Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO820
2009-12-21 06:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

MALIAN MILITARY COULD MAKE GOOD USE OF CESSNA

Tags:  MARR ML PINR PTER 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000820 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF PDAS DON YAMAMOTO AND DAS WILLIAM FITZGERALD
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
OSD FOR DASD VICKIE HUDDLESTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: MARR ML PINR PTER
SUBJECT: MALIAN MILITARY COULD MAKE GOOD USE OF CESSNA
CARAVANS

Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, for re
asons 1.4 (b) (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000820

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF PDAS DON YAMAMOTO AND DAS WILLIAM FITZGERALD
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
OSD FOR DASD VICKIE HUDDLESTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: MARR ML PINR PTER
SUBJECT: MALIAN MILITARY COULD MAKE GOOD USE OF CESSNA
CARAVANS

Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Gillian A. Milovanovic, for re
asons 1.4 (b) (d).


1. (C) I understand questions have arisen regarding funding
of two Cessna Caravan surveillance/transport aircraft to
Mali. This is the second year Embassy Bamako has requested
support for this program. It remains, we believe, a vital
step toward Malian efforts to regain control of the vast,
under-governed areas of northern Mali and facilitates the
defeat of violent extremist organizations which thwart key
U.S. goals of democratization and regional development.
These efforts will take time and, therefore, require
resources, sustained incremental assistance and training,
and patience on the part of the U.S. Government.


2. (C) Over the last several months, the U.S. Government has
provided over 40 trucks, 50 radios or radio systems, and
over USD 4 million in vehicle spare parts, life support
equipment, fuel, food, and individual soldier equipment to
provide a minimum of the basics needed to improve the ground
maneuver capacity of specific elements of the Malian Army.
Given the starting point, this represents a tremendous boost
to Malian military capacity and will go a long way towards
helping them begin to provide security in the North,
including in the fight against AQIM. In order to give the
Malian Army the tactical advantage -- something we would
insist on for our own troops -- these aircraft are needed.
They would provide the Malians with over-the-horizon
visibility to better locate the enemy and avoid running into
ambushes. Surveillance capacity ties in with the additional
capabilities we hope to provide the Malian military through
the Military Intelligence (MI) Train and Equip program funded
for FY10. The MI program will train an analytical cell to
use information from a variety of sources, and one important
method for collecting useful information would be aerial
surveillance via the Cessna Caravans. While the U.S.
Government currently provides some such information via the
Creeksand aircraft, the release requirements remain
sufficiently cumbersome to render the information of little

utility. My goal is to assist them with timely, actionable
intelligence rather than historical information, which is
better used for archiving than for guiding operations.


3. (C) These aircraft would also allow the Malian military to
resupply their soldiers either by landing and offloading the
supplies or by conducting an airdrop. The U.S. military did
an airdrop resupply of food and water to Malian troops in
contact in 2008, with the US. aircraft taking rounds from
ground fire. Adding this capability to the Malian Air Force
would be a significant force multiplier and would reduce the
likelihood of the need for requests for similar support from
the United States.


4. (C) I believe that, given their capacity constraints,
Mali's track record with respect to aircraft maintenance is
good. In 1994, the United States provided the Malian Air
Force with three Cessna O-2 observation aircraft. These
planes were Vietnam-era aircraft that the U.S. military no
longer wanted, in part because they were deemed to be too
expensive to maintain. However, nearly 40 years after they
went into service, and 15 years after arriving in Mali, one
of the aircraft is still flyable, and another could be with
relatively minor repairs. Given our records showing that one
of the airplanes was not even flyable when the Malians
received it, I would submit that this is a pretty good
showing. The Basler BT-67 (C-47) that Mali received from the
United States in the 1990s is another good example: the
Malian Air Force keeps it flying and uses it regularly.
While U.S. Foreign Military Financing FMF) has helped with
spare parts acquisition, Mali has received no FMF monies in
the last several years, so if the plane is still flying, it
is primarily the Malian Air Force that deserves the credit.
We have multiple Mil-to-Mil events scheduled with the Malian
Air Force in the second quarter of FY 2010, focusing on
maintenance and logistics management.


5. (C) Looking at basic cost-benefit, we believe that
keeping the Cessna O-2s and the Basler BT-67 airborne rather
than purchasing new aircraft is penny-wise, pound-foolish.
The Cessna O-2s do not have the range to support the ground
troops in contact in the North of Mali, nor do they offer the
transport capability of the Cessna Caravan. The BT-67 has

such range and carrying capability but remains very expensive
to operate.


6. (C) Concerns that the Malian military use the aircraft
against Tuareg rebels are real, but likely disproportionate.
The Tuareg rebellion has largely subsided over the last year,
and the primary threat to development in the North remains
AQIM. The President has repeatedly recognized this new
reality in meetings with senior U.S. Administration officials
and in conversations with me. Additionally, the overall
record of the Malian government approach to handling Tuareg
rebellions has been one of seeking compromise through
discussion and negotiation. Military action has been a
limited instrument of last resort, not the method of choice.
We do not see indications that this approach is likely to
change.


7. (C) If we want to help the Malian Army provide security
in the North so that the people there can benefit from the
assistance in economic growth, health, education and
governance resources like the rest of the nation, providing
two Cessna Caravans with appropriate sensors, a training
package, and a spare parts package via 1206 funding is a step
in the right direction. Compared with FMF funding, which as
noted has been non-existent in recent history, 1206 funding
will get the airplanes in Malian hands sooner. If FMF is
secured it could then help support spare parts purchases in
the future, as was programmed in the FMF request submitted
for FY 2011 and 2012.


8. (C) For all of the above reasons, I urge the interagency
to take a good look at funding the Cessna Caravans for Mali.

MILOVANOVIC