BASRA PROVINCE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER POST: NO PROOF OF LETHAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000060

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2019
TAGS: SMIG SNAR ECON PGOV ETRD PTER KTFN KCOR PREL IR
IZ
SUBJECT: BASRA PROVINCE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER POST: NO PROOF OF LETHAL
AID, BUT CONCERNS REMAIN

REF: A. A) BASRAH 052 B) BAGHDAD 366 C) BAGHDAD 343

B. D) 08 BAGHDAD 2964 E) 08 BAGHDAD 3475

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CLASSIFIED BY: John Naland, Leader, PRT Basra, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d),(g)

1. (U) This is a Basra PRT reporting cable.

Summary
--------------


2. (S/NF) Operations, equipment and procedures at the Shalamsha
port of entry (POE) at the Iraq-Iran border are under-financed
and inadequate for appropriate cargo and passenger screening.
The POE lacks clear lines of authority as a dozen GOI agencies
vie for control. Border control authorities enter passengers
through border control databases. They identify only a handful
as "travelers of interest" to detain. In response to these
problems, the US civilian-military Point of Entry Training Team
(POETT) has initiated and funded improvements and training.
While GOI and USG officials agree that vulnerabilities to lethal
aid exist at the POE, they have found no real evidence of it.
Officials also suspect that other smuggling occurs along the
lightly monitored border. Other challenges include POE
corruption, incompetence, under-resourcing, and enforcing basic
rule of law. Financial Systems Assessment Team officials
identify the lack of bank branches and a viable national customs
declaration policy as further vulnerabilities. If the GOI
expects to cement and build on USG initiatives to bring the POE
up to international standards, it will have to match the efforts
of POETT with much harder work and more good will. End summary.


Background on Shalamsha
--------------


3. (C) Basra Province has three POEs: Shalamsha; the Iraq-Kuwait
overland border at Safwan; and the Port of Umm Qasr. Shalamsha
is 13 miles due east of Basra, and around 20 miles northwest of
Khorramshahr, Iran. On the Iraqi side, a two-lane highway leads
to the POE flanked by vacant wasteland. Like other Iraq-Iran
POEs, Shalamsha was closed from the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
war in 1980 until 2003. It reopened for passenger and
commercial traffic in 2003. The GOI closed it to cargo during
the March 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign against
Iranian-supported militias. It reopened January 2009. Since
then, cargo and passenger throughput has increased. The POE,
which employs approximately 360 people, is open about 12 hours
per day, seven days per week. Passengers, but not cargo, cross
on Fridays. Typical traffic volumes can be seen in the week of
October 29 to November 5, 2009. During that time, the POE
processed 3,985 travelers inbound to Iraq, 3,655 travelers
outbound to Iran, and 761 cargo trucks. Duties collected for
that week totaled USD 74,600 and taxes equaled USD 13,500.
POETT calculations project around USD 3.6 million in total
tariffs, taxes, visa fees, and duties during 2009.

Confused Lines of Authority
--------------


4. (C) Like the Port of Umm Qasr (ref A),the Shalamsha POE
lacks any clear line of authority. The POE is nominally headed
by a representative from the GOI's Ports of Entry Directorate,
under the Ministry of Interior, but Deputy Director Kareem told
PRT EconOff that their control is more persuasive than legal or
operational. Over a dozen different ministries and agencies vie
for control, including the ministries of Health, Interior, Civil
Customs, Defense, Tourism, National Security, Agriculture,
Finance, Transportation, and the Iraqi National Intelligence
Service (INIS).

USG Presence
--------------


5. (C) MNF-I forces and DHS contractors maintain a nearby POETT.
Operating since early 2009, it works to train, mentor and
advise Iraqi border officials and inspectors, improve command
and control, and help to clearly delineate roles and
responsibilities among the various GOI entities.

One Way Trade: Iran Exports to Iraq
--------------


6. (C) US and GOI authorities confirm that POE trade is 100
percent one-way, with all goods going from Iran into Iraq. A
daily average of 120 empty Iraqi trucks enters Iranian territory
to load up Iranian goods. Iranian goods are largely comprised
of construction materials (cement, bricks, re-bar, ceramic
tiles, and Styrofoam panels),some agricultural produce

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(tomatoes, watermelon, potatoes, apples, cucumber, onions, and
green peppers),dry grocery goods (fish and packaged cookies),
refrigerated dairy products, and automobiles (around 300 per
week). It is difficult to obtain any accurate provincial trade
statistics on this aspect of Iran-Iraq trade as Iraq's
statistics agency, COSIT, does not gather or disseminate across
provinces. The inadequate customs procedures and equipment make
it difficult to accurately gauge the scope of trade at the POE.

Passenger Traffic: Largely Elderly Iranian Pilgrims
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The isolated clutch of ramshackle containers in the
middle of the desert seems an unlikely place for a busy border
crossing that processes over one-half million passengers per
year. According to POETT data, an average of 1,640 passengers
enter or exit the POE daily. POE officials report that around
90 percent of Iranian travelers are mostly older Iranian
religious pilgrims visiting Iraqi Shi'a holy sites of Najaf and
Karbala. Once Iranian passengers enter the Iraqi side, they
board one of the many buses and minivans waiting to take them to
Basra city. In recent months, the U.S. military constructed an
extensive overhead passageway system, providing relief from the
intense sun and heat. Other construction has improved what was
a passenger bottleneck.


8. (S) GOI officials process incoming passengers via the PISCES
(Personnel Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation
System) border control database. Iranian males between 14 and
65 years of age are taken aside to be fingerprinted and
photographed by USG officials using the biometric BATS
(Biometric Automated Toolset) system. According to USG and GOI
officials, only a handful of "travelers of interest" have been
found and detained at this POE in 2009. However, they caution
that this is not a watertight system. It is possible to enter
Iraq overland along the vast and largely unmonitored border.
Baggage and passenger screening is done by x-ray baggage
scanners, bomb-sniffing dogs, and/or walk-through metal
detectors. Officials caution that these machines are not always
functioning. A shortage of female Iraqi border guards means
that women travelers are sometimes not searched. According to
POETT officials, no lethal aid has been detected at the POE
during the time it has been present. Other than the equipment
mentioned, the POE lacks explosive- or drug-detecting devices.

Cargo Screening Procedures
--------------


9. (C) Iraqi trucks wait to cross to a transfer loading dock on
the Iranian side to pick up cargo out of the sight of GOI
inspectors. When the trucks return, customs inspectors scan
them with a single back-scatter x-ray. Two are necessary for a
full view of cargo trucks but only one of the three units on
site is currently operational. Health inspectors have the
rarely exercised discretion to send samples of food to Basra for
testing. Inspectors weigh cargo on a single, rickety scale.
POETT officials cite the need for a secondary inspection area,
which would relieve the pressure on the inspectors to conduct
inspections quickly to keep the traffic moving.

Operations, Equipment, and Procedural Shortfalls; US POETT
Provides Limited Assistance
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Iraqi and USG officials at the POE contend that
operations, equipment, and procedures are under-financed and
inadequate for appropriate cargo screening. POETT officials
deem POE leadership to be inefficient and possibly corrupt.
Buildings, equipment, and housing are old. Electricity supply
and connections are haphazard and hazardous. There is no Iraqi
grid connection to the site and Iran provides a weak and
sometimes intermittent supply. Occasional blackouts occur
during which time Iraqi and US officials have no knowledge of
what is going on. The POE lacks a dedicated phone landline to
Basra. There is no Iraqi surveillance system. The POE lacks a
formal trash collection or cleaning arrangement. There is
insufficient potable water for staff or travelers, and raw
sewage collects next to administrative buildings. There is
little to no lighting during the night. Workers come for a
one-week period and sleep in dilapidated accommodations or
outdoors.


11. (S) The POETT has initiated and funded improvements.
Construction of a new Iraqi Police station is about to begin.
Contractors are running electrical wiring throughout the POE.

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Water and septic work is also in progress. A new ramp is under
construction to facilitate faster cargo transfer. POETT staff
has conducted training in the areas of basic POE operations like
search procedures, technology, and professionalism. POETT
officials contend that while the Iraqi staff largely understands
these issues, they apply them only selectively. POETT officials
have also offered to provide two electricity generators, but as
the POE has no budget for fuel, this option might not be
exercised. Other possible purchases include hand-held wands and
a baggage scanner.

Despite Vulnerabilities, No Evidence of Lethal Aid or Militias
-------------- --------------


12. (S) GOI and USG officials agree that potential
vulnerabilities relating to criminal or even lethal nature exist
at the POE. Despite the vulnerabilities, they emphasize that
they have found no evidence of exploitation of the weaknesses.
At the same time, they concede that this assertion does not mean
that there is no lethal aid or militia members coming in; they
have just not seen it. (Note: Some observers and GOI officials
have speculated that some Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militants who
fled Basra to Iran after the March 2008 Charge of the Knights
campaign could be slipping back. POE officials claim that they
have not been detected. End note). In addition, given the
roughly 100 miles of lightly monitored Iran-Basra Province
border alone, such activities might not be observed at the POE.

Significant Challenges
--------------


13. (S) POETT officials strongly suspect that away from the
limits of the POE, smuggling exists, chiefly of oil. FSAT
officials identified the lack of a bank branch as another
vulnerability. Transactions are all done in cash, and according
to FSAT and USG military officials, this increases the risk of
corruption and various types of illicit money flows, including
terrorism financing. While there have been discussions about
installing a bank, there is none yet. Another vulnerability is
the absence of a viable customs declaration policy at the
national level. The policy should include documented procedures
and controls, and a mechanism to share information with other
GOI entities. POETT officials suspect that bulk and counterfeit
cash has been detected, but not reported, by POE officials.
Another concern, voiced in the past by GOI provincial and
national officials, including former Basra Governor Wa'eli (ref
E) regards possible Iranian efforts to influence the January
2010 Iraqi national elections by smuggling in fraudulent
ballots, ballot boxes, or false identification cards.

Comment: Shalamsha Faces Challenges in Maturing as a POE
-------------- --------------


14. (S) Despite improvement, there are legitimate concerns.
Inadequate screening, equipment, and training at Shalamsha
create vulnerabilities for lethal aid or militia members, as
well as smuggling of drugs, cash, and other contraband. This is
of particular concern given the coming year's drawdown of US
military presence and involvement. POETT officials expect
infrastructure improvements to continue during and after the
drawdown, but at a much slower pace. Without a USG presence,
however, they fear that oversight may fall victim to endemic
corruption unless the GOI acts quickly to improve port
officials' pay and living conditions. The USG's options are
limited to providing the infrastructure and human resource
training and assistance in the remaining months. If the GOI
expects to cement and build on USG initiatives, it will have to
match the efforts of POETT with much harder work and more good
will. Though the GOI has recently initiated some small projects
and improvements at the POE, it will have to step up its efforts
significantly if it hopes to quickly bring the POE up to
international standards. End comment.
NALAND