LEBANON: AMINE GEMAYEL, GHATTAS KHOURY ON MARCH 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000434

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: AMINE GEMAYEL, GHATTAS KHOURY ON MARCH 14
STRATEGY

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador on April 14, Kataeb head
Amine Gemayel of the March 14 coalition opposed the formation
of a national unity government with a blocking third after
June 7 elections. According to Gemayel, March 14 coalition
leaders had agreed upon "95 percent" of electoral lists.
Gemayel, however, was skeptical that all candidates running
as independents would ally with March 14 after elections.


2. (C) In a separate meeting with the Ambassador the same
day, March 14 member (and independent Chouf candidate)
Ghattas Khoury expressed concern about the March 14
coalition's messaging in the run-up to the June 7 election.
He described palpable Syrian influence in the country,
highlighted by what he described as March 14 exclusion of
outspoken anti-Syrian Christians on its electoral lists.
Khoury professed to support March 14 goals before his own
(although he presented his candidacy without senior March 14
leadership support). Khoury said that having gained
signatures of support from 52 of the 55 Chouf mukhtars
(mayors) for his candidacy, he would not withdraw from the
race. Ambassador urged both Gemayel and Khoury to keep the
focus on the big picture -- a victory for March 14 and
moderate independents -- rather than on simple political
party or solo candidate wins. End summary.

NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
WITHOUT VETO
--------------


3. (C) According to Gemayel, March 14 leaders had not yet
discussed as a bloc the possibility of participating in a
national unity government after the June 7 election.
Gemayel, however, shared March 14 leader Saad Hariri's
concerns regarding a "blocking-third" for the minority, an
arrangement that Gemayel argued made the minority as strong
as the majority. Pointing to several examples of the current
national unity government's inability to make decisions --
including its failure to pass the state budget or appoint the
constitutional court -- Gemayel argued a new national unity
government would provide more of the same. Veto authority
gave the minority power in the government without any share
in the duties, he said.


4. (C) Khoury assessed that a national unity government,
without a blocking third for the minority, could be possible.
He argued a clear majority was necessary to protect Lebanese
sovereignty. He expressed concern that without a decisive
victory for March 14 on June 7, the coalition would face
difficulties when trying to form a government after elections.

"FLEXIBLE" INDEPENDENTS
--------------


5. (C) Gemayel expressed skepticism about March 14's ability
to ensure the allegiance of "independent" candidates after
the June 7 election. Citing former Prime Minister Najib
Mikati -- an "independent" who reportedly will align with
Hariri in Tripoli -- Gemayel said that Mikati was "for
Mikati." Gemayel was unsure if Mikati had given assurances
to Hariri regarding his post-election alliances, but Gemayel
argued the position of Mikati and other independents would
remain "vague." (Note: Septel covers Ambassador's April 14
meeting with MIkati. End note.)


6. (C) Gemayel noted that Mikati wanted to frame himself as
the "alternate prime minister," who by straddling both sides
of the political equation, was able to be called upon to form
a compromise government. Regarding Minister of Trade and
Economy Muhammed Safadi -- another Tripoli "independent" --
Gemayel assessed that Safadi's alliance with March 14 for the
past four years indicated he probably would remain with the

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coalition after June 7.

UNITY AMONG MARCH 14 LEADERSHIP?
--------------


7. (C) Gemayel emphasized that ongoing meetings between the
four key March 14 leaders -- Sunni leader Saad Hariri, Druze
chief Walid Jumblatt, Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir
Geagea, and Gemayel -- required much courage. He noted that
although "differences, problems, and contradictions" exist
among the leaders, they have found "common priorities" in
their goals: the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty and
the removal of foreign influence and threats. After several
meetings, including most recently on April 10, the coalition
had agreed on 95 percent of electoral lists, Gemayel said.


8. (C) March 14 leaders now must strengthen solidarity within
the coalition and among its supporters in order to ensure
that March 14 candidate lists, in their entirety, are
selected by voters. (Note: Lebanese elections are based on
slate balloting. Voters may vote for an entire slate or may
cross off some candidates' names and replace them with other
March 14 or opposition candidates. End note.) Khoury also
emphasized the need for March 14 to encourage their
electorate to replace any crossed-out names with other March
14 candidates.


9. (C) Khoury, on the other hand, argued that Geagea and
Gemayel were solely concerned about the number of seats their
respective parties would win in the next parliament. Khoury
said Geagea, for example, supported an Armenian dentist from
Washington D.C. as the Armenian candidate in Ashrafieh
instead of backing a more popular March 14 but non-LF
Armenian politician. If the LF put forward its candidate,
Khoury assessed that the 25 percent of Armenians, those who
support March 14 in Ashrafieh, would not vote in the election.


10. (C) The Ambassador stressed to both Gemayel and Khoury
that, particularly in such a close race, March 14 should
continue intensive electoral efforts until the last moment.
She also strongly and repeatedly counseled both Gemayel and
Khoury against running March 14 candidates against each
other, whether Kataeb versus LF or Kataeb/LF versus
independents, especially in Christian districts, where tight
races will likely decide overall national election results.
(Note: Ambassador will repeat the same message April 16 to
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Media outlet Tayyar.org
reported April 15 that Ambassador was playing a conciliatory
role among the March 14 forces given the "traffic" impeding
March 14's finalization of its unified candidate lists. End
note.)


11. (C) Khoury also expressed concern regarding March 14
messaging. During the recent Future Movement convention,
Hariri stressed Lebanon's future and ways to improve
economic, political, and social conditions, Khoury said. On
the other hand, LF Geagea focused on the days of the civil
war in order to revive his sometimes extreme Christian base.
This message of the past and war does not appeal to the
Lebanese youth who are deciding if they want to stay in the
country and commit to its future, Khoury opined. Khoury then
told the Ambassador that Jumblatt's upcoming May 1
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) convention would emphasize
support to the Palestinians as its theme. The Ambassador
encouraged March 14 messaging to remain unified and focused
on the end game: winning the election.

SYRIAN INFLUENCE STILL AT PLAY
--------------


12. (C) Citing Kataeb's historical role protecting Lebanese
sovereignty -- a position that made the group a target for
the Syrians -- Gemayel called a "miracle" his party's ability
to counter Syrian influence. However, the Syrians still
maintained influence in the country, especially in the army,
security services, and education sectors, he said. Khoury
mentioned Zahle, Metn, West Bekaa, and Koura as nests of

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Syrian influence.


13. (C) Khoury pointed to the Christian candidates that he
said March 14 had decided not to included on their lists --
Samir Franjieh in Zgharta, Elias Atallah in Tripoli, Antoine
Androus in Baabda-Aley, Faris Soueid in Jbeil, and Khoury in
the Chouf -- and noted the anti-Syrian positions of all.
Khoury argued that those who had been outspoken against Syria
had lost coalition backing. He worried the exclusion of
outspoken anti-Syrian candidates indicated March 14 had lost
its "spirit of fighting."

KHOURY FOR MARCH 14
--------------


14. (C) Khoury stressed throughout his meeting with the
Ambassador that his priority remained the success of the
March 14 coalition, not of himself. Were his continued
candidacy in the Chouf to endanger March 14 electoral chances
in the district, he would withdraw immediately, but that
would cause 30 percent of Christian voters in the Chouf to
support the opposition, he claimed. Khoury presented the
Ambassador with an appeal signed by 52 of the 55 mukhtars
(mayors) in the Chouf district appealing to Walid Jumblatt to
include Khoury on his list. Jumblatt had ignored the
petition, but Khoury plans to leak the paper to media sources
soon.

NASRALLAH-EGYPT
SPAT WONT HURT AOUN
--------------


15. (C) Describing Aoun as a "demagogue" who, in the eyes of
his followers, could do no wrong, Gemayel assessed the
General would experience little fallout from the antagonistic
rhetoric between Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah and Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak. Gemayel described as a "mystery"
Aoun's ability to "hypnotize" his followers. Gemayel also
noted Hizballah's skillful handling of the electoral
alliance; Hizballah has allowed Aoun to appear to his
Christian supporters as a decision-maker in his alliance with
Hizballah, Gemayel said.


16. (C) The Ambassador assured Gemayel that recent U.S.
outreach in the region would not occur at the expense of
Lebanon. Gemayel, however, expressed concern that Lebanese
popular perception of U.S. outreach benefited the opposition
at the expense of March 14. Syria's allies in Lebanon are
depicting U.S. and French outreach to Syria as an
acknowledgment by the West that its policy of isolation had
failed. The Syrians are saying the U.S. "needs" us, Gemayel
said, and the Lebanese are listening. Opening to Syria is
seen as the "new alternative" in the West and, increasingly,
in Lebanon, Gemayel opined. For his part, Khoury noted that
March 14 had not presented a strong unifying Christian leader
to counter Aoun.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Fifty-three days until election, March 14's unity
continues to be less than ideal. Although Gemayel presented
a positive picture of agreement in the bloc, we continue to
hear that he and fellow March 14 Christian leader Samir
Geagea are in conflict as they promote their parties'
candidates for spots in the March 14 electoral lists. In the
case of Khoury, it is very possible that he is overstating
his appeal in the Chouf district because March 14 leaders
Hariri and Jumblatt left him off the March 14 list there.
Even if he is exaggerating, though, surely Hariri and
Jumblatt would prefer that Khoury accept their decision
rather than continue to promote his candidacy, potentially
drawing attention and supporters away from March 14
candidates. We will continue to urge March 14/independent
moderates to display unity in messaging and in candidate
lists in each of our meetings with our interlocutors. End
comment.

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SISON