CHINA: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE REPORTING REQUEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002593

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DEPT FOR EAP/CM AND ISN/MNSA
GENEVA FOR CD
UNVIE FOR IAEA
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PGOV UNGA
IAEA, NPT, CH
SUBJECT: CHINA: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE REPORTING REQUEST

REF: STATE 83600

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reason 1.4
(b and d)


1. (C) Below, please find Embassy Beijing's responses to
reftel questions in preparation for the 2010 Nonproliferation
Treaty Review Conference (RevCon).

-- What is the host government's general attitude towards
CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What
factors influence its attitudes and positions?

CTBT: According to MFA Arms Control Department officials,
China would welcome U.S. ratification. China's official
position is that it is moving toward ratification and
supports early entry into force for the CTBT. Arms Control
Department General Policy Division officials have asked to be
kept abreast of U.S. efforts to ratify the CTBT and,
informally, some have indicated an interest in synchronizing
China's ratification with our own.

FMCT: MFA Arms Control Department contacts maintain that
China welcomes the adoption of the FMCT program of work and
looks forward to the beginning of negotiations. The Chinese
suggest we try to address procedural questions from other
countries regarding the negotiations now in order to promote
productive negotiations beginning next year. China is
preparing for the negotiations and is considering asking for
bilateral negotiations/consultations on the FMCT with key
countries including the United States. The Chinese
characterize such bilateral talks as good for "mutual
understanding."

NPT: MFA officials tasked with preparing for the REVCON have
told us that China seeks a successful REVCON with substantive
results and supports a "balanced approach" to the three
pillars. Traditionally, China positions itself as a
supporter of developing countries and will almost certainly
emphasize that the concerns of non-nuclear states should be
addressed. Our MFA contacts maintain that we should balance
disarmament efforts with the peaceful use of nuclear energy
and try not to create confrontations in preparation for the
REVCON.

U.S.-Russia Disarmament: Chinese state-run media has
generally reported news of the renewal of U.S.-Russian talks
favorably. Our Chinese MFA contacts tell us that they look
forward to early substantive results to ongoing U.S.-Russia
negotiations because a good result would promote the
disarmament process worldwide. Our discussions with Russian
counterparts in Beijing lead us to believe there may be
opportunities to work jointly with Russia in promoting
nuclear disarmament by the Chinese, particularly in pressing
the Chinese to be more transparent about whether they
maintain a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons or continue
to manufacture fissile material. We have informally told the
Chinese that their lack of transparency complicates
U.S.-Russian disarmament talks because both Washington and
Moscow must take into account China's arsenal. The Russians
in Beijing share our belief that the Chinese have received a
sort of "free pass" on arms reductions talks and have
maintained the same talking points for over twenty-five years
(namely, that Russia and the United States should disarm
first, China's arsenal is small compared to the two major
powers, and China is willing to discuss reducing its arms
only after Russia and the United States reduce theirs.)

Factors of influence
--------------

There are three major factors of influence on PRC arms
control policies:


1. U.S. positions and policies. The overall positive trend

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in Sino-U.S. relations and the importance of that
relationship to senior Chinese leaders is invaluable. It is
important when meeting with Chinese counterparts to frame our
nonproliferation measures in terms showing their importance
to the overall relationship. Repeating key phrases used by
our leaders such as our shared desire "to build a positive,
cooperative and comprehensive relationship for the
twenty-first century" reminds the Chinese that
nonproliferation discussions do not take place in a vacuum.
The President's nuclear initiatives and calls for nuclear
arms reduction give us new opportunities to engage with the
Chinese. New initiatives such as the UNSC Conference and
Nuclear Security Summit benefit the efforts of arms control
officials in the Chinese government and help create momentum
within China as well. The Chinese have appreciated recent
efforts by senior Department officials to consult with them
on nonproliferation and disarmament matters.


2. Developing countries' attitudes are very important to
China. Some traditional friends of China maintain that
Western countries have double standards allowing nuclear
weapons in the West while thwarting moves among developing
countries. As a result, some bureaucrats in Beijing push
China to remain neutral on these issues. Generally, China
sees its role as trying to play on the differences in order
to enhance its own interests.


3. Regional security environment. We must take into account
the security environment in the area surrounding China as
well as China's own national security interests.

-- What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms
control efforts is the host government likely to take in
upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the
UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review
Conference in 2010?

Conference on Disarmament: Our MFA contacts maintain that
the Conference should focus on issues beyond the FMCT. Other
priorities should include negative security assurances and
the prevention of an arms race in outer space. China hopes
the conference will have a wide focus and "move forward in a
balanced way."

UNGA: China is preparing for the UNGA First Committee
meeting and looks forward to see what other countries will
put forward. Our interlocutors do not expect China's
position to change on expected resolutions.

NPT REVCON: The Chinese would like to resolve recent
obstacles. (Note: Our MFA contacts have made special
mention of the need to duly consider Egypt's proposal for a
Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.) Chinese officials
hope all parties can avoid confrontation over Iran and North
Korea. They emphasize the importance of making the REVCON a
success and acknowledge that failure to do so would be a
major blow to disarmament and nonproliferation progress
around the world.

-- With which countries does the host country work most
closely on these issues?

China holds regular bilateral consultations on these issues
with the United States, UK, EU, France, Germany and Russia.
China has periodic dialogues on these issues with Pakistan,
India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Australia and New
Zealand. Chinese officials discuss nonproliferation under
the aegis of ASEAN Regional Forum with Indonesia, Malaysia
and other ASEAN members. The fact that China has discussed
with us Egypt's proposal for a Middle East nuclear weapons
free zone suggests the Chinese also discuss nonproliferation
issues with some members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

-- Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms
control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry

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of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as Defense and
Energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora?

The Director General for Arms Control and Disarmament,
currently Cheng Jingye, is the key MFA official on these
issues. Cheng led the Chinese delegation to the September 8
Nonproliferation Dialogue in Washington and is well known in
international nonproliferation circles. VFM He Yafei, a
former DCM at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, is very
engaged on nonproliferation and arms control matters. He
told our Ambassador that the recent emphasis on
nuclear-related diplomacy, including the DPRK, Iran
(P5-plus-1),upcoming nuclear summits and CTBT ratification
is forcing a reconsideration of China's nuclear strategy with
attendant staffing and workload implications. Some issues
rise to a higher lever -- reaching to State Councilor Dai
Bingguo, Premier Wen Jiabao, and President Hu Jintao. Other
ministries play roles to varying degrees depending on the
issue. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) closely
coordinates on these issues, in particular the Armament
Division, the 2nd Artillery Division of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) and the General Staff. Civilian
agencies involved in these issues include the National Atomic
Energy Agency, the Department of Public Security and the
Customs Office. While the MFA has a major policy-making
role, it must work with other ministries. Coordination
usually takes place at the DG level, but will sometimes rise
to the Vice Minister level.

-- What role does China play in arms control and
nonproliferation organizations? Does it take a leadership
role on any issues?

China is the chair of the Six-Party Talks aimed at
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Generally, China does
not play a leadership role on other arms control and
nonproliferation issues, seeing the U.S. and Russia as the
leaders of the global denuclearization effort. China
generally supports international efforts to build a more
secure world and often prefers to work through the United
Nations.

-- How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation
policymaking process work, and what is the interplay among
government officials and agencies?

A major obstacle to better bilateral coordination with China
on security issues in general and nuclear nonproliferation
issues in particular is bureaucratic stove-piping within the
PRC. In preparing for upcoming nonproliferation meetings,
Washington should invite interagency Chinese teams to discuss
relevant issues.

-- Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on
which issues? MFA VFM He Yafei is influential and is well
known in Washington. State Councilor Dai Bingguo is the
Secretary's counterpart in the Strategic and Economic
Dialogue. FM Yang Jiechi has some influence. Senior
officials within the MND have strong influence, and Post
suggests U.S. teams visiting Beijing to discuss
nonproliferation affairs seek appointments with PLA
intelligence and general staff officers. MND and MFA have
different nonproliferation and arms control functions within
the Chinese government. MND has the lead on nuclear force
structure and modernization, preparation to counter any
nuclear threat and intelligence. MFA is the lead agency on
international nonproliferation and arms control diplomacy.
We rarely observe MFA officials at MND-sponsored events or
PLA officers at MFA meetings. Post suggests that USG
officials sponsoring meetings focused on nonproliferation and
arms control invite Chinese officials from both MND and MFA.

-- What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection
of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control
or nonproliferation issues?

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Inter-ministerial debate is often intense. Generally, this
process is opaque, but recent experiences with other security
issues in which different ministries advocated different
policies suggest that differences were only solved by
elevating the decision to higher-ranking leaders, sometimes
to President Hu Jintao.

-- How many people in China's missions (New York, Geneva, and
Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms control and
nonproliferation issues? Who are they?

New York: 2 people dedicated to these issues - one Counselor
and one attache.

Geneva: Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, 2 Counselors and
3 other staff members.

Vienna: Ambassador plus one counselor and one staff member.

-- Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key
relevant meetings?

China regularly sends large, multi-agency delegations to key
meetings. This promotes policy coordination, especially when
officials from key ministries are exposed firsthand to other
nations' views.

-- What are the roles and influence of China's nuclear power
industry (if any),academia, and non-governmental
organizations in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation
decision-making?

The nuclear power industry plays an advisory role to
consultations (e.g., FMCT and the multinational fuel supply
mechanism). In recent years, academics and NGOs in China
have played an increasingly prominent and important role in
fostering discussion of ideas, not only in China but in their
interaction with U.S. NGOs and think tanks, through their
publications and in the media. They sometimes coordinate
foreign experts visits to the MFA and other ministries .
Post encourages visiting U.S. delegations to meet with
Chinese academics and to invite them to visit Washington.
HUNTSMAN