Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIJING1032
2009-04-17 10:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:  

CHINESE ACADEMICS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Tags:  PREL PARM PTER NATO MOPS MARR CH PK AF IN 
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O 171023Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3511
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 6900
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0555
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4815
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001032 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2024
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER NATO MOPS MARR CH PK AF IN
SUBJECT: CHINESE ACADEMICS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Classified By: Classified by Acting Minister-Counselor for
Political Affairs Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 B and D.

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001032

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2024
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER NATO MOPS MARR CH PK AF IN
SUBJECT: CHINESE ACADEMICS ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Classified By: Classified by Acting Minister-Counselor for
Political Affairs Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 B and D.

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Embassy contacts expressed cautious support for the
new U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, though our
interlocutors argued that the new strategy did not
appropriately address the Kashmir issue. They were
suspicious of long-term U.S. intentions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Citing China's "foreign policy principle" of
noninterference, contacts expressed discomfort with PRC
involvement in NATO-led security operations, stating that
China could only step up security cooperation under a UN
framework. A number of scholars stated that high-profile
cooperation with the United States, such as participation in
a route for non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan, would
alienate Muslim Uighurs in China's far west and increase the
likelihood that Chinese would be targets of terrorism.
Contacts cited instability and security concerns as principal
reasons Chinese companies have not invested in the region on
a wider scale. End summary.

Cautiously Positive Reaction to the New Policy
-------------- -


2. (C) At a roundtable discussion at the Embassy on April 9,
a group of Afghanistan/Pakistan experts that included think
tank academics, a Chinese mining company official and two
representatives from the Afghan Embassy expressed cautious
support for the new U.S. Policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Li Li, a scholar from the Ministry of State
Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR),said President Obama's
strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan was "pragmatic," because
it integrated economic development and a troop surge. China
Institute of International Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar
Zheng Ruixiang said he agreed with the Obama Administration's
view of the challenges, particularly the emphasis on economic

growth and engagement with other regional players.
Afghanistan Embassy First Secretary Mirwais Nab liked that
the strategy called for challenging Taliban sanctuaries on
both sides of the border and engaging regional actors.

"AfPak" and Kashmir
--------------


3. (C) CICIR's Li noted that the new U.S. strategy treated
Afghanistan and Pakistan collectively, citing the term
"AfPak," but she noted (and other participants agreed) that
China had not yet made this formal linkage. Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (CASS) scholar Ye Hailin noted that
China's academic community views each country as separate and
distinct, and in fact scholars working on each country work
in different departments: Pakistan is covered in South Asia
while Afghanistan is covered in Central Asia. CICIR's Fang
Jinying, on the other hand, argued that linking the two
countries is a mistake, and that China should work with each
country bilaterally and not allow influences from one to
impact strategies in another.


4. (C) Contacts also argued that the new U.S. strategy did
not adequately address the Kashmir issue. Referencing
then-candidate Barack Obama's comments of October 2008,
CICIR's Fang said the road to peace runs through Kashmir.
CICIR's Li indicated Pakistan has a "problem of focus"
because of Kashmir, and as long as the dispute persisted, she
said, "real action" would be difficult. Li said India wanted
no third party to intervene in the Kashmir issue, and neither
the United States nor China could persuade India to move
forward on a solution.

Questions about U.S. Intentions
--------------


5. (C) Our interlocutors were suspicious of long-term U.S.
intentions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Asked about the
likelihood of China participating in security operations at
some point in Afghanistan, Tsinghua University Professor Liu
Libin replied, "without knowing your strategic end goal,
we're not going to just jump into it." CICIR's Li Li also
remarked that the U.S. goals remain unclear, which aroused
China's suspicions. CICIR scholar Fang went a step further,
raising the possibility that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan were
part of a larger plan to contain China. Some Chinese think
the United States wants to destabilize the region if it

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cannot dominate the region, Fang said.


6. (C) Citing anti-China voices in the United States and
recent U.S.-China confrontations in the South China Sea,
CICIR's Fang questioned whether U.S.-China mutual trust has
reached an appropriate level for greater cooperation in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. To increase mutual trust, she
suggested that Afghanistan and Pakistan be issues in the
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

Noninterference and UN Auspices
--------------


7. (C) Some academic contacts expressed discomfort with the
idea of PRC involvement in a NATO-led security operation,
citing China's long-held foreign policy principle of
noninterference, which CICIR's Fang called a "time-tested
policy to keep good relations." Tsinghua's Liu added that
China accepted "interference" in other countries for
humanitarian purposes only under the auspices of the United
Nations. Under the current arrangement in Afghanistan, Liu
continued, there is "little flexibility" for China to support
ongoing coalition military and security operations. CASS's
Ye stated that China should re-think this policy, based on
its growing set of national interests but acknowledged that
the Chinese government would probably continue to avoid any
direct participation in security operations as long as they
were not under UN auspices.


8. (C) Several scholars stated that China supported a leading
role for the UN in Afghanistan and that increased Chinese
security cooperation on Afghanistan could only be stepped up
within a UN framework. The current "characteristics" of a
U.S. and NATO-led effort did not lend themselves to China's
participation, CICIR's Fang said, adding that China could
cooperate in a UN-led military effort agreed upon by "all
relevant parties." Referring to the U.S. proposal for
Chinese participation in a supply route to Afghanistan for
non-lethal equipment, CASS's Ye said agreeing to the U.S.
request would be difficult without a UN resolution. Fang
said allowing the route would be "impossible" as long as the
military effort in Afghanistan was U.S. or NATO-led.

Colluding with the "Foreign Forces"
--------------


9. (C) Contacts suggested that high-profile cooperation with
the United States in Afghanistan would alienate Muslim
Uighurs in China's far west and put Chinese in Pakistan and
Afghanistan at greater risk for becoming targets of
terrorism. "We must avoid talibanization (in Xinjiang),"
CASS' Ye said, adding that China's support for coalition
efforts could also stir up problems with local militias and
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan that currently do not
target China.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization
--------------


10. (C) Asked whether China would assist Afghanistan under
the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
contacts noted that the SCO was not currently in a position
to make significant contributions. "The SCO is not NATO,"
said CASS's Ye. "It's a big family, not an army or military
bloc, and brothers don't always agree." Ye added that SCO
member nations were "a long way" from a common SCO defense
policy but suggested that the SCO, NATO, and U.S. Government
exchange ideas on Afghanistan.

Development Assistance
--------------


11. (C) Chinese contacts cited instability and security
concerns in Afghanistan and Pakistan as principal reasons
Chinese companies had not invested in the region on a wider
scale. CICIR's Fang said that while some companies, such as
Huawei and ZTE, had begun work on reconstruction projects,
the large state-owned enterprises were waiting on improved
security conditions before making significant investments.
She emphasized that China increasingly focused on training
and institution-building in its foreign projects, which could
be utilized to improve relations beyond simple economic
transactions.


12. (C) CASS's Ye reiterated that Chinese investment in
Afghanistan was contingent upon improved security, adding
that China was already making efforts to decrease trade

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imbalances between China and its two neighbors by increasing
imports from both countries, but that production, both the
type of goods and their quantity, limited how much China
could feasibly purchase. Ye continued that China was looking
to expand telecommunications and construction projects in the
region, with contracts stipulating the local proportion of
the workforce. He said that, in the past, importing Chinese
workers for similar projects was more effective because the
labor was cheaper and the workers "took orders well."
Currently, however, Chinese workers had become more expensive
relative to local labor, and hosting Chinese workers in large
numbers in the region presented numerous security issues that
could be at least partially resolved by hiring local workers.


13. (C) CICIR's Li noted the domestic political difficulty
China's government faced when providing aid overseas. While
China wanted to provide aid to Afghanistan, it must convince
Chinese citizens that aid is warranted. Since many Chinese
citizens were poor and in need of government assistance
themselves, she said, the Chinese government could face
difficulty justifying significant aid increases while facing
so many of its own social problems.
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