Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT396
2009-04-06 08:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: SUGGESTED USG MESSAGING IN THE RUN-UP TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000396 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SUGGESTED USG MESSAGING IN THE RUN-UP TO
THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS

REF: BEIRUT 305

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000396

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SUGGESTED USG MESSAGING IN THE RUN-UP TO
THE JUNE 7 ELECTIONS

REF: BEIRUT 305

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) With two months to go before the June 7 parliamentary
elections, the race remains too close to call. Both the
majority March 14 coalition and the Hizballah-led opposition
express confidence that they will win. In the key Christian
swing districts, nervous voters are looking to see who can
best protect their interests. Some observers believe recent
U.S. overtures to Syria and Iran may rekindle Lebanese fears
that a regional "deal" will be made at Lebanon's expense, and
that the U.S. will "abandon" Lebanon. Recent Embassy and
Washington media outreach continues to be effective in
tamping down these concerns. Nonetheless, we can expect that
the Hizballah-led alliance will try to exploit these fears to
pry voters away from March 14. Hizballah's Christian ally
Michel Aoun, still claiming to represent the majority of
Lebanese Christians, already is pointing to recent U.S.
engagement in the region as evidence that his approach --
allying with Hizballah and cultivating relationships with
Syria and Iran -- is best for Lebanon.


2. (C) It appears we have cleared our first hurdle,
reassuring Lebanese moderates that U.S. engagement with Syria
will not come at Lebanon's expense. However, we need to
continue to reiterate our support for Lebanese sovereignty
and independence, as well as the need for the June 7
parliamentary elections to occur on time, free from
intimidation or violence, to quell those voices who are
trying to plant doubt in the minds of voters about the U.S.
commitment to Lebanon.


3. (C) We should take our message a step further and continue

to spell out the U.S. position on Hizballah, given that the
U.S. has designated Hizballah as both a Specially Designated
Terrorist (SDT) organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist organization under Executive Orders 12947 and

13224. While such messaging will not impact either committed
March 14 or opposition supporters, it could make the
difference among undecided voters in critical Christian
areas. The recent UK decision to resume contacts with some
elements of Hizballah, which many in Lebanon erroneously
believe would not have occurred without a green light from
Washington, and which they interpret to suggest that a change
in U.S. policy vis-a-vis Hizballah is not far behind, makes
it especially urgent that we reiterate our position now.
Some fear that President Obama's March 20 message to Iran may
embolden opposition voices who will use our engagement to
argue that the U.S. will turn its back on moderate forces in
Lebanon. Pro-opposition New TV already has concluded that
"...now that the issue of a military strike against Iran was
blown off...the Lebanese majority lost strong cards they
could have used before the elections," while Christian
opposition leader Michel Aoun referred to himself and his
political allies as "the group who is standing with the
winners (i.e., Iran and Syria)."


4. (C) Furthermore, Hizballah already appears to have
launched an offensive to convince voters that there will be
no question of a "Hamas" scenario (i.e., isolation within the
international community) if its alliance wins the elections.
Citing World Bank and French government sources, Hizballah
claims to have received assurances from the international
community that its legitimacy will be recognized. Hizballah
MP Mohamad Raad claims "Western countries are knocking our
doors one after the other in order to have dialogue with us."
At the same time, Hizballah is attempting to paint the U.S.
as the only country unwilling to accept its legitimacy.


5. (C) Of course, we should steer clear of any messages that
hint or suggest U.S. interference in the Lebanese elections.
Our public messaging therefore should be positive, stressing
continuing U.S. willingness to engage and assist moderate
Lebanese leadership, while at the same time underscoring the
U.S. position on Hizballah.


6. (C) Post is incorporating the following themes into public

BEIRUT 00000396 002 OF 003


outreach and/or private messaging:

-- (Public) U.S. policy on Hizballah remains firm: we will
not deal with Hizballah, which we view as a terrorist
organization whose political and military wings are
intertwined. There are long-standing U.S. legal prohibitions
against providing financial and material support to Hizballah
and its related organizations. We anticipate the shape of
U.S. assistance programs in Lebanon will be evaluated in the
context of Lebanon's parliamentary election results and the
policies formed by the new Lebanese cabinet.

-- (Public and private) The U.S. will continue to support
moderates in Lebanon who want to live in harmony with all
their neighbors and are committed to using diplomatic tools
such as UNSCR 1701 to achieve their goals. Diplomacy, not
weapons, is the best guarantee of Lebanon's interest (this
echoes language in March 14's recently released political
program, reftel);

-- (Public and private) The U.S. remains committed to
securing a regional peace in the Middle East, including the
two-state solution. We want to work with Lebanese leaders
who share this vision; Lebanon will play a key role in the
long-term effort to build lasting peace and stability in the
Middle East.

-- (Public and private) The U.S. remains committed to
strengthening Lebanon's state institutions. We are pleased
with the results of our robust military and police assistance
programs, and intend to continue them with partners who share
our objectives of combating terrorism, implementing UNSCR
1701, and expanding the state's authority over all of
Lebanon's territory (alluding to Hizballah's
state-within-a-state status);

-- (Public) The U.S. reiterates its call for free, fair and
transparent elections in Lebanon. We will be watching the
elections closely, and hold accountable those who seek to
impose their will through political intimidation or violence.


-- (Public and private) The composition of the next
government should be made by the Lebanese themselves; the
shape of U.S. assistance programs to Lebanon will be
evaluated in the context of Lebanon's parliamentary election
results and the policies formed by the new cabinet;

-- (Public) Now that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is
operational, Lebanese citizens will want to elect a
government that is committed to cooperating with the
Tribunal, putting an end to political assassination of those
who stand for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence.

-- (Public and private) The election of moderate forces
committed to the rule of law and a free-market economy will
open the door to Lebanon's potential for growth and
prosperity. Conversely, the election of those who resort to
violence to achieve their goals could have repercussions on
the Lebanese economy;

-- (Private) The election of moderate forces intent on
Lebanon's playing a peaceful role in the region makes a
repeat of the 2006 war with Israel less likely, and will
strengthen U.S. efforts to secure Israel cooperation on
issues such as Sheba'a Farms, Ghajar, and implementation of
UNSCR 1701. Conversely, the election of those parties who
continue to be hostile to Israel may make it more difficult
for the U.S. and UNIFIL to convince the Israelis to exercise
restraint in times of conflict, such as the recent Gaza
crisis;

-- (Public) Regardless of which side wins the June 7
elections, the defeated parties should accept the outcome and
not seek, either through violence or intimidation, to impose
constraints not provided in the Constitution. (Note: No
party should be able to prevent the legitimate functioning of
the government through an automatic veto. Under the 2008

BEIRUT 00000396 003 OF 003


Doha agreement, the majority March 14 coalition agreed to
give the opposition such a veto through a blocking third in
the current cabinet. Hizballah is now insisting that this be
incorporated into the next government, arguing that Lebanon
must be ruled by consensus and no confessional group can be
excluded, something March 14 leaders oppose. End note).



7. (C) In addition, the U.S. should:

-- Encourage moderate Arab states (Egypt, UAE, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia),especially those who are providing military
assistance to Lebanon, and the EU to send the same messages
outlined above;

-- Encourage the international community as a whole,
including the UN Security Council, to continue to call for
free and fair elections, free from intimidation and violence
(a similar full-court press effort in 2005 overcame efforts
to postpone the 2005 elections); and

-- Encourage visiting CODELS to Lebanon and Syria to
reiterate U.S. support for Lebanon's independence and
sovereignty, and call for free and fair elections, free from
intimidation and violence. (In Syria, codels and other
visitors should stress that the U.S. is watching the Lebanese
elections closely; if they occur free from intimidation and
violence, we will view this as further evidence of Syria's
commitment to an independent Lebanon.)
SISON