Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGUI181
2009-08-11 16:29:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bangui
Cable title:  

CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL CODE SIGNED INTO LAW, FUTURE OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT 
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RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0293
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000181 

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL CODE SIGNED INTO LAW, FUTURE OF
ELECTIONS STILL IN QUESTION

REF: A. REF A (08 BANGUI 256, 251 AND PREVIOUS).

B. REF B (09 BANGUI 68)

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000181

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DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
NAIROBI FOR AKARAS
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL
INR FOR CNEARY
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: CONTROVERSIAL ELECTORAL CODE SIGNED INTO LAW, FUTURE OF
ELECTIONS STILL IN QUESTION

REF: A. REF A (08 BANGUI 256, 251 AND PREVIOUS).

B. REF B (09 BANGUI 68)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On August 3, 2009, the controversial and much
delayed Central African electoral code was signed into law by
President Francois Bozize. Written as a consensus document after
the Inclusive Political Dialogue (DPI) of December 2008, the law
has since been reviewed by the Government, the National Assembly
and the Constitutional Courts yet its passage comes with
substantial discontent from the opposition. The contentious
Article Twelve remains unchanged and the target of wide
criticism by the opposition. It stipulates that the Prime
Minister and President of the National Assembly, both of whom
are considered President Francois Bozize's loyalists, are to
pick the candidates for head of the Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC). With the signing of the law, the dispute is
now an academic one, and of greater importance is that the
electoral process is once again at a standstill as Bozize has
yet to set a date for the IEC's creation. Though the government
claims it will decree the creation of the IEC by the end of
August, if this delay persists, prospects for a proper and
timely ballot will dim. Stalling the elections appears
increasingly to be in Bozize's interests and may explain why
there have been so many delays in planning elections that are
five years in coming. END SUMMARY .

--------------
Article 12: The Polemic
--------------


2. (SBU) The 2010 electoral code is a redraft of the 2005
version with heavy input from a committee set up in the wake of
the DPI of December 2008 (Ref A) The follow up committee
comprises twelve members, two from each of the following groups:
The presidential majority (KNK),the opposition, the nonaligned
political parties, political/military (read: rebel groups),
civil society, and civil servants. The committee amended the
2005 code and submitted the proposed law to the government on
May 29. The law was then sent to the National Assembly for
debate on June 11, modified, approved by acclimation as the

opposition and the nonaligned parties boycotted the vote, and
submitted to the Constitutional Court on June 27. It was in the
modification of the law by the National Assembly that has caused
an uproar, with the opposition crying foul over what they
thought was to be a consensus document.


3. (SBU) The original Article 12 of the code, written with the
consent of the follow up committee, stated that each of the
groups would nominate two candidates and then a President would
be chosen by vote of the 30 members (five from each of the
aforementioned groups) of the Independent Electoral Commission.
The government-dominated National Assembly rejected this
proposition because by enshrining this rule in law, they argue,
political/military groups would in effect be institutionalized
into the law - a dangerous precedent. As a result, the National
Assembly reverted Article 12 back to its 2005 language as the
former system managed to pick a president who was accepted by
all sides. But the political conditions of 2009 are very
different than those of 2005. The National Assembly in 2005 was
transitional and its president was considered neutral whereas
today's president is a close associate of Bozize and the KNK
dominate the legislature. The opposition therefore has no
confidence that the commission will be independent or fair under
such rules and are agitated. Though the opposition recognizes
that the KNK is the elected majority and thus logically has the
right to support the president's choices, they remain obstinate,
exposing a fundamental breakdown in Central African democracy:
the members of the National Assembly, though elected, are more
responsive to the KNK and Bozize's needs than to their
constituents due to patronage and other special favors granted
to them. Thus, while in a more consolidated democracy the
majority can dissent, in the CAR, it does not and this has led

BANGUI 00000181 002 OF 003


to the complete lack of faith from the opposition.


4. (SBU) With the signature of the bill by the President, the
process now rests upon the creation of the IEC and no date has
been set. This step is likely to last into late August and
possibly September, leaving the country and the international
community just six months to organize the elections. As
previously reported, the government has not earmarked any money
for the elections in their 2009 budget, though they have
promised to do so in an additional budget to be passed in the
coming months. Problematically, the international community --
with the notable exception of four million Euros from the
European Commission -- has refused to allot money before an IEC
has been established. Therefore, with the time running low, very
little money has been set aside nor have any meaningful
organizational steps been taken, leaving the prospects for the
elections murky at best.

--------------
The Game Afoot
--------------


5. (SBU)If the election was held today, Bozize would likely win.
The opposition is in tatters with the strongest party, the MLPC,
torn in two between former Prime Minister and presidential
candidate of 2005 Martin Ziguele and former President Ange-Felix
Patasse (Ref B). Yet still, Bozize is stalling. The reasons are
likely twofold:

- The longer it takes the IEC to set up, the longer it takes for
the rules and dates of the election to be formalized. Because
there are stiff penalizes levied upon those that electioneer
before the official start of the campaign, Bozize's advantages
of incumbency, and the better (relatively) organized KNK,
markedly increase his advantage in a short electoral season.

- The electoral lists of 2005 are in shambles and unusable.
Therefore, a delayed electoral commission will be unlikely to
complete the work of establishing inclusive electoral lists in
time for the March ballot. The prefectures most affected by
displacement and insecurity are exactly those that are least
likely to vote for Bozize (Bamingui-Bangoran, Nana-Grebizi,
Ouham, Ouham-Pende, with the last two being the most populous in
the CAR). The instability and difficulty in accessing and
registering displaced persons means that these areas will almost
certainly suffer from disenfranchisement.


6. (SBU) Some post contacts speculate that some in the
opposition may actually want the elections to fail, thus causing
a constitutional crisis similar to 1993, which ultimately
granted power to some opposition leaders. After that election,
President Andre Kolingba annulled vote results that were widely
thought to have given the election to Patasse. As a result, a
constitutional vacuum caused Kolingba to create the National
Political Provisional Council of the Republic (CNPPR) as a
parallel body that the President was forced to consult with
before new elections were held. Made up of candidates from the
election among others, this body is widely credited as helping
pave the way to Patasse's election on the next ballot. It is
therefore possible that secondary members of the opposition, and
potentially even Ziguele/Patasse if they continue to lag far
behind Bozize, are seeing the possibility of a constitutional
crisis as a way to nullify the incumbent's inherent advantages
and either force another election or simply try and place
themselves in governing body that would give them access to
political power. This theory was given further credence this
week when a leading opposition figure demanded that an entirely
new electoral code be written and debated. This would condense
the electoral season down to a potentially impossible time frame
as meeting the constitutionally mandated election date would be
unfeasible and thus a constitutional crisis might ensure.

BANGUI 00000181 003 OF 003




7. (SBU) COMMENT: President Bozize, therefore, is running a high
wire act in playing with the date of the election: while he is
in a strong position today, he worries that a fickle electorate
could shift between now and March. While a short elections
season benefits him, the longer he waits, the more the
opposition and the international community will become
frustrated. This may lead to mistakes on his part, a flawed
election, or something akin to the constitutional crisis of

1993.


8. (SBU) Embassy Bangui is very worried about what ill organized
and flawed elections may portend for the CAR. Rebel groups in
the northwest will undoubtedly use any perceived unfairness as
further justification for rebellion and other regions may react
the same way. Bozize, already held in low esteem by many
observers, would suffer another blow to his legitimacy, which
will threaten his already shaky regime. Lastly, the CAR, already
tormented by 50 years of misrule, can ill afford another example
of flawed electoral politics. By December 2009, at which time
the IEC should be in place, a clearer picture will develop and
Post will be in a better position to prognosticate the outcome
of the 2010 election - but the initial signs are distressing.
END COMMENT.
COOK