ENGAGEMENT ON LAO HMONG ISSUE YIELDS CONTINUED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001485

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF TH LA
SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT ON LAO HMONG ISSUE YIELDS CONTINUED
DIALOGUE BUT LITTLE PROGRESS

REF: A. BANGKOK 1340 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH RTARF)

B. BANGKOK 1305 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH DPM)

C. BANGKOK 1225 (NGO PULLS OUT OF PETCHABUN)

D. BANGKOK 1223 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH FM)

E. BANGKOK 1028 (RTG DIALOGUE ON NONG KHAI HMONG)

F. BANGKOK 888 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH FM)

G. BANGKOK 822 (SUMMARY OF HMONG SITUATION)

H. BANGKOK 650 (AMBS RAISE HMONG WITH RTG)

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Classified By: A/DCM ROBERT D. GRIFFITHS, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Ravic Huso, met
with Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) International
Organizations Deputy Director General Ittiporn Boonpracong,
and Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) Border Division Chief LTG
Niphat Thonglek on June 11 and 12 to discuss the ongoing
custody of Lao Hmong in Thailand. The RTG position has not
changed substantially regarding continued repatriations but
both the MFA and the RTARF offered assurances that returns
would be "voluntary" and expressed their interest in
discussing "out of the box" options for dealing with those
Hmong whom the Thai have identified as being at risk should
they return to Laos. Separately, the office of United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described its
focus on the smaller group of detained Hmong at Nong Khai
(Ref G),and the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) indicated it anticipated an increasing role in
repatriations from Petchabun. Finally, Ambassador David
Lipman, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to
Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, briefed Ambassador Huso
on EU support of a proposed project that would involve
independent monitoring of Hmong who return to Laos.


2. (C) Comment: The RTG remains intent on returning as many
Hmong as possible to Laos and is prepared to use both
inducements and pressure to achieve this goal. However, Thai
officials recognize the damage that would result to
Thailand's image and international relations should they use
overt force to compel returns. The Thai also recognize that
not all the Hmong will "volunteer" to return and, in fact,
have identified an unspecified number who they believe would
be at risk should they return. The Thai are interested in
more discussions with the U.S. on the options for addressing
the protection needs of this population. End Summary and
Comment.

RTG INTERLOCUTORS STAY THE COURSE
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Huso engaged LTG Niphat Thonglek on Hmong
issues over lunch on June 11, 2009. Niphat had recently
returned from a trip to Laos with the RTARF Chief of Defense
Forces (Ref A) and said that the main issues discussed were
border demarcation and the Hmong situation. Referring to
accusations from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and others
that the Thai had used arbitrary arrests as a tactic to
isolate the Huay Nam Khao (HNK) camp leaders and pressure
them to agree to return to Laos or face incarceration, Niphat
instead characterized these individuals as genuinely "bad
boys." He complained that the MSF decision to pull out of
the camp was "political" and that the alleged interference by
the Thai Army in their activities was trumped up. He
extended an impromptu invitation to Ambassador Huso to visit
HNK to see the refugees himself, a suggestion that was
politely but firmly declined. (Note: Embassy had also
declined Niphat's earlier invitations to witness border
repatriation ceremonies out of concern that our presence
might be misinterpreted as U.S. support for repatriation.
End Note.) When asked, Niphat insisted that all further
repatriations would be on a voluntary basis. Ambassador Huso
pressed him to define "voluntary" and Niphat replied that the
RTARF would not use physical force or compulsion but would
use inducements and psychological pressure to encourage
returns to Laos. (Note: Although Niphat may hold this
position, we remain concerned that the RTARF is committed to
closing HNK by the end of this fiscal year and may be
prepared to use physical coercion, see Ref C.)

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4. (C) Niphat demonstrated a clear willingness to engage in
"end game" discussions about the disposition of a residual
group at HNK whom the RTG had determined have demonstrated a
connection to U.S.-trained forces pre-1975 and who may have
continued their resistance afterwards. These individuals and
their families, Niphat acknowledged, unlike the majority whom
he characterized as economic migrants, may have a credible
fear of persecution. Ambassador Huso reiterated the
importance of transparency regarding the screening process
that led to the identification of those with a reasonable
fear of persecution. He stressed that it would be extremely
helpful for the U.S. to have information regarding these
persons. Also, the U.S. has historical and other sources of
information that would assist in the identification of Hmong
who would be at risk. Niphat acknowledged our longstanding
request for access to the Thai lists but made no promises to
deliver the information.


5. (C) In a separate meeting, MFA Deputy Director General
Ittiporn Boompracong repeated prior comments on the need for
"out of the box" solutions to the Lao Hmong problem (Ref D).
He stressed that the RTG had an interest in keeping the Hmong
issue from undermining the overall Thai-Lao bilateral
relationship. He also expressed the Thai desire to address
the humanitarian and refugee concerns of the international
community. He defended the RTG screening process, saying
that it was based on decades of Thai experience in dealing
with refugee issues in cooperation with international
partners. He did not, however, offer any assurances that the
Thai would provide the details of the process and the
decisions reached, although Ambassador Huso pressed him
repeatedly to do so. Ambassador Huso urged him to take
concrete measures to improve transparency regarding the
degree to which the return process was truly voluntary.
Ittiporn reiterated that MSF's withdrawal from HNK (Ref C)
had prompted a very negative reaction within the RTG,
resulting in the suspension of discussions with IOM to
involve that agency in monitoring Hmong returnees from HNK to
the border. He indicated that talks with IOM could resume in
a "few weeks."


6. (C) Ambassador Huso strongly suggested to Ittiporn that
the Thai should open immediately a discussion with the U.S.
and other concerned parties regarding the Hmong who the Thai
had identified as being at risk because of prior association
with the U.S. during the war. A long-awaited and critical
first step would be for the Thai to provide the U.S. with the
names and interview results. With that information, the U.S.
could review its own sources of information and would also
have a clearer understanding of both the size and composition
of the group. Ambassador Huso pointed out that providing the
information would be very much in the Thai interest.
Ittiporn raised the Lao proposal to allow Hmong who returned
to Laos from HNK to resettle if third countries wished to
take them as immigrants. Ambassador Huso pointed out that
this proposal - even if it were confirmed - would be
inconsistent with basic principles and norms concerning
asylum-seekers. Even so, Ambassador Huso said the U.S. was
always interested in an open discussion with the Thai. He
stressed again that transparency on the part of the Thai
would be key to a productive dialogue.

IOM INCREASINGLY POSITIVE WHILE UNHCR DESPAIRS
-------------- -


7. (SBU) Ambassador Huso followed up a positive recent
discussion with IOM representatives in Laos in a meeting with
RefCoord and IOM representatives in Bangkok. The outgoing
IOM Regional Representative for Southeast Asia, Irena
Vojackova, concurred with Ambassador Huso's assessment that
the incremental progress IOM was making in establishing
itself with anti-trafficking and migrant return programs in
Laos could lead to a role in assisting and monitoring Hmong
returnees from HNK. The IOM Rep affirmed that she intended
to take a step-by-step approach to gain the confidence of the
GOL. IOM, she said, intended to focus for now on the GOL

BANGKOK 00001485 003.2 OF 003


half of the equation, until the dust had settled from the MSF
pullout. (Ref C)


8. (C) In contrast, UNHCR Regional Representative Raymond
Hall was focused almost entirely on the situation of the 158
Lao Hmong in Nong Khai who had received Person of Concern
status from the UNHCR almost 3 years ago. He appeared to
have concluded that UNHCR had no ability to influence the
Thai regarding the HNK situation. He believed that the RTG
was prioritizing its bilateral relationship with Laos above
the humanitarian concerns of the international community.
Also, it was impossible for UNHCR to operate effectively in
HNK because of the lack of transparency. In discussion of
Nong Khai, Hall said he was hopeful that the Hmong there
would not be sent back, but thought the Thai would not
release them locally or allow for third-country resettlement
until the current high-level of attention and interest had
died down.

EU WEIGHS IN
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Huso met EC Delegation Head Lipman, who
shared details of his recent trip to a project funded by the
EC near Pha Lak, the Lao village created to accept returnees
from Petchabun who had no links to established communities or
relatives to care for them. He indicated that the EU's
information suggested that the returnees were receiving
assistance as promised and land to farm, and that there had
been no reports of ill-treatment. Ambassador Huso also
discussed an NGO request for funding from the EU for a
project aimed at bringing the Lao government into a
confidential discussion with leaders of the Hmong diaspora
who remained hostile to the GOL. The EU officials confirmed
that they were in the final stages of funding the project.
Ambassador Huso urged them to ensure that there was a clear
commitment on the part of the NGO and the Lao government to
include a "Phase 2" that involved confidence-building
measures, specifically regular independent access to Hmong
returnees as well as those Hmong who have surrendered to
government authority over the last several years. Ambassador
Lipman agreed that this would be critically important to the
success of this initiative.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Huso.
JOHN