BASRA: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000015

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV IZ
SUBJECT: BASRA: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE

REF: BASRA 13

BASRAH 00000015 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Ian Sheridan, Economic Officer, Economic Section,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



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Summary
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1. (SBU) In March 17-19 meetings with the Senior Advisor for
Southern Iraq and the Regional Embassy Office, Basra political
leaders all but conceded that the next provincial government
will be headed by the Da'wa-led State of Law coalition, despite
attempts by opposition parties to capitalize on serious
divisions within the winning slate. Selections for the five
executive positions have still not been completed, though State
of Law has a plan for allocating the seats. Incoming Provincial
Council (PC) members pledged cooperation for the betterment of
Basra citizens, cited the need for tangible improvement in the
areas of services, security, and employment, as well as a
continued strong partnership with the Provincial Reconstruction
Team to be led by the U.S. as of April 1. End summary.

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Opposition Dreams
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2. (C) Newly-elected PC members gave the impression that they
were advising and lobbying the coalition-building process, but
that final decisions for Basra were being made by the Prime
Minister. Amir al-Fayez, sheikh of the Bani Amer Tribe and
leader of the Justice and Unity party, said that he had been to
Baghdad four times since the elections to discuss. He believed
that three "independents" within the 20-seat State of Law
delegation were unhappy enough with the coalition-building
process that they could be flipped to his side, which would give
the opposition a majority 18 of 35 seats. Fayez said that the
opposition was already coordinating as a group, with ISCI/Badr
and the Sadrists both attending a recent meeting he organized.
Fayez also left the door open to cooperation with State of Law,
saying that it would be smart for them to "put the burden on all
the parties" by appointing members from outside the party, thus
sharing any success and blame. He said that his party could
also leave the PC if there are "no fruitful results," and hinted
that he might later seek a seat in the Council of
Representatives.


3. (C) Hasan Kadim Hasan al-Rashid (Shaheed al Mihrab),leader
of Badr Organization, a former Governor, and the only PC member
who won re-election, was less optimistic that the opposition
would be able to make deals with State of Law dissidents. He
also played down the idea that the 15 non-SOL PC members would
be able to form any kind of cohesive opposition. He noted the
"different perspectives" among many individual parties, citing
in particular Fadhilah and the Christian representative, making
any such group hard to be cohesive. On the other hand, he said
"if there is conflict within the State of Law, we can make
things happen and take advantage."

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The View from Da'wa
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4. (C) Dayaa Jafar Hajham, newly-elected Da'wa Central PC member
and also Southern Oil Operations Manager, told us that the Prime
Minister's office had approved a plan developed by State of
Law/Basra for allocating executive seats. In this plan, the new
governor will be from Da'wa Central (Maliki's wing),the PC
chairman from Da'wa Iraq, and one of the two deputy governors
will be from the "Independents" wing associated with Dr. Safa
al-Safi. The plan included some outreach to the opposition.
Sheikh Amir al-Fayez will be offered either a deputy governor or
deputy PC chairman, with the other position going either to the
Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party or Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National
Accord. Jafar said that his coalition sees al-Fayez as "the
most cooperative one" among non-State of Law PC members.


5. (C) Dayaa acknowledged that the choice for governor would
come down to Dr. Chaltag Abud and himself, both Da'wa Central
members. When prodded, he said he was the leading candidate.
(Note: many REO contacts have also told us Dayaa has emerged in
the past couple weeks as the most probable governor. End note.)
Dayaa said that State of Law had discussed naming a governor
from outside its ranks as a means of showing that Da'wa was not
attempting to horde all the executive positions, but later
decided that it would be unwise to do so. The recent experience
with Governor Wa'eli - who never commanded the respect of the PC
majority - was cited as an example to be avoided.

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Maliki-Sadrists
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6. (C) Sadrists, who will be lining up with State of Law in most
other Shi'a-majority provinces, will not be part of the
governing team in Basra. Dayaa explained that Basra citizens
had "a bad experience with them; it would be hard to explain
(cooperation in the PC) to the people." He also noted that the
two newly-elected Sadrist PC members are not experienced in
government or management and do not have much to offer. Dayaa
noted wearily that some Sadrist detainees have been released
lately, due in part to talks with Baghdad, but said "we are
concerned even about those who were released." Hassan-Rashid
from Badr Organization, on the other hand, suggested he could
get along with the Sadrists in the opposition, saying "we
weren't the ones who attacked them."

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Christian Minority View
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7. (C) Dr. Saad Mati Potrous, who will occupy the Christian seat
on the PC, said that he had declined an offer to join a Da'wa
coalition. He emphasized that, given the vulnerability of his
constituents, it would be better to "keep on the sidelines," and
that he has good relations with all parties. He has told REO
officers in the past that other parties trust the Christians in
Basra, and it is best to "stay out" of their politics. He said
that his top priority will be to take care of the Christian
community's affairs. He asked for assistance in re-establishing
what he said was one of three destroyed or neglected Christian
community centers.

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Need to Deliver
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8. (C) All interlocutors emphasized that Basra citizens are
demanding tangible improvements in services, security, and
employment. Dayaa, the potential governor, focused on services
specifically, listing his priorities as electricity, water, and
health (sewage and hospitals). Everyone acknowledged that the
PC will be judged by its performance in these areas.
Representatives expressed their desire for a continued strong
partnership with the Provincial Reconstruction Team, to be led
by the U.S. as of April 1. Hassan al-Rashid (Badr) said that if
the U.S. and other "friendly countries" do not invest in Basra
and Iraq, "unfriendly" ones such as Iran will continue to do so.

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Comment
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9. (C) New PC members are well aware that the electorate has
high expectations for them to deliver. If Da'wa takes the vast
majority of executive positions, as appears likely, it would
strengthen the bond between Basra province and the central
government in Baghdad -- a relationship that has traditionally
been contentious and at time dysfunctional. While this would
contribute to the centralization of power in the Maliki
government, it could also help Basra get greater attention and
resources. End comment.
NEGRON