LAO HMONG: THAIS OPEN INFORMAL DIALOGUE ON NONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 001028

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, PRM/ENA, PRM/A
GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PREF PHUM TH LA
SUBJECT: LAO HMONG: THAIS OPEN INFORMAL DIALOGUE ON NONG
KHAI GROUP

Classified By: Charge' a.i., James F. Entwistle, for reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) On April 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
invited representatives from the four countries that have
received UNHCR referrals of the 158 recognized refugees
detained for over two years in the Nong Khai Immigration
Detention Center - the U.S. (70 referrals),Australia (47),
Canada (16) and the Netherlands (26) - to explore what it
termed "out of the box" solutions for the group. UNHCR was
also represented by its regional representative, Raymond
Hall. MFA International Organizations Deputy Director
Ittiporn Boonpracong told the group that progress in
returning Lao Hmong from the Petchabun army camp had eased
Government of Laos (GOL) objections to resettling the smaller
Nong Khai group to third countries. According to Ittiporn,
the GOL no longer demanded that the Petchabun issue be
"solved" before the Nong Khai group, could be addressed.
However, Ittiporn stated that the GOL continues to insist
that all Nong Khai refugees must return to Laos before
resettlement can take place. The return is necessary in
order to issue Lao identify and travel documents and, most
importantly, demonstrate that the Hmong can return safely -
required "to preserve national dignity."


2. (C) Reaction by the resettlement countries, and UNHCR,
was cool. UNHCR's Hall acknowledged that his organization had
proposed such a compromise in April 2007 as a special measure
to address the difficult humanitarian situation in the Nong
Khai jail. However, it was a risky venture that was workable
only if: 1.) the refugees returned to Laos on a truly
voluntary basis; 2.) there were verifiable guarantees in
place from the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and GOL regarding
the duration of stay in Laos (preferably very brief); and 3.)
UNHCR and resettlement countries were able to monitor the
refugees the entire period they were awaiting departure from
Laos. RefCoord suggested that a formal tri-partite MOU
between the two governments and UNHCR on the details of the
arrangement would be necessary. In addition, all U.S.-bound
Lao Hmong refugees would have to be travel-ready before
leaving Thailand. This meant that the RTG would have to
provide (for the first time) full access to the Nong Khai
group to the Overseas Processing Entity, DHS officers, and
the International Organization for Migration (which handles
refugee medical exams). RefCoord also noted that a number of
the Nong Khai refugees have immediate family members detained
in the Petchabun camp, and/or living freely in a nearby
province, who would have to be included in the resettlement.



3. (C) The Australian Embassy's political counselor
expressed "shock" at the RTG proposal, complaining it
conflicted with private assurances given to the Australian
Foreign Minister by FM Kasit in February. The Australian
government believed that Kasit had promised resettlement of
the Nong Khai group directly from Thailand - "and soon, too!"
(Comment: We have never received any such assurance. It is
possible the Australians assumed FM Kasit's use of the term
"resettlement" meant departure from the country of first
asylum - Thailand - as is international practice. End
Comment.) The Netherlands Embassy indicated it would have to
consult with The Hague before it could respond to the
proposal, and the Canadian Embassy was unable to attend the
meeting.


4. (SBU) MFA's Ittiporn stated this was the first in a
series of "informal problem solving" meetings on the Nong
Khai refugees, and that if agreement was reached on a
possible solution the RTG would attempt to win GOL
concurrence. There is no date yet for the next gathering,
however. We will report on any further progress.
ENTWISTLE