THAILAND: FM KASIT EXPLAINS ASEAN AND ARF RESULTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001842

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, AND EAP, NSC FOR BADER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ARF TH BM KN
SUBJECT: THAILAND: FM KASIT EXPLAINS ASEAN AND ARF RESULTS,
INCLUDING ON NORTH KOREA AND BURMA

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Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Thai FM Kasit invited the diplomatic corps to
an ASEAN Ministerial and ASEAN Regional Forum readout session
July 30. His comments covered ASEAN aspirations going
forward as a "community of peoples," global challenges facing
the region, and security challenges, specifically North Korea
and Burma. Skirting around the language in the ARF Chair's
statement on the Korean Peninsula, Kasit indicated that ASEAN
had worked hard to convince the DPRK to remain engaged in ARF
as a nonconfrontational body, and that the ASEAN Ministerial
Communique issued July 20, prior to the start of ARF,
remained the sense of the region (it condemned the recent
North Korean tests and called on full implementation of UNSCR
1874, see para 6). On Burma, Kasit said that ASEAN members
had consistently stressed to the Burmese FM in recent months
the need to move forward positively on prisoner releases,
including Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK),and national
reconciliation. Kasit concluded his comments by highlighting
U.S. accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)
and expressing deep appreciation for the presence of the
Secretary in Phuket, stating: "she was the star."


2. (C) Comment: Kasit told DCM afterwards that he would
welcome a call from Deputy Secretary Steinberg (we had
alerted his staff to a possible D call earlier in the day).
MFA ASEAN Department staff were clearly nervous before the
briefing about whether we would publicly raise ARF Chair
statement language on the DPRK during the question and answer
segment, aware of the concerns registered previously
informally by us, and formally by the Japanese and South
Koreans. MFA PermSec Virasakdi Futrakul, ASEAN Dept DDG
Manasvi Srisodapol, and ASEAN Counselor Suriya Chindawongse,
the three key Thai officials for ASEAN/ARF substantive
matters, all engaged DCM and PolCouns on the sidelines
regarding the Thai rationale for the statement's content.
They underscored ASEAN's concern that the DPRK might walk out
of the ARF meetings and withdraw from ARF altogether if
directly attacked.


3. (C) Comment, continued: We made clear our disappointment
with the ARF Chair language on substance and procedure, and
the Thai decision to change the language we had submitted and
include the North Korean rhetoric without consulting with us
or seeking judicious editing. Virasak, Manasvi, and Suriya
asserted that both the Chinese and the Russians came to them
separately after the U.S. del had forwarded language
discussed by the five parties to the Thai and said that they
did not want to associate publicly with the U.S. provided
language. Suriya confirmed what we had suspected: PermSec
Virasak played a personal role in determining the language in
the final statement. End Summary and Comment.

North Korea - different messages in AMM, ARF statements
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) In the briefing to the dip corps, FM Kasit described
his Phuket meeting with the DPRK head of delegation,
Ambassador Pak Kun-gwang. Kasit said he had described the
ARF as a forum where the DPRK could speak its mind, use ASEAN
as a bridge to the rest of the world. No one would attack
the DPRK; everyone wished to see the DPRK to return to Six
Party Talks, to become a full member of the international
community, and embrace the sense of change sweeping the
world. Pak had shared a "dialectical" view of history since
World War II from his country's point of view. Kasit had
replied that the world was changing: President Obama brought
new policies world wide; China and India were rapidly
transforming, and the ASEAN Charter gave Southeast Asia
promise for a different future. Kasit said he urged the
North Koreans to leave the Cold War mentality behind and
embrace 'a climate of change" and the U.S. willingness to
reach out for dialogue. ARF's intent was to facilitate all
countries working together for peace and security.


5. (SBU) Note: There was a stark difference in the language
on UNSCR 1874/DPRK issued in Phuket in the July 20 ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) Joint Communique and the July 23
ARF Chair statement. Kasit made clear that: "What we said

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about the Korean Peninsula in the 42nd AMM Communique remains
the sense of the region." (see para 6).


6. (U) Begin Korean Peninsula text from the 42 AMM Joint
Communique (paras 60-62):

- We recalled the statement by our leaders in June 2009 in
which they reiterated the condemnation of the recent
underground nuclear test and missile launches undertaken by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK),which
constitute clear violations of the Six-Party Agreement and
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including UNSC
Resolution 1874.

- We urged the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations and
relevant UNSC resolutions. We also urged all concerned
parties to return to the Six-Party Talks process as soon as
possible and fully implement their commitments made in
previous rounds of the Six-Party Talks, which remains the
main mechanism for achieving peace and stability in the
Korean Peninsula.

- We believed that the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes
ASEAN and all participants of the Six-Party Talks, can play a
positive and proactive role in promoting peace and stability
in the Korean Peninsula. We encouraged all concerned parties
to actively pursue this objective.

End AMM text excerpt.


7. (U) Begin text from the ARF Chair Statement (paras 7-8)

- The Ministers of several countries condemned the recent
nuclear test and missile launches by the DPRK. They strongly
urged all member countries of the United Nations to commit
themselves to fully implement the provisions of UNSCR 1874
(2009) according to which these recent activities violated
the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. They regarded
these activities as adversely affecting peace and stability
in the region and beyond as well as the non-proliferation
regime. They expressed their strong conviction that peace
and stability of each relevant State can and should be
safeguarded through political and diplomatic means. In this
connection, they supported the dialogue and cooperation among
all the concerned parties, including the early resumption of
the Six-Party Talks to address the issue of the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and humanitarian
concerns of the international community. They also
emphasized the importance of the full implementation of the
Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. They expected that all
concerned parties would exercise self-restraint and refrain
from any moves that could aggravate the situation in
Northeast Asia.

- The DPRK did not recognize and totally rejected the UNSC
Resolution 1874 which has been adopted at the instigation of
the United States. The DPRK briefed the Meeting of the fact
that the ongoing aggravated situation on the Korean Peninsula
is the product of the hostile policy of the United States
against her, and stated that the Six-Party Talks have already
come to an end, with the strong emphasis on the unique and
specific security environment on the Korean Peninsula which
lies in its continued division and presence of US military
troops for over half a century to date in South Korea, since
this factor is vital to consider and address the question of
the Korean Peninsula.

End ARF text excerpt.


8. (C) PermSec Virasak told DCM that that the language the
U.S. had submitted on the morning of July 23 must not have
been fully coordinated with the five parties, because both
the Chinese and Russian delegations subsequently came to the
Thai and stated they could not be associated with the
language proposed. Counselor Suriya claimed, but offered no
details, that an unnamed member of the US del had
acknowledged later on July 23 to Thai officials that there
was not consensus on language among the five parties.
Virasak said this lack of five party consensus was the reason

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for the use of "several" in para 7. Virasak claimed that the
Thai were pressured to accept the DPRK language because:

- ASEAN members had made clear to the Thai they were wary of
isolating the DPRK;
- The DPRK delegation threatened to walk out and never return
if their language was not accepted; and
- The Chinese had pressured the Thai to accept the DPRK
language.

Burma
--------------


9. (SBU) On Burma, Kasit stressed that ASEAN countries had
repeatedly stated their views in recent months on the steps
necessary for Burma to move forward, namely release of all
political prisoners including ASSK and a move to a genuine
national dialogue. This message had been conveyed in
US-ASEAN meetings, ASEM meetings in Hanoi, ASEAN-EU meetings
in Phnom Penh, the ASEAN Summit in Hua Hin, and again in
Phuket. "The Burmese leadership should know what must be
done, and what must be avoided." The Burmese had in the end
accepted mention of ASSK in the ASEAN Communique, Kasit
stressed, a sign of their willingness to acknowledge the
region's consensus opinion.

10 (SBU) The Burmese FM had asked ASEAN countries to give the
country "some time" to show progress, Kasit said. With an
eye towards 2010 elections, he commented, ASEAN was willing
to wait some months for "credible changes" to commence, while
worried as well about the expected July 31 verdict in ASSK's
trial. "This is the reason PM Abhisit will not be traveling
to Burma tomorrow." The lack of progress and change affected
not only the 40 million residents of Burma, but the displaced
persons, refugees, and exiles around the world, he concluded.
JOHN