PRC/DPRK: POST-LAUNCH ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000952

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: POST-LAUNCH ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINESE

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Ben Moeling. Reason
s 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Chinese are telling the P-3 countries, Japan and
the ROK the same thing about the DPRK's missile launch: it
might have been a satellite launch (technical data are
ambiguous) and therefore we cannot conclude that it was a
UNSCR violation, pass another resolution or apply additional
or enhanced sanctions. Russia and China agree on this
position, and on the general principle that we should be
encouraging positive behavior by the DPRK rather than risking
isolating North Korea further. A Russian Embassy source said
the Chinese had more influence on the North Koreans than they
admitted to. The Japanese and ROK embassies said that
contact with the Chinese on this issue had been at the
ministerial level, and the ROK and Japanese embassies had not
been able to meet with MFA contacts to discuss the launch.
The Chinese media, meanwhile, has hewed close to the official
line in describing the launch, repeating language on the
right of peaceful use of outer space. End Summary.


Not Necessarily a UNSCR Violation, Says China
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2. (C) Acting PolMinCouns, French Political Counselor Erkki
Maillard and British First Secretary Gareth Ward jointly
delivered a demarche to MFA International Organizations and
Conferences Department, UN Division Director Yang Tao on the
evening of April 7. P-3 members stressed that North Korea's
launch of a Taepo-Dong 2 on April 5 was a violation of UNSC
Resolutions. Maillard and Ward noted that anything short of
a resolution condemning the launch would be inadequate and
would send the message that the UNSC was ineffective. This,
possibly, would encourage other countries who would perceive
that the UNSC would not punish violations of UNSC
resolutions. Maillard added that the failure of the
international community to respond strongly in this case
could cause Japan to rethink its national security strategy
with implications for regional peace and stability.

3.(C) UNSC P-5 members were "facing difficulties" resolving
differences on how to respond to the North Korean launch,
responded Yang. China believes that we need to maintain the
Six-Party Talks, maintain peace and stability in Northeast
Asia, and maintain the authority of the UNSC and the unity of
the P-5. Regarding the various draft resolutions that had
been circulated, China had three primary concerns:

i) Format: China would like to see a press statement, not a
resolution. China would be flexible on a presidential
statement with "acceptable" content.
ii) Sanctions: "Enhancing exiting sanctions" or some similar
formulation would cause problems on the Chinese side, as
mention of sanctions in any way would harm the Six-Party
Talks;
iii) Violation Language: China did not believe the launch was
a clear violation of 1718. China understood the P-3 points
about the connections and links between missiles and space
launch rockets, but the nature of such launches was
different. If the statement were to say "clear violation,"
China could not support it.


4. (C) According to Yang, China felt that the UNSC should
take "proportionate" action. "Technical differences"
remained in the positions of the P-5 countries, but speed was
important and the discussions should not be delayed through
needless argument. China hoped for a low-key, quick reaction
by Council members. French Counselor Maillard asked Yang to
clarify the points on which China had said it needed to do
additional investigation before characterizing the launch.
Yang said that such information at this point would not be
useful, since "arguing over legal definitions and terms would
take such a long time." The Council members should recognize
that this had become an issue to view from a political and
security perspective, not a legal one. To argue over
technical legal details would waste time and not achieve
results, said Yang.

China Understates its Influence over DPRK, Russia Says

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5. (C) Acting PolMinCouns met April 9 with Russian Political
Counselor Sergey Yakimets. Yakimets said that the Russian
Embassy in Beijing consulted "quite regularly" with the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on North Korean issues.
China had influence over North Korea, Yakimets said, because
China represented international legitimacy for the DPRK and
also because China provided a large portion of North Korea's
imports. China downplays this influence, Yakimets observed.


6. (C) The Russian Embassy spoke with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs several times immediately after the launch, but as of
Tuesday, April 7, the Chinese MFA told the Russian Embassy
they preferred that further consultations on the issue of the
launch be handled through both countries' UN offices in New
York. Yakimets said that in the estimation of the Russian
Embassy, the decisions on this issue were being made "above
the foreign ministry's head" but not at the Politburo
Standing Committee level; the Russians assumed that State
Councilor Dai Bingguo was in charge.


7. (C) The Chinese and Russian positions on the issue of the
launch were similar, Yakimets said. Both agreed that the
technical data from the launch were "ambiguous" and could
point to a peaceful satellite launch. Russia and China did
not want to see "debate on this issue which lasted a long
time and achieved nothing," he said. Russia also agreed that
a UNSC resolution would be a mistake. A resolution would
"push North Korea back into its hole" at a time when we
should be using incentives to encourage the DPRK to behave
better. North Korea needed positive reasons to cooperate,
such as a security guarantee, political legitimacy and
economic assistance. He said that the Russians and Chinese
agreed that if North Korea had these things, "it would not
need missiles and bombs." In addition, Yakimets said, Russia
and China agreed that the DPRK's actions in following
international protocols for formal notification in advance of
the launch of a rocket were positive steps that should be
encouraged. "In a way, it showed the North Koreans can
follow diplomatic rules," he said.

Japan to China: Support a Resolution
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8. (C) Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Naksone has had two
phone conversations with PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi,
urging China's support for a UNSC resolution condemning the
launch, according to Japanese Embassy First Secretary
Katsutoshi Takeda. Yang told Nakasone that China had
demanded that North Korea not escalate tensions in the
region, but also urged relevant parties to be cautious and
"have an appropriate reaction" to the DPRK launch, reported
Takeda. Yang had no comment regarding China's position on
supporting a resolution, said Takeda.

ROK to China: Support a Resolution
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9. (C) ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan has also spoken
with PRC FM Yang twice regarding the launch. Yu also urged
China to adopt a new UNSC resolution, said Lee Heon,
Counselor at the ROK Embassy in Beijing. FM Yang's message
to FM Yu was the same that the MFA gave after the P-3
demarche April 7: China preferred a press statement, not a
resolution, but was willing to show flexibility on a
presidential statement if the content was appropriate. It
would be appropriate, said Yang, "to settle the situation
quickly," according to Lee. On a separate note, ROK FM Yu
recently dined with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central
Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Director
Wang Jiarui in Seoul. Wang was a member of CCP Standing
Committee Member Li Changchun's delegation that visited South
Korea April 4-7. During the April 6 dinner, reported Lee, FM
Yu pressed Wang and the Chinese Ambassador to Seoul to
support a resolution.


10. (C) The ROK Embassy attempted to schedule a meeting for
their Ambassador to meet with PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu
Dawei, but was rebuffed by the MFA, said Lee. They were told
that since ROK-China discussions were taking place at the
ministerial level, there was no need to have additional
meetings regarding the launch. The ROK Embassy has also

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requested an emergency appointment with CCID Director Wang
Jiarui, but Lee was pessimistic that ROK Ambassador to
Beijing Shin Jun-seung would get an appointment.

Media Reaction
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11. (SBU) Chinese media have presented straightforward
coverage of the DPRK "satellite test" and have largely hewed
to China's official position. Several Chinese commentators
have echoed comments made by MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu during
the April 7 regularly scheduled press briefing: that a
satellite launch is different from a missile launch, each
country has the right to the peaceful use of outer space,
relevant parties should exercise caution and restraint, and
actions in the UN Security Council should be appropriate.
WEINSTEIN