LEBANON: JUMBLATT WEARY, BUT STILL WITH MARCH 14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000426

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: JUMBLATT WEARY, BUT STILL WITH MARCH 14

REF: BEIRUT 416

BEIRUT 00000426 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) March 14 coalition leader Walid Jumblatt confirmed
to the Ambassador April 9 that he was unhappy about
"abandoning" two Christian candidates in Aley and Baabda
districts, in favor of ones supported by fellow March 14
Christian leaders Samir Geagea and Amine Gemayel. Geagea
and Gemayel were still in competition, he said, and Sunni
leader Saad Hariri had made some missteps of his wn in
districts such as Tripoli and with Shia constituencies.
The key Christian district of Zahle was "a mess," Druze
leader Jumblatt reported. Due to the official start of the
electoral campaign season, Jumblatt said the GOL was now
"inoperative" until after the elections. He predicted
formation of the new government would neither be quick nor
painless, as he expected heated negotiations of several key
ministerial spots, including the Ministers of
Telecommunications and Justice. Jumblatt came across as
weary with his March 14 allies, but still in the March 14
camp.


2. (C) Jumblatt credited Hizballah's electoral program,
released April 1, for speaking directly to the concerns of
the Lebanese public, including economic and social plans.
He said he relationship with opposition-allied Speaker of
Parliament Nabih Berri was "fine," although Hariri and
Berri were not on speaking terms. Jumblatt did not expect
Syria to intervene in Lebanon's electoral season through
the use of assassination or other intimidation tactics,
preferring not jeopardize its budding relationships with
western powers and Saudi Arabia. He praised U.S. President
Barack Obama's overtures to the Muslim world, but believed
that a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was
no longer possible. End summary and comment.

ELECTORAL HORSE-TRADING
WITHIN MARCH 14
--------------


3. (C) March 14 coalition Druze leader Walid Jumblatt told
the Ambassador, DCM, and Poloff that March 14 Christian
leaders Samir Geagea (Lebanese Forces) and Amine Gemayel
(Kataeb) remain in competition with each other to name
candidates, despite general agreement on the March 14
candidate lists for the June 7 parliamentary elections.
Meeting at his Beirut home April 9, Jumblatt said he was
forced to "abandon" two of his preferred candidates for
Christian seats in Aley and Baabda districts, in favor of
ones chosen by Geagea and Gemayel. He said that Geagea and
Gemayel view any "independent" as "undermining," similar to
rhetoric coming from opposition Christian leader Michel
Aoun. Jumblatt also accused Sunni majority leader Saad
Hariri of "ignoring" the Shia constituencies in certain
districts, which now Jumblatt was playing the role of
"bridge" between the Shia and Hariri, he said.


4. (C) In the northern electoral district of Tripoli,
Jumblatt said the list was "settled" and would include
former PM Najib Mikati, current Minister of Economy and
Trade Mohammad Safadi and MP Mohammad Kabbarah.
Independent MP Mosbah al Adab, Jumblatt said, would not be
on the list and believed this was "bad" for the image of
March 14. When asked about Safadi's loyalty to March 14,
Jumblatt responded that Safadi would always stay with the
coalition with "certain conditions" (nfi). Furthermore, he
predicted Mikati would side with a March 14 majority, but
continued to hold out hope for the possibility of joining
an independent bloc in support of President Michel Sleiman.


5. (C) In the Sunni district of Sidon, Jumblatt predicted
current MP and Minister of Education Bahiya Hariri and

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Prime Minister Fouad Siniora would "easily" win. However,
he anticipated majority leader Saad Hariri having problems
with the Jemaah Islamiya party who sought an alliance with
Hariri in Saida and other districts, but was refused. He
said there was a low probability of violence between rival
majority and opposition supporters in Sidon, but added
violence was more likely in the predominantly Christian
district Zahle. In Zahle, "everything is a mess," he said.

GOL "INOPERATIVE" UNTIL
AFTER THE ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (C) With the campaign season now in full swing, Jumblatt
said the government is completely "inoperative." Jumblatt
called President Sleiman little more than "an elections
administrator" assisted by Interior Minister Ziad Baroud.
He said Sleiman's hands were tied when the Cabinet could
not deliver him a viable budget and when Sleiman did not
insist on a independent parliamentary bloc. Both
parliament and the cabinet are handicapped until the
elections are over, he continued. In parliament, he said,
Speaker Nabih Berri would not get a quorum to vote on
legislation until the electoral season ended.


7. (C) Post-election, Jumblatt predicted that the two main
political forces -- the current majority March 14 coalition
and the opposition March 8 alliance, led by Hizballah --
would remain. He cautioned not to expect the formation of a
new government until weeks or possibly months after June

7. Jumblatt advisor Marwan Hamadeh, said the new
government could be formed quicker if -- and he stressed if
-- the election results gave Sleiman a freer hand through a
majority that included March 14 and independents. Jumblatt
anticipated a protracted battle for the parties to agree on
the new Telecommunications and Justice ministers, as these
would remain two of the most sensitive portfolios. (Note:
In the current government, opposition-allied Gebran Bassil
is the Minister of Telecommunications. Bassil also is
running for a parliamentary seat in Batroun. Current
Justice Minister, Ibrahim Najjar, is allied with March 14.
End note.)

JUMBLATT ON HIZBALLAH
--------------


8. (C) Jumblatt credited Hizballah's electoral platform
(reftel),released April 1, for articulating the issues
that the Lebanese people care about at the micro level,
including economic and social issues. By contrast, March
14 kept the level of discourse at a macro level for the
time being, he said, but it would become necessary to talk
about serious problems, such as the economy, unemployment,
and electricity after the election. He assessed that the
relationship between nominal allies in the opposition --
Speaker Berri (Amal) and Michel Aoun (Free Patriotic
Movement) -- was not going well. Hizballah, the dominant
opposition force, would be forced to mediate between the
two for the sake of holding the alliance together and to
ensure Aoun's success.


9. (C) He told the Ambassador that his relationship with
opposition-aligned Berri was "fine," although Hariri, he
said, would not even talk to Berri. He did not, however,
address rumors in the press that he was preparing to defect
from March 14 to join the opposition.

REGIONAL INFLUENCES
AND CHALLENGES
--------------


10. (C) Syria, the "biggest troublemaker in Lebanon,"
Jumblatt assessed, had no interest in using assassination
or other intimidation tactics to interfere in Lebanon's
electoral season. He explained that Syrian government was
not willing to jeopardize, in the near term, recent
diplomatic moves by western powers, such as the United

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States and France, and Saudi Arabia to reach out to it.
Advisor Hamadeh added that he believed the Lebanese were
listening more to other Lebanese, than outside regional
influences for the June 7 election.


11. (C) Jumblatt said he admired U.S. President Barack
Obama's recent statements about Islam and his overtures to
the Muslim world. He called President Obama's visit to
Turkey "excellent." The Arab-Israeli problem, however,
would be a "big headache." He suggested that if
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas could not
take charge of Ramallah, at the least, the possibility of a
two-state solution was "long dead."

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Jumblatt came across as weary with his allies, but
still in the March 14 camp. His encounters with Hizballah,
as portrayed in the press, are not uncharacteristic, as he
maintains that his first priority is always the protection
and security of his Druze constituency. However, the
ongoing electoral wrangling over Christian candidates on a
the March 14 ticket does not portend well for presenting a
unified front, especially when most analysts predict it
will be key Christian districts, such as Zahle, that will
determine the ultimate electoral outcome.


SISON