Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGUI209
2009-10-07 07:27:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bangui
Cable title:  

CAR: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DISCUSSES VISION;

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT 
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PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHGI #0209/01 2800727
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 070727Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1050
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0215
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0320
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0331
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0230
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0171
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0161
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0519
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0507
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0153
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0492
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1316
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000209 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
NAIROBI FOR AKARAS
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL
INR FOR CNEARY
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CAR: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DISCUSSES VISION;
FEELING PRESSURED

REF: A. A 09 BANGUI 183, 68, 56

B. REF: B 09 BANGUI 195 AND PREVIOUS

C. REF: C 08 BANGUI 256 AND PREVIOUS

D. REF: D 09 BANGUI 207

BANGUI 00000209 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000209

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
NAIROBI FOR AKARAS
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL
INR FOR CNEARY
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CAR: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DISCUSSES VISION;
FEELING PRESSURED

REF: A. A 09 BANGUI 183, 68, 56

B. REF: B 09 BANGUI 195 AND PREVIOUS

C. REF: C 08 BANGUI 256 AND PREVIOUS

D. REF: D 09 BANGUI 207

BANGUI 00000209 001.2 OF 003



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 5, 2009, the Charge (CDA) met with
Martin Ziguele - former Central African (CAR) Prime Minister and
2005 Presidential candidate - who is President Bozize's
principle challenger for the anticipated elections of 2010.
Engaging, erudite and shrewd, Ziguele covered a range of topics
including the state of his party, the Movement for Liberation of
Central African People (MLPC),his vision for the 2010 elections
and his rivalries with Bozize and former President Ange-Felix
Patasse. He also gave the Charge a troubling letter currently
circulating the National Assembly that proposes an extension of
both the Deputies' and the President's terms in office. Ziguele
is clearly feeling pressured by Patasse and knows that Bozize
holds a significant incumbent's advantage in organization,
funding and the influence spread by his ministries. Therefore,
he is trying to involve the international community as much in
possible in the lead up to the elections to try to create a more
level playing field. Ziguele insists that the UN Office in the
CAR (BONUCA) take a prominent role as a watchdog for the
electoral process and that it must take the lead in establishing
firm and unequivocal benchmarks that Bozize must be forced to
meet. END SUMMARY

--------------
ZIGUELE'S VISION FOR THE CAR
--------------


2. (SBU) Martin Ziguele, head of the CAR's opposition MLPC (Ref
A),is a rare politician in Bangui who can explain his political
vision rather than resorting to a litany of disagreements with
the current incumbent. He declared that his platform for 2010
would consist of three principle points:

-- Restoring the power of the State and bringing peace to the
CAR through stronger leadership and diminished emphasis on clan
loyalties (an overt reference to Bozize). If he wins, he claims
he will form a government of consensus, involving 60 percent of

members from his party, 30 percent from the opposition, and 10
percent from non-aligned parties. He acknowledged that a
winner-takes-all approach would only lead to more rebellions.
While he stated there would be no witch hunts against Bozize
loyalists, he did insist that those who had ``stolen'' from the
State would be expected to reimburse it. (COMMENT: This caveat
might risk the same net effect he claims to want to avoid. END
COMMENT).

-- Economic reforms - such as the encouragement of agriculture,
the support private development through increased transparency
in the mining sector, and a crackdown on corruption.

-- Greater investment in human capital: Ziguele lamented the
state of the national education system. He conceded that the CAR
would need significant help from the international community in
this regard.


3. (SBU) According to Ziguele, despite the harassment suffered
at the hands of regional authorities, the MLPC has set up
offices in 13 of the CAR's 16 prefectures. He plans to open
offices in the remaining three, but appears to be playing
politics in at least one of the cases: though technically he
does not need authorization, he is waiting for the Minister of
Interior to grant the MLPC permission to go to the populous
Ouham Prefecture (COMMENT: While MLPC activists have been
impeded, but not stopped, from freely circulating, and

BANGUI 00000209 002.2 OF 003


permission would likely smooth their travels, their delay in
setting off for Ouham seems as much a ploy for sympathy and
attention as a necessary precaution. END COMMENT). Ziguele
noted that the violence ridden Vakaga (Ref B),while worrying,
will not play a major role during the election due to its remote
location and low population.


4. (SBU) Ziguele dismissed out of hand the thought of boycotting
the elections, stating that boycotts in the African context are
``self defeating'' as the victor simply goes on without
legitimacy.

--------------
FEELING INSECURE
--------------


5. (SBU) Ziguele framed his attacks on Bozize in the context of
the President's lack of leadership and vulnerability to
international pressure. Conceding that Bozize is deficient in
long-term strategic planning, he believes that Bozize is an
astute tactician - one who is capable of playing competing
national and international interests off each other for his
short term benefit. Yet, he continued, when faced by a forceful
response, Bozize will always bend to the international
community. Citing examples of international pressure that
resulted in concessions like the Inclusive Political Dialogue of
2008, if faced with a united international response, Ziguele
believes Bozize will make the election process relatively
transparent and increase accountability within his own
government.


6. (SBU) Rumors that former President and longtime MLPC leader
Ange-Felix Patasse's declared candidacy for the elections is
making some in the MLPC reconsider their allegiances are also
contributing to Ziguele's insecurity (NOTE: On October 6, 100
members of the MLPC from the prefecture of Mambere Kadei in the
southwest [Ref D], released a statement that they were rallying
to Patasse, the first members since those from his home town
joined him upon his declaration of candidacy. END NOTE). It is
unclear how much support Ziguele has lost, but he did go so far
as to suggest that the international community pressure Libya -
Patasse's current host - to expel Patasse. He also intimated
that Patasse's mere presence would ``send people into the
streets''. Surprisingly, he even stated that the head of BONUCA
declared that she too wished to avoid seeing Patasse in Bangui.
While such a statement by BONUCA seems very unlikely, it does
contribute to an overall picture of a man feeling pressured by
his former boss and rival - a position that Bozize clearly
appreciates and encourages.

--------------
WORRYING NEWS FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
--------------


7. (SBU) Ziguele provided the CDA with an unsigned letter
submitted on October 2 to members of the National Assembly. It
proposes that the National Assembly extend its and the
President's mandate for an unspecific amount of time to allow
for:

-- The role out of the Disarmament Demobilization Reinsertion
(DDR) - scheduled to last three years.

-- The return of the estimated 200,000 refugees and internally
displaced people - no time frame exists.

-- The expulsion of the LRA from the CAR.

BANGUI 00000209 003.2 OF 003



This letter is likely a test balloon floated by the President's
entourage. On September 5, 2009, the Prime Minister discreetly
proposed the idea that perhaps the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) might be formed without with participation of
the opposition, but after a resounding rejection by
international and national actors, the idea died.


8. (SBU) COMMENT: While Post shares Ziguele's opinion of
Bozize's likely response to concerted international pressure,
Ziguele's focus on international engagement in the electoral
process points to a more fundamental insecurity on his part: the
electoral deck is stacked in Bozize's favor. Though the
population is frustrated with the culture of impunity among
those close to the President and with the deplorable nature of
country's development, at least Bozize has brought a measure of
stability to Bangui after the turmoil of Patasse's regime (which
included military mutinies and the presence of Libyan soldiers
and Congolese mercenaries). As a result, it is proving difficult
for Ziguele to shake off the memories of him as Patasse's last
Prime Minister. This history, coupled with the resources of the
government, means the President is still the odds on favorite to
carry the elections.


9. (SBU) The signing of the amended electoral law on October 3
by President Bozize, and the expected formation of the IEC
expected for the October 9, hopefully deflates the specter of
the government and the legislature extending their mandate
indefinitely. Yet, if the fundamental problems cited by the
letter remain (likely),or the IEC reaches some new deadlock
(quite possible considering the level of recrimination) this
idea may resurface and should be highly discouraged. As for
Ziguele, he remains outwardly confident and buoyant, but it is
clear he is feeling the heat. His idea that the BONUCA take a
more forceful position is a good one and is already envisaged by
the transformation of BONUCA into BINUCA (Integrated Office of
the United Nations in the CAR) in the new year. The head of
BONUCA, Ambassador Sahle-Work Zewde, has indeed intervened with
the CARG on several occasions to keep the elections process
moving along and chairs a coordination group to manage the
efforts of the international community. END COMMENT.
SMITH