MINURCAT PERFORMING WELL, BUT VIOLENCE IN NE CAR NEEDS A

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000212

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: MINURCAT PERFORMING WELL, BUT VIOLENCE IN NE CAR NEEDS A
POLITICAL SOLUTION

REF: A : 09 BANGUI 195 and Previous

BANGUI 00000212 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 8th, 2009, the United Nations
Mission in Chad and the CAR (MINURCAT) hosted an Ambassadorial
level (attended by POLOFF) trip to Birao, Central African
Republic (CAR) as an informational session ahead of the October
21 Security Council meeting on the Mission's role. The
northeastern town in the Vakaga prefecture suffered two attacks
by ethnic Kara militias in June (Ref A) and ethnic tensions have
simmered since. With the rains coming to an end, and suffering
from a poor harvest due to the conflict, Birao and the
surrounding area risks descending into renewed violence.
MINURCAT in Birao is functioning well and is up to full
capacity, but suffers from a fundamental mission flaw: it was
sent to Birao to protect Darfur refugees and the humanitarians
providing them services but is now facing an unexpected civil
conflict. The solution to the quarrel in the region is a
political one and MINURCAT is ill equipped to facilitate this.
It is therefore the opinion of Post that the UN Office in the
CAR (BONUCA) be pushed to take a more active role in the
conflict with MINURCAT's mission in Birao supporting its efforts
at mediation. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The town of Birao is still marked by the violence from
June. The abandoned Kara area is over grown with weeds sprouted
during the rains. The Prefet of Birao claims that all is
returning to normal, citing evidence that the markets, empty in
July, are now full again. Yet, when the delegation drove by, the
market it was empty. The Prefet had no idea why the market was
closed and it was only later that the delegation found out that
it was because the Houssa ethnicity traders were on strike
because of a violent reprisal the day before by a few Kara who
had a bike stolen three days previous. The deficient knowledge
of the Prefet was telling of the overall lack of engagement and
understanding by the Central African Government (CARG). Though
there was a marked increase in military (FACA) elements (NOTE:
in June about 30 FACA were in Birao, now, the Prefet claims to
have 100. END NOTE),the government has only three functionaries
in the city. Furthermore, though MINURCAT offered to transport
the teachers from Bangui needed to start the school year, the
Prefet has until now not gotten back to them and schools have
yet to open.


3. (SBU) The delegation then met with the Sudanese Consul. The
Consul is the only accredited member of the diplomatic corps
residing outside of Bangui and he is widely thought to be the
true center of power in the town. As stated previously (Ref A),
Birao and the cities in the east down to Bambari, 250 km away,
depend almost exclusively on Sudan for their commercial goods.
In exchange, this fertile area provides western Sudan with
agricultural goods, diamonds and even ivory. As a result, the
government of Sudan (GOS),through the Consul, is more active in
Birao politics than the CARG. According to the Consul, the GOS
sent the peacemaking mission of early July that halted major
hostilities and is organizing a meeting in November for all the
ethnic groups. He did not give any more details about the
gathering and said that the ``ball is now in the CARG's court''.
Alarmingly, the Prefet did not mention anything about the
meeting. It is also very clear that the GOS interests lay with
the Kara. The Consul stated with conviction that the town, which
is thought to be majority Goula, is a Kara one. Therefore, it is
a strong possibility that the GOS' role as an arbiter will not
produce a peaceful consensus.


4. (SBU) The last meeting was with the humanitarian actors
(NGOs) who were all pessimistic about the coming months. They
believe that when the roads open after the rains - probably in

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late October or mid November - there will be renewed fighting.
Each of the NGOs agreed that they would not be able to leave
Birao without armed protection and one said they had been
informed by the Kara militia that if they left Birao, their cars
would be stolen. To a person, the NGOs do not see any political
motive for the threats towards the international actors; instead
the militias are simply seeking the finances to buy more arms.


5. (SBU) The NGOs also are receiving troubling humanitarian
reports from the west and south of Birao. They have heard that
the Goula dominated west has suffered two serious floods that
have decimated the area, but do not yet know the extent. To the
south, there are unregistered displaced persons camps that very
likely lack all basic needs.


6. (SBU) A new armed group now operates in the area and is run
by two former Union of Democratic Forces for Unity(UFDR)
officers who broke from the now Goula dominated group. According
to the Prefet, they seek integration into the DDR process and do
not seem likely to participate in the violence. Post worries
that with the slow roll out of the DDR, and the logical
inability of the UFDR to disarm with the threat posed by the
Kara, that this group may add another destabilizing element to
the witch's brew currently developing.


7. (SBU) COMMENT: The Minister of Interior and the Minister of
Communication are expected in Birao over the coming month, with
the later there to start the DDR process. But if the rebels'
frustrations with DDR first stages in the northwest are anything
to go by, there risks being more discontent then less after the
high level visits. In concert with the poor performance by the
Prefet, Post believes the CARG has still not made the Vakaga a
top priority. Though very influential, the GOS should be seen as
a neutral arbiter either.


8. (SBU)Therefore, in order to stop the region from descending
into bloodshed, it will take a concerted effort by an uninvolved
third party. MINURCAT's endeavor to understand the situation on
the ground and protect humanitarians is admirable, but they
simply do not have the capacity to broker a political solution.
As a result, only BONUCA, with its political mandate and
presence in Bangui can truly engage with all the relevant
actors. To do so BOUNUCA must install an office in Birao - which
it plans to do - and develop a truly effective political office,
which is currently does not have. The relations between the
current Representatives are better than with the previous ones,
but there needs to be more pressure from New York to clearly
define the rolls of each, giving BONUCA the political lead and
MINURCAT the capability to enforce BONUCA's negotiations and
protect the NGO and civilian population. END COMMENT.
REYNOLDS