RECENT VIOLENCE AGGRAVATES SIMMERING TENSIONS IN NORTHERN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000114

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
AFRICOM FOR KOCH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: RECENT VIOLENCE AGGRAVATES SIMMERING TENSIONS IN NORTHERN
CAR

REF: A. 07 BANGUI 61

B. 09 BANGUI 12, 21, 46, 47, 50

C. 09 NDJAMENA 173


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Increased instability and violence in the
northeast of the Central African Republic (CAR) is not waiting
on the rains. As the summer downpours will make the unpaved
roads of the Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran, and the Haute Kotto
prefectures impassable between July and November, Post suspects
that the Patriotic Convention for Justice and Peace (CPJP),the
Union of United of Democratic Forces (UFDR) and the region's
various role players may feel pressured to consolidate their
positions while they still can. With the illness of UFDR chief
Zakaria Damane, the CPJP may see an opportunity to retake the
diamond fields between Ouanda Djalle, Ouadda, and Sam Ouandja or
potentially even make a move for Ndele and towards Bangui.
While this should not threaten the fundamental stability of the
Central African Government (CARG),it is yet another example of
the CARG's lack of control over the northeast and Post remains
fearful that the ethnic overtones of this conflict could lead to
heretofore unseen levels of violence. The recent outbreak of
fighting in Birao, however, may indicate however, that this has
already begun. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) General Zakaria Damane, who led the UFDR to prominence
in between 2006 and 2007, is reportedly suffering severe renal
trouble, possibly as a result of kidney stones. Despite
reportedly going into a possible coma for three days, Damane is
said to be cut off from medical care in both Bangui and Birao,
the only two options available for grave health issues in the
CAR. Blocked from Bangui (a government plane reportedly landed
in the village in which he is convalescing but did not pick him
up),Damane also is unable to go to Birao as all roads to the
town are purportedly blocked by Kara militia men. The Kara are
hostile to the UFDR after a long running dispute with the Goula
whose most recent manifestation was an attack on Birao with some
60 armed men aimed at the Central African military (FACA) and
UFDR positions on June 6th, 2009. This follows the burning of
thirty four homes in Kara dominated Delembe in response to the
murder and crucifixion of a young Goula man by the Kara.
Furthermore, Damane's brother was recently murdered by Kara,
though it is not clear if he was targeted or killed at random as
he was trying to go to Birao to get medicine for his sibling.
Until now, the violence has been for economic reasons, with each
side wanting control of the roads and trade, but Post fears that
the acrimony is as such that the violence may escalate the
stakes.


3. (SBU)After Saturday's violence, Post received reports that
the UFDR commanders were asking for Damane's permission to
retaliate, and, even absent his permission, might do so anyway.
This is sole source, but if true, would signify not only a
dangerous shift into disorder by the UFDR, but would also open
the door to overreaction by less disciplined subordinates. Also,
one of the Kara columns that attacked Birao is thought to have
come from the Nyala, Sudan area and, though historically
intertwined, the internationalization of the conflict will do
nothing to ease the situation. Overall, tensions are extremely
high between the Kara and the Goula and there are signs that the
Rounga and the Kara, former enemies, may be making common cause
against the Goula in the name of retribution for the latter's
greed post the UFDR/CARG peace agreement of April 2007 (07
BANGUI 61) .


4. (SBU) A reliable Embassy source said he recently saw what he
believes to the ``missing'' male population of the Rounga tribe.
As previously reported, over 18,000 mostly Rounga have fled to
Chad. Strikingly, over 80 per cent of these refugees are women
and children. (09 BANGUI 12, 21, 46, 47, 50; 09 NDJAMENA 173)
This has led to speculation among AmEmbassy Bangui staff as to
the location and intentions of the male Rounga. It now appears
the men, probably the core of the CPJP, have moved into the town
of Sikikede. Normally a collection of small villages, Post's
source saw a marked increase in the town's population. Among the
recent arrivals were men in uniform, sporting new camouflage,
satellite phones, and weaponry (type unknown). Though they
maintain a headquarters in a school building in Sokoumba (09
BANGUI 46),and are openly present in Akoursoubak (both north of

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Ndele) such a large number of men concentrated in one location
begs the question, why are they there? It could be that the
CPJP is gearing for an assault either towards the Vakaga or to
Bamingui-Bangoran and further south.

-- Sikikede is not far from the UFDR stronghold of Tirigulu
(100km). The origins of the CPJP lie in their opposition to the
Goula led UFDR and their complaints that the Goula pushed them
off their diamond fields; a problem yet to be resolved.

-- More importantly, past Tirigulu are the diamond fields of the
Vakaga, in the area of Ouanda Djalle and Sam Ouandja. A push
before the rainy season would not only allow the Rounga to
exploit the fields uninhibited for the coming few months, but it
would also allow them to consolidate their defenses and/or
negotiate with the Goula from a position of strength going
forward. CAR diamonds are all alluvial and it is said to be
easier to dig/sluice the diamonds in the rainy season when water
is abundant and rivers are flowing. There are been very few
large scale fights of this kind in the CAR, so while this is not
probable, it remains a possibility.

-- Post received reports over the weekend that elements of the
CPJP have deployed north of Ndele with motor vehicles and an
unknown number of troops. While a FACA detachment has moved
north, they halted thirty miles outside of the city and have not
engaged the suspected CPJP column. Our well informed source
speculated that the CPJP may make a move on Ndele and from there
Kaga Bandero and perhaps even Bangui. It must be stressed that
there has been no independent confirmation of this intention,
though a source from the FACA said he thought it possible that
the rebels will attempt to take Ndele. But with the government
recently discussing the need to replace the highly influential
mayor (and the Sultan) of Ndele (BANGUI 46),the potential
exists that he may seek to strengthen his position by
encouraging the rebels.


5. (SBU) The most interesting bit of RUMINT to come out the area
is a report of a motorized column of some sixty French ``special
forces'' from Chad, not/not Birao. The column was said to have
been seen in February somewhere between Birao and the Chadian
border. The troops were not hostile, but refused to let their
faces be photographed. (We have not determined if any photos do,
in fact, exist.) While our source on this has never been wrong,
we have no confirmation and it is interesting that this
information was not shared with the Ambassador and only
developed later. Post remains skeptical, but offers this up in
the event that others may be able to confirm/deny the veracity
and, perhaps more to the point, the purpose of such an
incursion. Rumors and conspiracy theories abound, of course,
but we cannot see any reason for a French movement of this type.



6. (SBU) COMMENT: Tensions are extremely high in the Vakaga,
Bamingui-Bangoran, and the Haute Kotto prefectures. While Post
has some solid sources on the happenings in the region, it is
both physically and politically very far from Bangui and thus
elements of the equation may well be missing. Despite this,
there are some clear takeaways from rising tensions:

-- The central government has neither the will nor the capacity
to be anything more than meddlesome in these events. This
ensures that otherwise minor players are able to have major
effects on the politics of the area and threaten the stability
of the southern parts of Chad and the west of Sudan, not to
mention the CAR.

-- Further violence would undoubtedly push more refugees into
southern Chad, compounding the pressures upon an already
overstretched UNHCR in Daha.

-- Violence and insecurity has already caused the remaining NGOs
in the region to shut down until at least October 2009,
compounding the root causes of alienation and a lack of
development that spurred the original creation of these groups.
On Saturday 6th of June, international NGOs in Ndele closed and
sent their workers south. Government functionaries in the town

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have apparently done the same thing with their families.

-- The rupturing of the traditional coexistence between these
groups risks creating ethnically motivated violence. The CAR
has thus far been blessed by the absence of purely ethnic
violence and, up until now, the hostility in the northeast been
ethnically flavored but driven by economics. As the lines
harden and more blood is split, Post worries that atrocities
could follow.

-- Damane has no obvious successor. Should he die from his
illness, his charisma and political acumen would be hard to
replace and could lead to a further breakdown of an already
tenuous order.

There are at least two possible scenarios: the sides will make a
rush before the rains come in mid July so that they can
consolidate gains over the wet months and negotiate from a
position of strength. Yet at the same time, food is always in
chronic shortage and the groups may plant, harvest and store
food in anticipation of a fight after the rains. Post leans
towards the later hypothesis, but the violence of the weekend
may push the sides to early action. Regardless of the short term
potential for violence, the root cause will remain and none of
the involved players appear willing or able to solve them,
meaning the northeast will remain an area of great concern going
into 2010. END COMMENT
COOK