Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIRUT373
2009-03-31 15:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE U.S. SUPPORT TO

Tags:  MCAP PBTS PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY 
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DE RUEHLB #0373/01 0901540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311540Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4564
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3621
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3824
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000373 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR PM ACTING A/S RUGGEIRO
IO ACTING A/S WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
INL FOR A/S JOHNSON
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY, KAHL, AND DALTON
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT, SHAPIRO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: MCAP PBTS PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE U.S. SUPPORT TO
THE LEBANESE MILITARY

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000373

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR PM ACTING A/S RUGGEIRO
IO ACTING A/S WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
INL FOR A/S JOHNSON
DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY, KAHL, AND DALTON
USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT, SHAPIRO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2019
TAGS: MCAP PBTS PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE U.S. SUPPORT TO
THE LEBANESE MILITARY

Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) In all but the most pessimistic post-election
scenarios, a robust program of U.S. assistance to the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will serve to further our policy
goals in Lebanon and the region. Without continued support,
the LAF will be unable to address the challenges of
terrorism, border control, and internal security. While we
want the LAF to one day more aggressively confront sensitive
issues, including Hizballah's weapons, our assistance will
also help enable longer-term political solutions that
consolidate military and political authority in the hands of
the government. We should view assistance to the LAF as a
long-term, institution-building project and a means of
countering terrorism in the region, not merely a political
"reward" to a friendly government. The April 7-9 visit to
Washington by GOL Defense Minister Elias Murr presents an
opportunity to review our strategic cooperation with Lebanon.


2. (C) U.S. military assistance is linked to the LAF's five
year modernization plan, which was developed with U.S.
guidance and based upon two CENTCOM assessments of the LAF's
needs. The modernization plan is intended to elevate the LAF
into a more professional force focused on shared U.S. and
Lebanese goals enshrined in UN Security Council resolution
1701: counterterrorism, border security, controlling
Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps and Palestinian military
bases, and preserving civil order.


3. (C) The LAF's battle against Fatah al-Islam militants in
the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in 2007 demonstrated both the

utility and necessity of our assistance. Without our 41
plane-loads of emergency assistance, the LAF would have been
unable to defeat the militants and take back the camp. Our
assistance is targeted to address deficiencies in LAF
training and equipment revealed during the Nahr al Barid
fighting; LAF units that had received U.S. support performed
markedly better. The battle also highlighted the
disproportionate costs of "emergency" assistance in response
to a crisis; a long-term institution-focused train and equip
program could save money and lives in the event of another
similar conflict.


4. (C) Downgrading our assistance would impede the
implementation of UNSCR 1701. For example, our support to
the LAF aids UNIFIL's mission in south Lebanon and helps
maintain calm along Israel's northern border. After several
rocket-launching incidents during and after the January 2009
conflict in Gaza, UNIFIL and the LAF increased their patrols,
recognizing that even isolated incidents could trigger
renewed hostilities with Israel. Without the vehicles,
tactical surveillance drones, and high vision equipment we
will be providing, the LAF would have a harder time
monitoring UNIFIL's area of operations and deterring further
rocket launches given its acute shortage of manpower. In
addition, our continued assistance is necessary to improve
border security and smuggling interdiction as called for by
UNSCR 1701. If the LAF is to take on large-scale border
security operations, we cannot afford to disrupt provision of
vehicles and surveillance assets as well as secure
communications gear.


5. (C) The LAF has an impeccable record of accountability
for U.S.-origin equipment, including weapons and munitions,
since the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990. The LAF's
track record indicates strong institutional discipline in
supply logistics, as well as the efficacy of our end-use
monitoring and accountability training programs.
Furthermore, the LAF has followed through on commitments to
destroy Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) missiles in
its depots. This was politically sensitive, as it opened the
LAF to criticism that it was reducing its ability to defend
Lebanon under pressure from the U.S. and others. From the
commander to individual officers, the LAF understands the

BEIRUT 00000373 002 OF 002


need to exercise strict control over its U.S.-origin
assistance. We expect the LAF to continue to safeguard all
U.S.-origin training and equipment.


6. (C) In addition to our support to the LAF, we have an $80
million U.S. assistance program for the Internal Security
Forces, aimed at strengthening the ISF so that it can fully
assume traditional law enforcement duties and thereby lessen
the LAF's involvement in policing. Currently, security
responsibilities that would traditionally be carried out by
police, such as crowd control, check points, and some
criminal investigations often fall to the LAF. The program
will train almost 10,000 ISF police members over four years.
The program's goals include improving police skills,
leadership, management, curriculum development and training.
The U.S. is equipping units of the ISF with essential,
non-lethal police equipment and vehicles needed to perform
their duties as well as upgrading ISF training facilities,
command centers and communications systems.


7. (C) Downgrading our support would negatively impact our
relationships with senior Lebanese government leaders
including President Michel Sleiman, Minister of Defense Elias
Murr (who will be in Washington April 7-9),and LAF Commander
General Jean Kahwagi. All are working to build the capacity
of government institutions and curtail the influence of
Hizballah and other militant groups. These leaders have
taken political risks to strengthen ties with us, including
by concluding a bilateral defense agreement at the first-ever
U.S.-Lebanese Joint Military Commission (JMC) in October

2008. (Note: Additionally, as the LAF is led by a Christian
in Lebanon's confessional system and has traditionally been
viewed as a Christian-dominated institution, a reduction in
assistance would strengthen opposition leader Michel Aoun's
and Hizballah's message that Lebanese Christians cannot rely
on the government to protect them. This could push critical
Christian swing voters toward Aoun and his Hizballah-aligned,
Syrian-backed bloc in future elections. Already Aoun is
pointing to the new U.S. contact with Syria and Iran to argue
that his approach of improved relations with them is being
vindicated. End note.)


8. (C) Continued assistance will also strengthen the LAF as
a counterweight to Hizballah. To date, Hizballah and its
allies have refrained from attacking our assistance, but have
made known their discomfort with an increasingly capable LAF.
As the LAF grows stronger, Hizballah's claim that its arms
are necessary to defend Lebanon will grow weaker.


9. (C) Continued backing of the LAF, whatever the electoral
outcome and shape of the next government, will help us
maintain influence over the sole government institution
respected by all Lebanese and further our goal of
de-politicizing government institutions more generally, an
important step in consolidating the government's authority.
At the same time, the embassy recognizes that USG skepticism
in the event of an electoral victory by Hizballah and its
allies may necessitate tactical shifts in the quality and
quantity of our assistance. These shifts could include
canceling the planned delivery of 56 additional M-60 tanks
from Jordan (ten will already have been delivered),not
sending a second Caravan (one will have been delivered); and
reconsidering planned delivery of TOW launchers, 81 mm
mortars and M4 rifles. However, we strongly recommend
leaving the core elements of our train and equip program
untouched. In addition to the senior-level USG policy
discussions that will take place after the June 7 elections
to assess Lebanon's future, the run-up to the October 2009
second meeting of the Joint Military Commission will provide
an opportunity to review our assistance program and make
adjustments as necessary.

SISON