LEADER OF A FAILED STATE: HOW BOZIZE MAINTAINS POWER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGUI 000022

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

AF/C FOR SSARDAR, MASHRAF, SLOPEZ, KWYCOFF; PARIS FOR RKANEDA;
LONDON FOR PLORD; YAOUNDE FOR POL/ECON
STATE FOR OPS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON EAID CT
SUBJECT: LEADER OF A FAILED STATE: HOW BOZIZE MAINTAINS POWER


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Francois Bozize took power in the Central
African Republic on March 15, 2003 overthrowing Felix-Ange
Patasse. It was his second attempt at that coup, but may have
been only the last in a long series of extra-legal attempts to
gain power. This message describes how Bozize, often the man in
the background, has none the less consolidated and maintained
his hold on power. END SUMMARY

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The Man and the Military
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2. (SBU) Bozize is always referred to in formal introductions as
General of the armies as well as head of state. This is not a
mere formality; his father was a military officer and he has
been a military man for almost all of his adult life. Moreover,
he appears to see the military as both a guarantor of his power
and a threat. He had been appointed to ever higher military
posts in every Central African government, starting with that of
Bokassa and continuing through that of Patasse. (It is rumored
that his favor with Bokassa was enhanced by his physical attack
on a French non-commissioned officer who his alleged to have
insulted Bokassa.) He has been, at various times, for various
governments, Minister of Defense, Minister of Information, and
Chief of Staff of the Army. It was during his tenure as
Minister of Information for President Kolingba that he was
accused of coup plotting, arrested, returned to Bangui and,
according to reports (BBC and others),physically tortured.
There are also numerous reports of his being the enforcer for
various presidents and taking the lead in the violent
suppression of various coup attempts and mutinies. The key
point being that Bozize does not appear to be any stranger to
violence, both political and personal. He is also no stranger
to palace conspiracies and the danger of the military turning on
the president as has happened so many times in the cAR's past.
His presidential guard has included Chadian and, more recently,
South African elements as well as Central Africans such as the
notorious Eugene Ngaikosse, responsible for reprisals against
civilian populations for attacks on the regime by rebel forces.
Bozize has, until recently, maintained for himself the title of
Minister of Defense, though he has now appointed his son Francis
as Deputy Defense Minister.

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The Man and the Government
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3. (SBU) While Bozize is clearly a military man, he has long
harbored political ambition, dating from at least 1993 when he
lost the presidential elections to Patasse. Now in power at
last, he is not an impressive president. Most elements of the
government are barely functioning, staffed by often unpaid civil
servants with no resources, while Bozize fills key ministries
with members of his family and clan. Foremost among these is
Minister of Mines Sylvain Ndoutingai, a former Colonel in the
armed forces, who is usually described as Bozize's nephew. With
access to the nation's diamond resources, Ndoutingai is the
Bozize clan's money man, often working with individuals such as
Saifee Durbar, an Anglo-Pakistani businessman wanted for fraud
in France and recently given the position of Vice-Minister of
Foreign Affairs in a brazenly transparent attempt to establish
immunity from prosecution for Durbar.

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The Opposition(s)

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4. (SBU) Sadly, perhaps, the Opposition is unimpressive; the
best lack all conviction, while the worst are simply full of
passionate intensity against Bozize, the man - none is evidently
more competent or less corrupt. Former Patasse Prime Minister
Martin Ziguele, head of the MLPC is an urbane, sophisticated man
who ran strongly against Bozize in 2005, but the Inclusive
Political Dialogue of 2008 seems to have sidelined him and he
has told us that he is content to make his living doing
consulting work in Paris and that he no longer seeks any
government position. The rest of the unarmed opposition to
Bozize is arrogant, disorganized and lacking in any coherent
program beyond the questioning of Bozize's legitimacy. Much of
their disdain for Bozize results from his membership of the
Gbaya ethnic group, described by some Central Africans
(including one Minister in the government) as `the stupidest
tribe in the nation.' Bozize's time spent driving a bush taxi
is much mocked by better educated opposition figures, some of
whom, in their impassioned rhetoric, border on advocacy for
violent overthrow. Yet in July and August of 2009, when Bangui
was deprived of electricity and water following failure of power
turbines at the Boali dam, the opposition was unable to organize
planned demonstrations to protest the government's incompetent
handling of the crisis. The members of the former armed
opposition have yet to step forward and take any political
action. Interestingly, but again, not surprisingly, the unarmed
opposition say that they have not yet made any effort to reach
out to the former armed opposition to form common fronts, or
plan joint actions. The CAR's population was deeply traumatized
by the looting, rape, and killing by forces loyal to former DRC
rebel turned DRC Vice-President turned ICC defendant,
Jean-Pierre Bemba, that came to Patasse's aid. Bozize's coup
was eagerly accepted by Bangui and he may be still be seen as
the best alternative, being `the devil you know.'

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The neighbors
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5. (SBU) Chadian President Deby assisted Bozize in his seizure
of power. Although Deby is preoccupied elsewhere, Bozize
probably counts on Deby to protect his northern flank. To the
south, former DRC Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, currently on
trial by the ICC, no longer holds sway in Equateur, neutralizing
any threat from across the Oubangui River. The north east of
CAR, bordering with Chad and Sudan is so remote from Bangui as
to be of little concern to Bozize. Accordingly, he has been
content to let French troops, now wearing EUFOR badges, maintain
a presence in Birao until such time as a UN force is deployed as
part of MINURCAT. Similarly, while the arrival of the Lord's
Resistance Army in south-eastern CAR in February of 2008
attracted international attention, it was virtually ignored by
the CARG; Obo is closer, and has better road links, to Kampala
than Bangui. Relations with Cameroon appear to be almost
moribund. Bozize has not met Biya in years and the Cameroonian
Embassy in Bangui was led by a Charge for over a year until the
recent appointment of a new Ambassador; this despite the CAR's
almost total dependence on Douala as its only real port.
Congolese President Sassou is a friend of Bozize's: he was the
only foreign leader to attend CAR Independence Day celebrations
in 2007. The friendship may be based in part on forestry
concessions made by Bozize's government to companies controlled
by members of Sassou's family as well as on common membership of
the same Masonic lodge. At the same time, the CAR forest

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industry complains that the poor state of the Pointe
Noire/Brazzaville railroad, coupled with `processing' delays of
up to six months, means that they cannot export logs down the
Oubangui River and are forced to use the much more expensive
overland route to Douala. They also note that the Cameroonians
are subsidizing fuel costs for their timber industry to keep it
competitive during the world market downturn. Bozize clearly
has important work to do with his neighbors, but there is no
sign that he is even aware of these issues. Which brings us to
Gabonese President Bongo. Bozize was born in Gabon, a fact
which may or may not have significance, and President Bongo
speaks the Central African national language Sango fluently,
according to some reports. What is undoubtedly significant is
that Bongo agreed to act as godfather to the peace accords
reached between the government and the rebels and to open and
close the Inclusive political dialogue. According to at least
one observer, Bongo provided the cash necessary to buy off the
rebel leadership. COMMENT: Given the political, rather than
tribal nature of the CAR's civil war, AmEmbassy Bangui is
inclined to believe these reports. END COMMENT

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Outside interests
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6. (SBU) Although Bozize reportedly received a tongue-lashing
from French President Sarkozy during their brief one-on-one
meeting at the Elysee in November 2007, tensions appear to be
somewhat eased with the settlement of a dispute between the
government and French petroleum company TOTAL and the signing of
a deal with AREVA for exploitation of CAR's uranium resources.
The French Embassy in Bangui, previously tough with the CARG on
governance issues, appears to have moderated its position with
these developments and the arrival in August 2008 of a new
Ambassador who appears more favorable to Bozize. The
appointment of Saifee Durbar as deputy minister of foreign
affairs may have ended that honeymoon. The French have
demarched the Department in Washington about Durbar and the
French ambassador (PROTECT) has had several very quiet
conversations with the Ambassador in Bangui. These
conversations express his deep frustration with the actions of
the Bozize government and his search for ways to make it clear
that the Durbar appointment is an unacceptable insult and that
the Bozize government will have to suffer a penalty. While
AmEmbassy Bangui had previously thought that the French Embassy
in Bangui was ahead of the Quai, it now appears that they may
have Paris on board and that we may expect some action by the
French. Although China was unwilling to finance the repair of
the Boali turbines, Bozize knows that he can count on the
Chinese, and the Russians (who have no visible interests in
CAR),for at least tacit support. The Chinese have built a
large stadium and continue to build schools and similar projects
while running an aggressive public diplomacy program with
outreach directly into the poorer neighborhoods of Bangui. The
Chinese are also reported to have bought 49 per cent of the
French uranium concession at Bakouma. Libya's presence is much
diminished since the beginning of the decade, but Bozize has no
issues with Gadhafi in particular or with the African Union in
general. Bozize does, however, appear to be concerned about the
possibility of an ICC investigation into the activities of his
forces when he took power, writing a formal letter to UNSYG Ban
to suspend the prosecution of Bemba.

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The population

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7. (SBU) There is a streak of fatalism and resignation among the
population. Most Central Africans are poor, many are
traumatized by the events of their history and all appear to be
tired of the struggle for power among Bokassa's heirs. Bozize,
who is an uncharismatic leader, even when he is somewhat more
animatedly addressing crowds in Sango, is thus able to portray
himself as a force for stability. He also makes just enough
movement in his accommodations with the opposition and in his
cabinet appointments (most of which, including that of Prime
Minister, come with no real authority) to hold out to optimists
the hope for a better future. Pessimists believe that Bozize
will allow a certain amount of democracy as long as it will not
lead to his being voted out of power.


8. (SBU) The conventional wisdom in Bangui today is that the
opposition is incapable of mounting any real action against that
Bozize government and the general population is too resigned to
take action. The Ambassador was thus very attentive when the
French let him know, very privately, that they are dusting off
their Emergency and Evacuation plans and are concerned by what
they see. At least some in the French embassy believe that
popular patience does have limits and they note that
confrontations in Bangui have always been violent. There is no
way of knowing if the French have information that causes them
to be worried or if this is merely a result of the arrival of a
new Defense Attache, a special forces officer with a previous
tour in Bangui during one of the spasms of fighting. In any
case, we continue to work on our emergency preparedness.

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The Future
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9. (SBU) What does this mean for U.S. policy and activity in the
CAR? A full discussion can be found in our Mission Strategic
Plan, but in simplest terms: The peace accords provide an
opening in 2009, but the history of problems in CAR is long and
the challenges of engaging with this government start at the
very top. We must thus keep our expectations low. We must do
all we can to protect the fragile peace and prevent the failure
of the upcoming elections. Any other programs that we may
attempt will be rendered irrelevant if the CAR slides back into
civil war.
COOK ##