Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BASRAH66
2009-12-30 07:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN BASRAH BOLSTERS CONFIDENCE IN

Tags:  ASEC PGOV KCOR PTER PREL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7699
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHBC #0066 3640715
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300715Z DEC 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0955
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0533
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0993
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000066 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV KCOR PTER PREL IZ
SUBJECT: STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN BASRAH BOLSTERS CONFIDENCE IN
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basra, US State
Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000066

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019
TAGS: ASEC PGOV KCOR PTER PREL IZ
SUBJECT: STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN BASRAH BOLSTERS CONFIDENCE IN
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basra, US State
Department.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) The security situation in Basrah has remained stable
since the April/May 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign. That
operation largely rid Basrah of the militias that had turned the
province into a cauldron of violence and instability. Although
occasional IED and IDF attacks continue against Iraqi and U.S.
forces, the absence of any large-scale suicide bombings or other
major attacks has bolstered the provincial population's
confidence in the national government to meet its security
needs. People we talked to in every echelon of Basrah society
share favorable impressions of the local security situation,
generally crediting Prime Minister Maliki for having brought
stability to the province.


2. (C) Basrawis mainly view security as a central government
responsibility. They widely hold the Iraqi Army in high esteem
for having maintained security in the province, and see the
Iraqi Army as very much in control of security. Anecdotal
evidence and limited polling data reveal that the local, popular
opinion of the Iraqi Police is less favorable than that of the
Iraqi Army. Despite that perception, the Iraqi Army and the
Iraqi Police work very effectively together throughout Basrah
province on security issues.


3. (C) With the province secure and calm, the PRT observed no
evidence of fears that increasing violence outside of Basrah
will affect the stability or effectiveness of the provincial
government. The concerns that exist about the effectiveness of
the provincial government arise not from lack of security, but
rather from perceptions of corruption, political infighting, and
incompetence. In short, Basrawis expect the provincial
government to continue to operate as it has in the past,
unaffected by outside events.


4. (C) As for the national security situation, Basrawis view the
increased violence in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq through a
political and/or sectarian lens. They see the violence
elsewhere as either a struggle for national political power or
the result of various ethnic/religious groups living together
and competing for influence and power locally. Since Basrawis
credit Prime Minister Maliki with having brought stability to
Basrah province, they do not see him diminished in any way by
the recent spike in violence. Nor do they see the violence
undermining the ability of the national government to govern
effectively. The concerns that were voiced about the impact of
the increased violence on Basrah were not political, but
economic. Some feared that the high-profile attacks in Baghdad
could create a perception abroad that Iraq is becoming less
stable, discouraging foreign investment, especially in Basrah's
growing oil industry.

NALAND