FORMER PRESIDENT PATASSE CALLS ON THE AMBASSADOR

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TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT PATASSE CALLS ON THE AMBASSADOR

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Former President of the Central African
Republic (CAR) Ange-Felix Patasse called on the Ambassador on
Monday, November 16, 2009. In the course of an hour and half
long visit Patasse affirmed his friendship with the United
States, blamed the French for his downfall, and stressed his
utility to U.S. foreign policy -- specifically concerning Libya.
The Ambassador stressed that the United States supported
institutions and processes, not individuals. He noted that the
United States recognizes only one elected government in the CAR;
that of Francois Bozize and was opposed to any attempt to change
the government by non-constitutional means. He repeated our
three main messages: Armed groups must cease hostilities and
participate in the political process; the government must foster
development and protect human rights, and the CAR must look to
the private sector, not international assistance to finance its
development. Patasse was effusive and flattering and said that
he hoped that there could be future meetings. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) On November 12, 2009, former CAR president Ange-Felix
Patasse "convoked" the Ambassador to meet him at his residence.
The Ambassador declined the convocation, but replied that he
would be willing to meet the former president at the chancery.
On November 16, Patasse came to the chancery with an escort of
about ten troops from an international PKO force (MICOPAX) in
full battle dress and body armor. He was accompanied by a large
delegation. The Ambassador admitted only Patasee, his wife, his
Foreign Minister, and three advisors to the office - all others
were excluded.


3. (SBU) Patasse began by affirming his friendship with the
United States, naming all of the U.S. Presidents, Secretaries of
State, and Assistant Secretaries for African Affairs with whom
he had worked. He expressed great admiration for President Obama
and took much credit for facilitating the U.S. rapprochement
with Libya. He quoted the adage that one can choose one's
friends, but not one's family. He then characterized Kaddafi as
"African family" and the United States as a friend. Patasse was
very proud of a meeting that he claimed to have organized in
Bangui where he left the U.S. and Libyan negotiators in a room
with the warning that they would not be allowed to leave until
they had produced an agreement. One of the messages of his visit
was that, if elected, he would be helpful to the United States
in relations with Kaddafi, whom he referred to repeatedly as
"The Guide."


4. (SBU) He presented the Ambassador with hard copies of three
position papers on the upcoming CAR elections:
-- A project to use satellite telephones and computers to
transmit polling results from 6,000 polling stations to Bangui;
-- A call for a new census to establish new lists of voters; and
-- A demand that all Central African refugees and internally
displaced persons be allowed to vote.
These color documents featured Patasse's portrait on the cover
and were datelined Tripoli, 23 September, 2009 and Bangui, 6
November. The first paper proposed a $10 million satellite
telephone network to transmit election results to Bangui.
(Note: Less than $7 million has been pledged in international
assistance for the elections, and the government has committed a
little more than $2 million. End Note.) The second paper is a
careful review of the current electoral situation and calls for
a new census to establish a list of voters and various other
reforms -- this is a serious issue since there are no viable
lists remaining from the last elections. The third paper calls
for the CARG and the international community to develop
mechanisms to assure that internally displaced persons (IDP) and
refugees can vote in the upcoming elections. This, too, is a
serious issue as there are well over 200,000 Central African
IDPs and refugees. It is not at all unreasonable for Patasse to
assume that his supporters make up the majority of these people
and want to be sure that they can vote.


5. (SBU) Patasse blamed the French for his political troubles,
claiming that they had sabotaged his government from the
beginning, but he did not elaborate. This is nothing new and it

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is very clear that the French are not at all pleased to see him
back in Bangui. Patasse said that he would be running as an
independent, but did not spend any time attacking Martin
Ziguele, the leader and official presidential candidate of the
political party that Patasse founded (the MLPC).


6. (SBU) In response, the Ambassador stressed that the United
States supported institutions and processes, not individuals.
This point is especially important as Patasse and his partisans
have always made much of U.S. Ambassador Daniel Simpson's
energetic (and successful) efforts to force then-President
Kolingba to hold elections in 1992. (Patasse was elected
president in 1993, after Kolingba's efforts to corrupt the first
elections were exposed.) Because these elections would never
have taken place without Ambassador Simpson's intense personal
efforts, the MLPC has sometimes tried to present itself as the
party of the United States and has, on occasion, offered implied
criticism of the current U.S. ambassador for not giving them
public support. The Ambassador went on to stress that the United
States recognizes only one elected government in the CAR -- that
of Francois Bozize -- and is opposed to any attempt to change
the government by any non-constitutional means. The Ambassador
repeated our three main messages: Armed groups must cease
hostilities and participate in the political process; the
government must foster development and protect human rights, and
the CAR must look to the private sector, not international
assistance to finance its development. The first of these
messages is especially important as Patasse is widely seen as
the inspiration for, if not actually connected with, the Popular
Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD),the major rebel
group in the northwest of the country.


7. (SBU) COMMENT: Patasse was confident, charming, and
flattering in the extreme. It is clear that despite years of
exile, Patasse still feels very presidential as witnessed by his
initial "convocation" of the Ambassador. During the course of
the conversation, he said that he would be "convoking" the other
ambassadors in Bangui. Indeed, the Chinese ambassador went to
meet Patasse at Patasse's residence, where, as might be
expected, Patasse stressed his long abiding friendship for
China. The Special Representative of the Secretary General of
the United Nations received Patasse at her office, not his. The
French Ambassador, Dean of the Corps, has not decided whether to
meet Patasse at all.


8. (SBU) Patasse attached great importance to his relationship
with Kaddafi and seemed rather oblivious to the possibility that
the U.S. might not/not be entirely favorably inclined towards a
Central African head of state who was close to Libya. Similarly,
he did not seem consider the possibility that it was this very
closeness to the Libyans (and Bemba's Congolese rebels) that
made his overthrow popular with many Central Africans. One of
his initial demands as a condition of his return to Bangui was a
security detail from CEN-SAD; Kaddafi's new African organization
(http://www.cen-sad.org/new/index.php?option= com_content&ta
sk=view&id=33&Itemid=76). The Central African government is very
aware of the Patasse/Kadaffi connection and quite ready blame
many of its problems with rebel groups on "foreign" money and
influence.


9. (SBU) Patasse's return to Bangui is the subject of great
interest and speculation in the media and in the street. As
reported previously, popular theories include:

A. He really thinks that he can win the election as an
independent.

B. He has cut a deal with Bozize -- he spoils Martin Ziguele's
chances and Bozize will let him reclaim his lost properties.

C. He cut a deal with Ziguele - we just don't know what it is
yet.
Following the rule that one should always look for the simplest
answer, we would have to rank the probability of these theories
in the order presented, even if the second seems the most
reasonable. END COMMENT.
COOK