Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BASRAH2
2009-01-25 14:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

MAJOR GENERAL AZIZ CONFIDENT ABOUT SECURITY BUT ACKNOWLEDGES

Tags:  PGOV PINS ASEC IZ IR 
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VZCZCXRO4547
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0002 0251427
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251427Z JAN 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0820
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0403
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0857
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000002 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC IZ IR
SUBJECT: MAJOR GENERAL AZIZ CONFIDENT ABOUT SECURITY BUT ACKNOWLEDGES
SOME VIOLENCE POSSIBLE

REF: 2008 BAGHDAD 3475

CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000002

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINS ASEC IZ IR
SUBJECT: MAJOR GENERAL AZIZ CONFIDENT ABOUT SECURITY BUT ACKNOWLEDGES
SOME VIOLENCE POSSIBLE

REF: 2008 BAGHDAD 3475

CLASSIFIED BY: Ramon Negron, Director, Regional Embassy Office
Basrah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary: Meeting with the REO Director at Iraqi Army
14th Division Headquarters, Major General Abd al-Aziz al-Dalmi
expressed confidence in his security plans for election day but
acknowledged the likelihood of some violence, including
political assassinations and a brief period of political
instability immediately after the elections. He also discussed
Iranian influence in the province and Tehran's perceived
attempts to undermine the local economy. End summary.

Security: Election Day and Beyond
--------------


2. (C) During his January 14 meeting with the REO, Aziz
confidently promised that citizens would be able to vote safely
on election day. He added that some election-related violence
was to be regrettably expected, however, and suggested the
possibility of political assassinations prior to January 31st.
There have been some incidents of violence but none that could
be directly linked to the elections. He also stressed the
likelihood of violence in the months immediately following
election day. Aziz explained that democracy and the peaceful
transition of power were not fully understood in Iraq, and
various individuals would seek to resist election outcomes. He
confidently added, however, that the ISF were prepared to face
the expected threat (small targeted intimidation attacks) and he
projected a return to normalcy within three months.

Iran
--------------


3. (C) Aziz vented his frustration at perceived Iranian
dominance of the local economy. He explained that Basra was the
center stage for political power in the region and that Iran was
jockeying for control. According to Aziz, Iran benefits from
Iraq's poverty. He accused Tehran of trying to undermine
Basra's economy by dumping cheap and subsidized goods onto the
local market and suppressing Iraqi industrial development. Iraq
buys many Iranian goods because they are cheap, he explained,
and a wealthier Iraq would have other market options. Likewise,
he added that Iraq's inadequate health care resources produce a
steady flow of patients seeking medical care across the eastern
border. Aziz asserted that Iranian economic policies seek to
keep Iraq poor. (Note: Many Basrawis equate Iran's predatory
trade practices - even though they may be legal - with an agenda
to undermine Iraq. Like most Basrawis, Aziz can not - or is
unwilling to - give specific examples of illegal activity
connected to Iran. End Note.)


4. (C) Although Aziz expressed support for an open commerce with
Iran, he reiterated concerns of Iranian interference in Iraqi
affairs. He pointed out that the importation of goods provides
smuggling opportunities for lethal aid, including military
hardware, ammunition, and expertise. Aziz commented that
ports-of-entry, especially the port at Umm Qasr - which does not
fall under his command - should be tightly controlled.
According to Aziz, increased contact with Iran would mean
increased influence. "There are hardliners in Tehran who want
to export the Islamic Revolution, a plan which benefits from an
unstable Iraq" he said, "and we have politicians who are Iranian
proxies."


5. (C) Comment: Aziz is judged as very competent by Coalition
military personnel. His leadership is evident from talking to
his subordinates and walking around his three-square-kilometer
headquarters, which noticeably lacks the litter and sectarian
flags which are common in other military compounds. Reports
from REO contacts confirm Aziz's positive assessment of the
local security situation and anecdotal evidence suggests that
public confidence in the ISF continues to be strong. For a
Shi'a with rumored ties to ISCI and Badr, his hostile attitude
towards Iran is notable, and shared by many Basrawis. (See
reftel.) Coalition intelligence sources have recently reported
plans by various groups to assassinate candidates and target
voters at the polls, confirming Aziz's prediction of
election-related violence. End comment.

NEGRON