Siniora said he had not intended to run for
parliament, but circumstances made it "imperative" than he
throw his hat in the ring.


13. (C) Although the opposition was joining forces to make
Sidon the "battle of the century," Siniora professed to being
relaxed about his electoral prospects, comparing himself to
the tortoise racing against the opposition's hare. He said
he was working off the assumption that his chances were 50/50
to ensure that his supporters did not take his victory for
granted. His focus was on "enlightened" Shia and Christians
who had emigrated from Sidon during the 2006 and previous
wars.


14. (C) Sidon voters were concerned primarily with their
immediate needs, rather any March 14 political program,
Siniora said. Rather than talking from an "ivory tower" down
to voters, or lowering himself to their level and staying
there, his approach was to reach down to voters and pull them
up. He hoped to provide value-added by developing Sidon's
institutions and private sector, all the while keeping an eye
on the nation's macroeconomic situation.


15. (C) Siniora relayed that he had circulated a paper to
cabinet during the April 24 meeting outlining his vision for
economic development throughout the country. He had been
soliciting funding from Gulf countries, and enumerated a
number of projects he was pursuing both in Sidon and other
areas. Siniora said he had received the support of prominent
Sidon-based business groupings such as the Bani and Abellah
Groups. Iranian money is continuing to "pour in" to Lebanon,
he noted, and confirmed that March 14 members were
complaining about not getting any money from the Saudis.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) The relaxed and confident Siniora who greeted us was
clearly in campaign mode, with his focus seemingly much more
on winning a seat in Sidon rather than government business.
His complaints about the ineffectiveness of the national
unity government track with Berri's comments to the
Ambassador earlier the same day (septel) that Siniora has no
intention of pushing for cabinet decisions under the current
government. Although Siniora gave no indications of future
aspirations of becoming Prime Minister should the March 14
coalition prevail in the June 7 elections, he agreed with the
Ambassador that the process of cabinet formation could be
prolonged, joking that he expected to be around for quite a
while as caretaker prime minister. End comment.
SISON