BASRA INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ON LOCAL AND FOREIGN THREATS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000049

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRA INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ON LOCAL AND FOREIGN THREATS

BASRAH 00000049 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Shearer, Deputy Leader, PRT Basra, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
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Summary
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1. (C) In a September 6 meeting, Colonel Hazam, head of the
Iraqi Intelligence Service's Fusion Center for the Basra region,
called the special cells of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) the biggest
security threat in southern Iraq and said Baathists and other
insurgent groups were infiltrating their ranks to advance their
own agendas. Commenting on foreign interference in Iraqi
affairs, he said that Iran was a bigger and more sophisticated
threat than Syria, and was using ISCI as a strategic ally to
advance its goals. Hazam predicted an increase in violence
leading up to the January national elections, and saw the recent
attacks as a signal to PM Maliki to reconsider his refusal to
join the Iraqi National Coalition. Hazam assessed Basra's
security forces as better prepared and more capable to counter
the expected spike in violence, but said that insurgent
infiltrators were still present within their ranks, including in
senior positions. Our dealings with Colonel Hazam has shown his
intelligence on threats to be highly accurate, and his methods
for flushing out the terrorist very effective. End summary.


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Baathists Pump Up the JAM
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2. (C) Hazam gave an assessment of the security threat in
southern Iraq. He divided enemy forces into two groups -- the
Iranian-backed JAM and all other groups. Hazam stated that the
special cells of JAM are a constant threat, one he deals with
daily. In the "other" category, Hazam included hard-core
Baathists, the Badr Corps, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AIQ),and other
unspecified groups. While still a threat, he said these groups
had become less active than JAM of late. In fact, Hazam said
that with so little activity coming from them, the security
forces had been "poking" these groups to elicit useful
information on their membership and possible plans. AQI's
profile in particular, said Hazam, was much lower as a result of
a shift in its attention to Afghanistan. AIQ, however, remained
a threat since it still maintained sleeper cells in Iraq that
could be activated at any time.


3. (C) Hazam said that the Baathists and other insurgent groups
were infiltrating special cells of JAM and using them as a
platform to advance their own agendas. Though the specific
agendas of the various groups differed, they all shared common
goals:
- to weaken the central government;
- to prove that the political groups supporting the attackers
still had the power to create chaos, and could not be ignored;
and,
- to create instability in Iraq that would scare off potential
foreign investors; (Hazam cited the early September mortar
attack on a refinery outside of Basra as the latest "message to
foreign companies" to stay away).

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Iran and Syria: Pursuing Same Goals, Using Different Means
============================================= =============


4. (C) Commenting on foreign interference in Iraqi affairs,
Hazam stated that all of Iraq's neighbors benefitted from its
insecurity and would welcome the failure of its democracy. He
said that Syria was supporting forces trying to destabilize
Iraq, but not to the same degree as Iran. In addition to
supporting insurgents, Iran was using all available means --
political, economic, and diplomatic -- to exert influence in
Iraq. As the latest evidence of Iran's ill intentions toward
Iraq, Hazam cited a cache of 1,500 Iranian-made IEDs and
numerous launchers recently seized in al-Amarah. He stated that
since ISCI was involved the Bloody Wednesday bombings in
Baghdad, Iran was greatly benefitting from PM Maliki's
scape-goating of Syria.


5. (C) Hazam said that Iran was using ISCI as a strategic ally
in advancing its goals. He said that recent change in ISCI
party leadership would not alter this relationship since Iran
had strong connections throughout party structure that ensured
its influence within ISCI. Hazam said that PM Maliki had not
politically exploited the change in ISCI leadership or the
involvement of one of ISCI Vice President Adel Abdel Mehdi's
body guards in the July 28 Rafidain Bank robbery in Baghdad, in
which eight people were killed. He said that Maliki understands
that going after ISCI in any way would cross a red line with
Iran.

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Better Means to Counter the Expected Increase in Violence
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6. (C) Hazam predicted an increase in violence leading up to the
January national elections. He expected a spike in
assassination attempts from the Badr Corps against political
opponents. He also foresaw a rise in general violence aimed at
sabotaging the economy and creating a sense of insecurity. Much
of the recent violence, according to Hazam, could be seen as a
signal to Maliki to reconsider his refusal to join the Iraqi
National Coalition, the successor to the Shiite-dominated UIC.


7. (C) Asked to assess the ability of Basra security forces to
counter the expected spike in violence, Hazam said that they
were more willing to fight and much better at conducting
surgical strikes as a result of experience gained in the
April/May 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign. He believed that
these forces had managed to rid themselves of many low-level
infiltrators from insurgent groups, but likely still had some
infiltrators serving at much higher levels, making the
infiltrators potentially more effective and dangerous.

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Comment
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8. (C) We have had multiple interactions with Colonel Hazam.
His intelligence on terrorist threats has been highly accurate,
and his methods on flushing out terrorists have proven very
effective.
SHEARER