Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT472
2009-04-24 14:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: FEW SHIA ALTERNATIVES TO HIZBALLAH

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR IR LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHLB #0472/01 1141450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241450Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3897
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3697
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4754
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000472 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PPD
ALSO FOR R, INR/R/MR, AND INR
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FEW SHIA ALTERNATIVES TO HIZBALLAH
BEFORE ELECTIONS

REF: BEIRUT 351

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000472

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PPD
ALSO FOR R, INR/R/MR, AND INR
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FEW SHIA ALTERNATIVES TO HIZBALLAH
BEFORE ELECTIONS

REF: BEIRUT 351

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Arabic Islamic Council (AIC) emerged in 2006 as a
self-declared Arab alternative to Hizballah. AIC attracted
the attention of Lebanese and Arab media because of its
claims of "promoting a culture of peace and Arab unity" as
opposed to Hizballah's culture of "armed resistance" and ties
with Iran. Hizballah has not commented on AIC's policies.
The AIC has declared that it has an armed wing, the Arabic
Islamic Resistance (AIR),whose purpose is to "oppose the
enemies of Arabism." There is no evidence to indicate such
an armed wing actually exists. After declaring in November
2008 its intention to contest the June parliamentary
elections, AIC announced in March 2009 that it would
"boycott" the elections. Several other non-Hizballah Shia
figures including former Speaker Hussein al Husseini and
former Ambassador Khalil al Khalil, have also opted not to
run in the elections, with the main exception being Lebanese
Options Gathering leader Ahmad al-Assad. End Summary.

AIC: Background
--------------


2. (C) Sayyid Mohammed Ali El-Husseini, a thirty-year old
graduate of the Iranian religious center in Qom, launched the
Arabic Islamic Council (AIC) in 2006. AIC received funding
from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and reached out to
underserved Shia communities in south Lebanon and the Bekaa.
In a November meeting with Public Diplomacy staff, the AIC
announced that it would open television and radio stations,
adding to its already existing newsletter, website, and
online forum. The TV and radio outlets never opened.
Husseini declared in November that AIC planned to participate
in the June 7 parliamentary elections by running fourteen
candidates, including women and youth, in several Shia
districts. However, in March 2009, AIC announced its
decision to "boycott" the elections because Husseini does not
want to participate in a "non-transparent" process.


3. (C) AIC announced in a press release the establishment of

the Arabic Islamic Resistance (AIR),an armed wing of AIC.
Previously, Husseini had promoted peace as a means to counter
aggression. In an interview with news portal
lebanonfiles.com, Husseini stated that AIR was militarily
ready and that it had been training for seven months with
Hizballah's knowledge. Claiming to have 1500 armed men from
different Arab countries, Husseini said AIR had conducted
military maneuvers in the Bekaa. The maneuvers supposedly
included the use of conventional and unconventional defensive
tactics, establishing central command areas to coordinate
future military operations, and tactics to counter potential
chemical attacks. On April 12, AIR claimed it conducted a
military maneuver for its newly created female military
squad. However, there is no evidence that AIR has any armed
wing, controls 1500 armed men or has a female military squad.


Love or Hate Relationship?
--------------


4. (C) The relationship between AIC and Hizballah is unclear.
AIC headquarters are located on the Beirut airport highway, a
Hizballah-dominated area. Contacts in the Beirut southern
suburbs observed that Hizballah has neither harassed nor
interfered with AIC.


5. (C) AIC has made public statements distancing itself from
Hizballah. In an October, 2007 interview with alarabiya.net,
Husseini accused the Iranian regime of attempting to
"assassinate Arab Shia imams and political leaders...," he
went on to say that "(We) as a group of Arab Shia
imams...have started to mobilize against the guardianship of
the jurisprudent and Iranian clout... our relationship with
Hizballah is bad... I am the alternative to Hizballah and its
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah." In November 2008, the
National News Agency quoted Husseini during a press

BEIRUT 00000472 002 OF 002


conference in Tyre. He stated "...there is no third Shia
power in Lebanon, there is Hizballah and Amal, and the true
popular base we represent is that of resistance and we
originate from (this base)...we appreciate and value our good
relationship with Amal and Hizballah, they welcome what we
are doing, we work for Lebanon's sake." In his interview with
lebanonfiles.com, Husseini claimed that AIC coordinates "not
only with our brothers in Hizballah( but also with the
Christian Resistance (nfi)...we will be side by side with the
Lebanese Armed Forces."

AIC'S ROLE AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO HIZBALLAH
--------------


6. (C) Media reports and AIC's website initially identified
it as an alternative to Hizballah and said that it was
focused solely on providing educational and welfare services.
During the November 2008 meeting, the AIC stressed that it
was only concerned with services to the community; and its
members reinforced its message of treating women equally. A
Beirut Shia contact called AIC "nothing but an Iranian tool
that adopts Hizballah's rhetoric and objectives but is based
on Arabism."


7. (C) This same source told us that Husseini received
$500,000 from another, unidentified country to create an
image of an armed group. Another contact from the Beirut
southern suburbs recently told us that AIC was offered money
to claim responsibility for the Katyusha rockets that were
found in south Lebanon in February, but refused.


8. (C) Husseini justified AIC's aboutface on the election by
accusing others of buying votes and because there have been,
according to him, compromises between March 8 and March 14.
Shia contacts in Beirut and the Bekaa said, however, that AIC
decided to boycott the elections because its leadership was
aware that it does not have enough popular support among the
Shia to win any seats in the upcoming elections.

WHERE ARE THE OTHER
SHIA ALTERNATIVES?
--------------


9. (C) Other non-Hizballah Shia also have changed their
minds about running. Former Speaker Hussein al-Husseini
withdrew his candidacy from Baalbeck-Hermel on April 22 and
retired Lebanese Ambassador and figurehead of a prominent
Shia family Khalil al-Khalil, who personally informed Embassy
staff of his intention to run in Tyre (reftel),did not
register to run. The primary Shia figure who is seemingly
not bowing out to Hizballah is Lebanese Option Gathering
(LOG) leader Ahmad al-Assad, who announced his own candidacy
in Hasbaya-Marjeyoun on April 5. Observers criticize Assad
because his Lebanon Options Group does not have a presence in
the south.


10. (C) Assad announced five other individuals in districts
in southern Lebanon are running as LOG candidates. One of
the five, Elias Abu Rizk, who is Greek Orthodox and also
running in Hasbaya-Marjeyoun, clarified to the media
immediately after Assad's announcement that he was not
running on LOG's list and subsequently refused to discuss the
matter over the telephone with EmbOff. Another LOG
candidate, Zein Khalifa, has since withdrawn his candidacy in
Zahrany.


11. (C) A potentially third LOG Shia candidate, Mohammed Ali
Mkalled, is publicly stating he is running independently in
Nabatieh, but an Embassy contact told us he is "secretly
allied with Assad." (Comment: While the withdrawal of
candidates is to be expected, we notice a trend of candidates
intentionally distancing themselves from the most vocally
anti-Hizballah figure, Assad. The quieter Hizballah
opponents have either dropped out, or are forging
behind-the-scenes alliances to bolster their chances on
election day. End comment.)
SISON