Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK2724
2009-10-26 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI ARMY: REMAINING LAO HMONG TO BE DEPORTED FROM

Tags:  PREF PHUM SMIG TH LA 
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VZCZCXRO9910
OO RUEHCHI
DE RUEHBK #2724/01 2991116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261116Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8732
INFO RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY 5793
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7208
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2167
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002724 

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA
DEPT FOR PRM/ANE AND PRM/A; EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019
TAGS: PREF PHUM SMIG TH LA
SUBJECT: THAI ARMY: REMAINING LAO HMONG TO BE DEPORTED FROM
PETCHABUN IN EARLY NOVEMBER

REF: BANGKOK 2712

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., James F. Entwistle for Reason
s 1.5 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002724

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA
DEPT FOR PRM/ANE AND PRM/A; EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019
TAGS: PREF PHUM SMIG TH LA
SUBJECT: THAI ARMY: REMAINING LAO HMONG TO BE DEPORTED FROM
PETCHABUN IN EARLY NOVEMBER

REF: BANGKOK 2712

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i., James F. Entwistle for Reason
s 1.5 (b, d)


1. (C) Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) General Nipat
Thonglek, head of the Thai delegation to the bilateral
Thai-Lao committee handling the Lao Hmong in Petchabun,
unexpectedly told Charge on October 26th that all remaining
4,221 Lao Hmong in the facility would be deported to Laos in
early November. The deportation will include Lao Hmong
identified in a January 2008 Royal Thai government (RTG)
vetting process as "screened in" and previously privately
described by RTG officials as not subject to return. Nipat
said an operational plan has been developed that "foresees
using force" if necessary. According to Nipat, the decision
to resort to a large-scale forcible deportation was made by
the National Security council (NSC) last week, and awaits a
green-light from the Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva,
expected "in the next few days." Gen. Nipat requested U.S.
support for this "last stage" of the Lao Hmong return
operation, which has seen 2,800 returned in small groups over
the last 18 months.


2. (C) According to Gen. Nipat, RTARF Chief of Defense
Forces Songkitti Jaggabatara and the NSC Secretary General
noted the recent destruction (by French officials) of a
illegal migrant settlement in Calais, France, and became
"very confident" that the forcible return of the remaining
Lao Hmong was defensible. The early November timing of the
deportation was requested by Lao army Brigadier General
Bouaxieng Champaphanh, Nipat's counterpart, to avoid
conflicting with the Southeast Asia Games, to be hosted by
Laos in late November. Nipat claimed that the remaining Lao
Hmong in Petchabun "refuse to return" and that therefore the
"rule of law" will be used to solve the long-standing
problem. The RTARF's operational plan envisions returning all
the Petchabun Hmong within a 12-hour period. Initially, about
50 key Hmong leaders--of whom 30 were characterized as
particularly important- will be apprehended and forced on
buses. The RTARF expects that others in the camp will then
acquiesce and return without force. Government of Laos (GOL)

officials will be invited to observe the large-scale
deportation.


3. (C) In response to Charge's request, the RTARF agreed to
provide a list of the "screened in" Hmong to assist in
possible third country resettlement after their return to
Laos. Gen. Nipat claimed that Lao BG Bouaxieng had agreed
recently to allow the group to be resettled abroad after a
30-day "processing period" in Laos. The RTARF delegation
suggested that the U.S. quickly accept the group, and
appeared surprised when the various refugee processing steps
were described (again.) Nipat and his staff were unable to
provide details regarding arrangements in Laos to identify,
segregate and provide access for the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program to the "screened in" Hmong. RefCoord noted the
practical obstacles in identifying and locating them once
they had dispersed to their home villages, and suggested that
OPE pre-screening (to include collecting biodata and contact
information) prior to departure from Thailand would be the
minimum required to pursue later processing in Laos. Gen.
Nipat asserted that the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) had been approached by the RTG to "witness"
the large-scale forcible return, and that IOM was considering
participation. (Note: we believe that IOM is only considering
assisting the current repatriation process in an attempt to
improve transparency and voluntariness, and would not be
willing to be involved in a clearly forced deportation. End
Note.)


4. (C) Comments.
--------------

We have heard RTG announcements concerning the closing of the
Petchabun camp several times in the past, and deadlines have
passed without action. This occasion was different: a solemn
RTARF delegation visited the Embassy to inform us directly,
and to gauge our reaction. Still, it may be that a clearly
uncomfortable Gen. Nipat previewed the mass deportation for
us so that we could weigh-in with the Prime Minister's office
in opposition. That would allow the RTARF to avoid a
difficult, messy operation for which they (and particularly
Gen. Nipat) are certain to receive international criticism.
Nipat could then inform his Lao military counterpart that the
RTARF attempted to meet the December 30th closure date for
Petchabun, but were prevented from doing so by the PM under

BANGKOK 00002724 002 OF 002


international pressure. In support of this theory, Gen. Nipat
did not appear discomfited when we reminded him of PM
Abhisit's July commitment to the Secretary that there would
not be forcible returns of the Petchabun group, and he
quickly inquired if the issue might be raised by POTUS in
Singapore next month. (We told him it very well might.) We
also note that the operation outlined by Nipat borders on the
impossible (4,000 Hmong loaded on buses and removed in twelve
hours, particularly if there is resistance) and wonder if
Nipat was laying out as dire a scenario as possible in the
hopes that we might object strongly.


5. (C) We will "ground truth" Gen. Nipat's odd account with
the MFA and IOM over the next few day and formulate action
recommendations to perhaps include reminding PM Abhisit of
his "no forced returns" promise to Secretary Clinton, and
raising the matter with General Songkitti when he is in
Washington at the end of this week. It would also be very
helpful to have Embassy Vientiane's read on all this.
ENTWISTLE