Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGUI152
2009-07-07 17:19:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bangui
Cable title:  

PESSIMISM STILL THE ORDER OF THE DAY FOR NORTHEASTERN CAR

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2466
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0152/01 1881719
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 071719Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0976
INFO RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0180
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0283
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0293
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0194
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0138
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0473
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0459
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0125
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0455
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1231
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000152 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: PESSIMISM STILL THE ORDER OF THE DAY FOR NORTHEASTERN CAR

REF: 09 BANGUI 114

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000152

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: PESSIMISM STILL THE ORDER OF THE DAY FOR NORTHEASTERN CAR

REF: 09 BANGUI 114


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 21, 2009, Birao, Central African
Republic (CAR) was attacked for the second time in a month as
Kara tribe gunmen and the Goula tribe and Central African
Military (FACA) defenders of the town battled for supremacy.
This follows a similar attack on Birao on June 6 (BANGUI 114)
accelerating the worrying spiral of violence in Northeastern CAR
that has left at least thirty dead among the attackers,
defenders, and civilians. While the Kara have been the
traditional rulers of Birao for over one hundred years, their
militancy is a new development and they may be making a push to
secure military and political victories before the rains shut
down movement until November. Despite a peace commission sent to
Birao, and an apparent ceasefire deal reached, Post worries that
the Central African Government (CARG) has neither the
military/political capacity, nor the will, to take control of
the area and the issue. Furthermore, we do not believe that
MINURCAT has the mandate or anywhere near the force necessary to
play a decisive role. The humanitarian consequences may be dire.
END SUMMARY

--------------
Birao Half Empty, A ``New Rebel'' Formed
--------------


2. (SBU) The June 21 assault on Birao was perpetrated by the
same Kara armed group that attacked the town on the June 6 and
has recently announced that it is named the Union of the
Democratic Movements for Unity (UMDR). This group is a function
of an internal split in the Kara community of the Vakaga and
should be noted that it is not a rebel group in the traditional
sense but it rather a movement of tribal vengeance fused with
local political brinksmanship. The former Mayor of Birao, Ahmed
Mustafa, appears to be using a simmering tribal conflict between
the Goula and Kara based on revenge killings to gain a political
advantage over a fellow Kara, and most recent mayor of Birao,
Abdurrahman. While there is certainly an ethnic flavor to the
violence, the direction of the fighting - away from the Goula
villages south of Birao and toward to mixed ethnicity city
itself - suggests the fighting has more than ethnic score

settling behind it. According to multiple sources, Mustafa and
Abdurrahman have been competing for supremacy of the city (which
controls the vital link to Sudan through which all goods to the
Vakaga pass) for at least a year. Recently, Abdurrahman called
in members of the UFDR (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity and
a majority Goula group) to protect his interests in the city and
UMDR attacked those forces as a reaction. Further evidence in
support of this thesis is that the Kara communities who support
Abdulrahman remain in Birao while those that support
Mustafa/UMDR have fled. Thus, while the Kara and the Goula have
legitimate grievances against each other, an essentially village
against village polemic is being used by Birao politicians to
further their political agendas.


3. (SBU) On June 22, the UFDR announced the pullout of its
forces, though about ten fighters remain to care for wounded at
the local hospital. This suggests two things:

-- The Goula leadership does not feel the price they are paying
to protect Abdurrahman is worth the punishment it has taken, and,

-- The UFDR may be fracturing and the consolidation is a move by
the leadership in Tiringoulu to keep a closer eye on their
elements.

As postulated in BANGUI 114, UFDR leaders in the Ouanda Djalle
area have reportedly split from Damane's control and have
threatened to take up arms against the government and/or the
Kara. Post has yet to see a manifestation of this, but it is
none the less very worrying.


4. (SBU) The pull out of Birao by the UFDR has a number of
distressing elements to it:

-- The UFDR is the last remaining element of order in the city.
The FACA is incapable/unmotivated and law

BANGUI 00000152 002 OF 003


enforcement/peacekeeping is out of MINURCAT's rules of
engagement (NOTE: The start of the Togolese force's mandate has
been ``catastrophic'' according to one NGO. They deployed to
Birao without any ammunition, setting back the mission some
critical days. Additionally, on June 21, they returned to base
when faced with the firefight in the town instead of ensuring
the safety of humanitarian workers in Birao as is their charge).
Worse, the specter of ethnic strife also looms as accounts are
settled from previous violence.

-- Multiple sources have now confirmed that elements of Sudanese
Kara/Ta'asha have joined those already in the CAR in the two
attacks on Birao. Multiple sources also claim that among them
are horseback mounted warriors who are said to ``Janjaweed''. It
is impossible to tell at the moment if this is a pseudonym for
Sudanese warriors on horseback in general (the opinion of the
Sudanese Ambassador in Bangui) or if these are same Janjaweed of
Darfur notoriety who have come to the CAR for loot. What is
certain is that there are figures that are profiting from the
lawlessness and conflict to pillage and steal from the
surrounding area.

-- The precarious security situation in Birao will lead to
obvious humanitarian fallout. As it stands now, an NGO on the
ground estimates that half of the town's population has fled and
that there are 1,000 displaced (IDPs) in the immediate area. The
IDPs are almost exclusively Kara who sought refuge after
reprisal attacks were made upon them by Birao's other
inhabitants.

-- Furthermore, due to the panic created by the violence, it is
feared that farmers in the area will not be able to plant their
crops during the rainy season and that a food shortage is likely
in 2010. This was confirmed to POLOFF during a UN sponsored trip
to Birao on July 2, 2009. Additionally, humanitarian workers
confirm that they have already distributed food aid meant to
last until November. This has created concerns that as
inhabitants know there is food in humanitarian worker's care;
residents of Birao may turn against those workers if food
becomes too scarce.


5. (SBU) A delegation lead by CAR Minister of the Interior
Oueifio, visited Birao on July 2, 2007 and is said to have
secured a ceasefire. He gave 4 million CFA (8,700 USD) in blood
money to the Kara to quell the violence and both sides have
agreed to an arbitrated solution. Mediation efforts are
allegedly to be headed by President Bozize, but no date has been
set for his trip to Birao. (N.B. the Ambassador has long urged
President Bozize to engage personally, base on the
recommendations made by the Sultan of Ndele during the
Ambassador's visit to that city in February, 2009.) A Prefet has
been sent from by Bangui and he will act as both Prefet and
Mayor until elections are held in March. Regardless, until
mediations are begun and elections are held, both sides will
remain armed and apprehension will reign. The displaced Kara
have not yet returned from the bush, and until Post sees this,
we will not be comfortable making an optimistic prognostication
of peace in the area.


6. (SBU) COMMENT Post still maintains that the worst of the
violence is likely to come after the rains. The evolving
situation in Birao and the prospect of further violence in Ndele
(SEPTEL) pose two major problems for the CAR:

-- The rains and continued violence will block any large scale
humanitarian aid to an already remote area. Further violence
will only exacerbate the already critical humanitarian situation
in the CAR overall, setting back development in this desperately
poor country.

-- The next months are crucial in the CAR considering that
preparations for elections, called for by March/April 2010, are
already behind schedule. Continued instability and a perceived
threat from the north will either distract the CARG from the
task at hand, or worse, give it a convenient excuse to postpone
the ballot. As previously stated, it is expected that the

BANGUI 00000152 003 OF 003


President personally mediate the Kara/Goula conflict and if he
fails to do so, the Vakaga risks being subject to continued
conflict.

Post believes that, given the CARG's lack luster efforts at
peacemaking and its military's lack of capacity, pessimism is
still the order of the day. The CARG has, thus far, displayed
very little political acumen or leadership, especially in the
Vakaga. We fear that the grievances in the north, which go back
at least a decade, will likely fester through the rainy season
and will, unless addressed with unseen good faith, engulf the
region yet again before the end of 2009. END COMMENT
COOK