Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIJING3238
2009-12-04 01:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

PRC/ASEAN: OUTREACH SIGNALS CONCERN OVER RISING

Tags:  EAID ETRD PREL XC CH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7084
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #3238/01 3380124
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040124Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7056
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0128
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7427
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003238 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM, EAP/EP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EEB/TPP/BTA
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD AND ALTBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: EAID ETRD PREL XC CH
SUBJECT: PRC/ASEAN: OUTREACH SIGNALS CONCERN OVER RISING
U.S. INFLUENCE

REF: (A) BANGKOK 00002682 (B) BEIJING 001209 (C)
BEIJING 002699

Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor William Weinstein for reason
s 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003238

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/CM, EAP/EP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EEB/TPP/BTA
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD AND ALTBACH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: EAID ETRD PREL XC CH
SUBJECT: PRC/ASEAN: OUTREACH SIGNALS CONCERN OVER RISING
U.S. INFLUENCE

REF: (A) BANGKOK 00002682 (B) BEIJING 001209 (C)
BEIJING 002699

Classified By: Economic Minister Counselor William Weinstein for reason
s 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: China's outreach to ASEAN over
the past two months, while mainly a repackaging of previous
commitments, is intended to deepen Southeast Asian regional
integration and respond to perceived rising U.S. influence in
the region, ASEAN diplomats in Beijing told Econoffs.
Beijing's commitments include a commercial credit fund and an
investment fund, though it has attempted to distance itself
from the investment fund, presumably in order to reap the
commercial benefits of any investment deals while protecting
itself against claims of mercantilism, as it ostensibly has
ceded control over its investment fund to a "neutral" general
manager. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

CHINA CONCERNED ABOUT GROWING U.S. INFLUENCE


2. (C) China has perceived renewed U.S. engagement in
Southeast Asia as a challenge to its influence in the region,
according to Thai and Singapore diplomats. Despite public
assurances that Beijing welcomes the U.S.-sponsored Lower
Mekong Initiative (LMI) as a potential partner for
development in the region, Beijing officials have quietly
voiced concern about increased U.S. involvement in the Lower
Mekong, according to Singapore EmbOff Joel Tan. Thai EmbOff
Kanyarat Bhanthumnavin on October 28 separately noted that
China had increased its participation in working-level Mekong
River Commission Track II meetings (ref A) because "the U.S.
LMI has got China's attention."

CHINA'S ASEAN AID PACKAGE


2. (SBU) Premier Wen Jiabao at the ASEAN 1 Summit in Thailand
on October 24 announced tweaks to a series of pre-existing
economic packages, including USD 15 billion in commercial
credit for infrastructure projects and a USD 10 billion
investment fund, probably also for infrastructure. The PRC
raised the preferential portion of the commercial credit
package for ASEAN countries to USD 6.7 billion, an increase
of USD 5 billion over the originally announced figure. Of

the USD 10 billion in investment funding, however, China only
planned to raise USD 1 billion in the first year, of which
the government would only provide USD 300 million, according
to China Ex-Im Bank's Deputy General Manager Lu Yueping,
whose Special Financing Account Department was responsible
for the project. According to Lu, institutional investors
would provide the remaining 70 percent, which would be run as
an offshore private equity fund, "just like Carlyle."


4. (C) Lu stressed that although transportation
infrastructure was listed as a priority, the fund's focus
would extend beyond infrastructure projects, despite media
reports and Singapore diplomats' statements that most of the
money would be directed toward a Kunming-Singapore or a
China-India railroad. (Note: The concept paper provided by
Ex-Im listed transportation facilities, public works,
telecommunication networks, energy, and resources as
potential investment targets. End Note.) As a commercial
fund, Lu explained, all investment decisions would be made by
a managing team on a commercial basis, and the general
partners in the fund would operate independently of China's
Ex-Im Bank. Ex-Im would select the general fund manager in a
"process completely transparent to the limited partners,"
according to Lu.
ASEAN DIPLOMATS SING A SIFFERENT SONG


5. (C) Vietnam Embassy diplomats Quach Quang Hong and Thai
Thi Xuan Minh on November 13 told Econoffs that China had
three priorities in the Lower Mekong Region. First, China
wanted to drive development in its southern border provinces
of Yunnan and Guangxi through closer economic integration
with the Greater Mekong Subregion, which included those parts
of southern China through which the Lancang flowed. Second,
China wanted to exploit the sub-region's natural resources,
again to spur development in Guangxi and Yunnan. Third,
China wanted access to the sea through Mekong Delta
countries. (Comment: Although Quach did not elaborate on what
specific purpose China had in mind for ocean access through
the Mekong, a railroad from China to a port on the Bay of
Bengal would lower transportation costs for Yunnan and
Guangxi-produced exports and facilitate natural resource
imports back into Southern China. End Comment.)

BEIJING 00003238 002 OF 002




6. (C) Vietnam Embassy's Quach Quang Hong noted that Greater
Mekong sub-region countries needed to balance Chinese aid and
investment by engaging with other third parties to avoid
over-reliance on China. According to Quach, Vietnam welcomed
the United States, China, the Asian Development Bank, and
other partners' development assistance. China Foreign
Affairs University Professor Su Hao on November 13 separately
told PolOff that deepened U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia
superficially appeared to run counter to Chinese interests,
but in reality benefitted China because it gave Southeast
Asian countries confidence to deepen regional integration
with China without fear of being drawn into a Chinese sphere
of influence.


7. (C) Thai EmbOff Kanyarat Bhanthumnavin told Econoffs on
October 28 that the Lower Mekong countries viewed development
in the region on a project-by-project basis, and focused less
on which country was providing the funding. She noted
Thailand favored a trilateral cooperation framework, where a
developing ASEAN country, a more developed ASEAN country, and
a funding partner such as the Asian Development Bank or the
UN Development Program were all involved.


8. (C) The Singapore Embassy's Joel Tan said on October 29
that China attached different levels of importance to the
various ASEAN members in its regional outreach. China viewed
Indonesia as the "top dog" in ASEAN and was working to
cultivate closer ties. Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines,
Malaysia and Thailand (in rank order) were first-tier
priorities, and Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Burma were
second-tier priorities.
HUNTSMAN