Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO85
2009-02-12 12:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

IS THE REBELLION OVER? MALI BEATS BACK BAHANGA AND

Tags:  PTER PINS PINR PREL PGOV ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0073
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0085/01 0431228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121228Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0001
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0564
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0039
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0011
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0110
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0022
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0482
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000085 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR PREL PGOV ASEC ML
SUBJECT: IS THE REBELLION OVER? MALI BEATS BACK BAHANGA AND
PREPARES FOR PEACE IN KIDAL

REF: A. BAMAKO 00036

B. BAMAKO 00047

C. BAMAKO 00058

D. BAMAKO 00012

E. BAMAKO 00069

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000085

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS: PTER PINS PINR PREL PGOV ASEC ML
SUBJECT: IS THE REBELLION OVER? MALI BEATS BACK BAHANGA AND
PREPARES FOR PEACE IN KIDAL

REF: A. BAMAKO 00036

B. BAMAKO 00047

C. BAMAKO 00058

D. BAMAKO 00012

E. BAMAKO 00069

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga's hold
over northern Mali seemingly reached an end on February 7 as
paramilitary groups led by northern Malian military officers
pushed Bahanga and his rapidly dwindling number of followers
across the Malian border into Algeria. While it is perhaps
too early to know whether the stars over northern Mali have -
for the first time since fighting resumed in May 2006 -
aligned in Mali's favor, a confluence of factors have come
together to create not the perfect storm but rather the
perfect clear sky, perhaps signaling the beginning of the end
of Mali's simmering third Tuareg rebellion. These factors
include President Amadou Toumani Toure's decision to meet
force with force after Bahanga's late December 2008 foray,
via Mauritania, into central and western Mali; Mali's
decision to unleash paramilitary units composed of regular
and irregular Tuareg and Arab fighters against Bahanga's
positions north-east of Kidal; Bahanga's banishment and the
apparent implosion of his Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for
Change (ATNMC); a new agreement between Mali and the Tuareg
rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) regarding the
ADC's return to Kidal, disarmament, and reintegration into
mixed military units per the Algiers Accords; and indications
that rivals Algeria and Libya are no longer working at
cross-purposes in so far as Tuareg rebel movements are
concerned. Bahanga's swift and stunning defeat suggests that
President Toure and the Malian military actually can, when so
required, mount an effective military campaign in northern
Mali. If Mali and the ADC manage to engineer both a peaceful
return to Kidal and the creation of mixed military units, the
end of hostilities may enable the Malian government and
Tuareg rebels to stop fighting one another and concentrate,

instead, on other common enemies such as insecurity in the
north and AQIM. End Summary.

--------------
Bahanga: Exit, Stage Right
--------------

2.(C) Paramilitary units composed of northern Malians and
led by two Malian military officers from northern Mali - Col.
Elhadj Gamou and Col. Mohamed Abderahmane ould Meydou -
pushed Tuareg rebel leader Ibrahim Bahanga across the Malian
frontier and into Algeria on February 7. The news that
Bahanga was no longer in Mali capped a stunning reversal for
the Tuareg rebel leader whose campaign of violence against
the Malian military began almost two years earlier with an
attack on the Malian military garrison in Tinzawatin in May,

2007.

3.(C) Since the New Year, Bahanga has suffered a number of
increasingly important setbacks, including the capture of
eight Tuareg rebels, including Bahanga ally Ahmed Anakib, by
Malian forces on January 12 (Ref. A); the Malian military's
claim to have captured what appears to have been Bahanga's
deserted camp at Tin-Asalak on January 20; and the January 22
Battle of Bourghessa that may have resulted in the deaths of
perhaps as many as 31 ATNMC members (Ref. B). On January 25
Bahanga unilaterally released the three remaining Malian
military officers he had been holding as prisoners since
mid-2008 and called a time-out from hostilities, which was
promptly rebuffed by Malian officials (Ref. C). On February
2 Bahanga's father-in-law and Paris-based spokesman Hama ag
Sid'Ahmed added to his already impressive collection of
bizarre press releases by issuing a statement on behalf of
the ATNMC claiming to have accepted a cease-fire offer
supposedly articulated by "mediating" countries, "in
particular Libya, Algeria, Mauritania, France, certain Malian
political parties, Mali's technical and financial donors, and
the United Nations." Ag Sid'Ahmed also registered a
complaint over Mali's use of irregular militias against the
ATNMC and warned that Mali was fanning the flames of ethnic
civil war.

4.(U) On February 6 Agence France Presse reported that Mali

BAMAKO 00000085 002 OF 004


and the ADC had reached an agreement permitting the ADC to
return to barracks in Kidal. AFP also reported that an
estimated 35 members of Bahanga's ATNMC had asked Algeria to
facilitate their disarmament and reintegration into the peace
process. Hamma ag Moussa, whose brother Mohamed ag Moussa
was executed along with ADC commander Barka ag Cheikh by
unknown assailants in Kidal on April 11, 2008, is reportedly
among those who have abandoned Bahanga and the ATNMC. On
February 7, Malian and Algerian military sources told AFP
that Bahanga was no longer on Malian soil and that Algeria
had authorized, in accordance with a pre-existing pursuit
agreement, Malian forces to enter Algeria to pursue Bahanga
and those remaining loyal to the ATNMC. On February 9 the
Malian newspaper l'Aube, which sometimes serves as the
unofficial news outlet of the Malian government, reported
that Bahanga had fled to Djannet, Algeria, and was
negotiating terms of asylum with Libya. On February 10 the
Malian military said it had captured all of Bahanga's
logistical and operational bases as well as a significant
quantity of arms, vehicles, and equipment, placing northern
Mali fully under the control of Malian security forces.

--------------
A Northern Answer for a Northern Problem
--------------

5.(C) Bahanga's late December 2008 foray into Mali's central
and western regions of Segou and Koulikoro via Mauritania
triggered a noticeable shift in Malian tactics. President
Toure signaled his decision to revert to force just hours
after Bahanga's December 20 attack on Nampala, declaring
"enough is enough." The President alluded to this shift in
more detail during a brief interview with Radio France (RFI)
on February 6. When asked by RFI to explain the reasons for
his evident fury following Nampala, President Toure said: "I
admit that we spent two or three years trying to restrain
ourselves. We tried everything. . . Unfortunately we were
facing a group which had not one stated demand. Their only
demand was simply the withdrawal of the army from the north,
but I think this is a group with close ties to
narcotraffickers." President Toure went on to explain that
Mali knew Bahanga was hovering near Nampala prior to the
December 20 attack: "We are not short of means; we are not
lacking intelligence either. We knew they were in that zone."
Apparently referring to assistance from unnamed individuals
in Mauritania, President Toure said Bahanga's group
"benefited from a certain complicity which I would prefer not
to mention which enabled them to approach our frontiers and
get to Nampala. But, today, we have decided to change. We
have adapted." At another point in the interview President
Toure stated: "I think that Bahanga has never respected a
negotiated agreement. Never. He is a warrior. All that
matters to him is a show of force, and we are going to show
him some force."

6.(C) A second important shift in Malian military tactics was
the mass mobilization of Tuareg and Arab members of the
Malian military and locally recruited Tuareg and Arab
militiamen. Prior to Nampala, Mali relied primarily on its
regular military composed mostly of soldiers from southern
Mali for combat in Kidal. The Nampala attack and President
Toure's evident exasperation presaged the unleashing of
Mali's irregular militia units led by Col. Gamou and Col.
ould Meydou. Col. Gamou constituted a militia of primarily
Imghad Tuareg fighters in mid-2008 to counter Tuareg rebels
and also provide Gamou, who is an Imghad Tuareg from Gao,
with his own trusted security and information network. In
2008 Col. Gamou's militia engaged with Tuareg rebels from
time to time but never seriously attempted to track Bahanga.
This changed after Nampala.

7.(C) On February 6 President Toure told French radio that
Mali's armed forces counted more than 3,000 soldiers of
northern descent, although this appears to be seriously
inflated. "The essential factor therefore being knowledge of
the terrain," said President Toure, "we rapidly created
Saharan units which know the terrain as well as the
(rebels)." The addition of Arab forces led by Col. ould
Meydou, together with Tuaregs led by Col. Gamou, gave the
Malians a one-two punch combination that left Bahanga
reeling. Ould Meydou was among those dispatched from Bamako
to Kidal after Bahanga's attack on Nampala. An ethnic
Telemsi Arab, ould Meydou brought with him not only a cadre

BAMAKO 00000085 003.5 OF 004


of Arab soldiers loyal to the Malian government, but also a
group of newly formed Arab militia men.

8.(C) According to our Defense Attache's Office, all Malian
military units in northern Mali are organized into
company-size combined armed task forces, also known as ETIAs.
General Gabriel Poudiougou, Chief of Staff of Mali's armed
forces, pushed for this reorganization during his early
January 2009 relocation to Gao, from where General Poudiougou
has been overseeing ground operations against Bahanga.
Incorporating ould Meydou and Gamou's paramilitary units into
these ETIAs gave Mali a significant operational advantage in
the north as it meant that southern Malian soldiers need no
longer be deployed to fight against Tuareg rebels. At the
same time, the Malian army garnered credit for operations
that were largely carried out by ould Meydou and Gamou's
locally recruited soldiers. Though General Poudiougou
directs overall ground operations, Col. ould Meydou exercises
wide latitude in the use of his paramilitary force. Another
point worth noting is that when reporting tactical military
intelligence to the field, Mali's Military Intelligence
Directorate contacts both Gen. Poudiougou and Col. ould
Meydou. Our Defense Attache also reports that Malian
officers in Bamako communicate with Col. ould Meydou through
a Malian Arab interpreter as neither ould Meydou nor members
of his militia speak fluent French.

--------------
A Return to the Algiers Accords
--------------

9.(C) In case unleashing "Saharan Units" led by Col. Gamou
and Col. Meydou didn't give Bahanga enough things to worry
about, Malian and Tuareg leaders in Kidal stepped up efforts
to convince the ADC to return to Kidal. The ADC was supposed
to have returned to Kidal on January 5 but balked at the last
moment after Malian military authorities refused to let the
rebels enter Kidal with their weapons (Ref. D). Since the
failure of the January 5-7 talks between Mali and the ADC in
Kidal, several Tuareg officials led by National Assembly
Deputy Alghabass ag Intallah have been shuttling back and
forth between Kidal and the ADC's temporary camp about 60 KM
outside of Kidal in search of an amenable solution. The new
agreement divides ADC members into those who formerly
belonged to the Malian military and those who did not.
Former members of the Malian military will be allowed to
return to Kidal with their weapons on February 15. They will
then symbolically turn over their arms before being
reintegrated back into the Malian military. ADC fighters who
were never part of the Malian armed forces will give up their
guns before entering the city. Latest press reports indicate
anywhere from 300 to 500 Tuareg fighters, including many who
have recently deserted Bahanga's ATNMC, are now ready to
return to Kidal.

10.(C) As a side-bar to discussions between the ADC and Mali
in Kidal, at least one prominent Tuareg Idnane leader has
been shuttling back and forth between Libya and Tessalit to
secure the disarmament of ADC's Tuareg Idnane faction led by
National Assembly Deputy and renowned trafficker Deity ag
Sidamou. Mohamed ag Erlaf, a former Malian government
Minister and currently Director of the Malian Agency for
Local Investment, recently left Bamako for Tessalit to
facilitate the disarmament of Tuareg rebels led by ag
Sidamou. Ag Erlaf and other Idnane leaders arranged a
January 19 disarmament ceremony for Idnane Tuaregs who were
portrayed as former rebels but in reality likely had little,
if any, connection to the current conflict in northern Mali
(Ref. E). Ag Sidamou, however, is the real deal as far as
Tuareg Idnane rebels are concerned. While ag Sidamou is
listed as the ADC's "Finance Secretary" his operations as
both trafficker and rebel are largely independent of the ADC.
After traveling to Tripoli in late January, ag Erlaf
reportedly returned to northern Mali, armed with funds needed
to convince ag Sidamou to return to his day job as one of
Mali's highest elected officials. Ag Erlaf's Libyan
supported initiative seems to indicate that instead of
working at cross-purposes vis-a-vis Tuareg rebels as Libya
and Algeria have done in the past, the two north African
rivals have divided the various Tuareg rebel movements into
those over which each nation has the most influence, with
Libya taking on the Bahanga and Idnane portfolios and Algeria
assuming the larger and central ADC file.

BAMAKO 00000085 004 OF 004



11.(C) One issue that seriously complicated previous
attempts to convince the ADC to return to Kidal but has
strangely not surfaced this time is the composition and role
of the mixed military units to be created by the Algiers
Accords. Previous disagreements between the various Tuareg
camps and Malian leaders have centered around who would
command the one or more mixed units once created. Tuareg
sources indicate that mixed units now in view would be more
closely controlled by Malian military command in Bamako than
previous iterations which Malians regarded as giving Tuareg
ex-rebels too much independent authority.

--------------
Comment: Too Good to be True?
--------------

12.(C) Mali's swift and remarkably successful action against
Bahanga has many wondering why it took the Malian government
nearly two years to reach what, on the surface, appears to
have been a relatively straightforward action plan.
Bahanga's exile to Libya, should it be confirmed, would be
welcome even though it still leaves Bahanga within striking
distance of northern Mali. This is not the first time
Bahanga has withdrawn to neighboring nations, but it is the
first time he has been forced to flee by military action.
Mali may now depend on Libya and Algeria to keep close tabs
on Bahanga's whereabouts - something neither nation has
proved particularly willing or able to do in the past.
Algeria's mediation with mainstream ADC leaders and Libya's
overtures to the more peripheral but still important Tuareg
Idnane rebel leaders, however, may indicate that Algeria and
Libya are no longer working at cross-purposes in so far as
Tuareg rebel movements are concerned.

13.(C) It now appears that the Malian military actually can,
with the help of local paramilitary units, function rather
effectively in northern Mali. If the ADC's return to Kidal
goes as planned and one or more mixed military units are in
fact created per the Algiers Accords, an end to hostilities
with the Malian government may enable northern units
commanded by Bamako to turn their sights on other pressing
northern security matters including AQIM.
MILOVANOVIC