THE HIGH ISLAMIC COUNCIL - A VIEW FROM THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAMAKO 000695

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI ML
SUBJECT: THE HIGH ISLAMIC COUNCIL - A VIEW FROM THE
PROVINCES

REF: A. BAMAKO 580

B. BAMAKO 551

Classified By: PolCouns Peter Newman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) In a recent conversation with the Embassy, Kidal's
representative to the national High Islamic Council (HCI),
Moussa ag Ali, noted the presence of internal tensions
between the provincial and national level of the HCI and
between ethnic groups represented in the HCI. Moussa's
account indicates that the HCI is not a monolithic Islamic
force in Mali, but rather a diverse and sometimes fractious
organization still attempting to determine its appropriate
role in a democratic Mali. End summary.

DISDAINFUL OF AQIM


2. (C) By way of background, Moussa ag Ali is one of the
Kidal region's leading imams and its representative at the
national level of the HCI. Although he is a member of the
Dawa movement, a religious organization that arrived in Kidal
in the 1990s and which has its origins in Pakistan, Moussa
seems to align himself more closely with the Qadiriyya Sufi
order, the form of Islam practiced by most Malian Tuaregs.
Moussa has a political, as well as a religious role within
the Kidal Tuareg community. He remains in close contact, for
example, with people like Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga, a former
rebel leader and Chief of the ADC's military faction. He
also recently traveled to Oubari, Libya to attend the
international Tuareg conference hosted by Muammar Khaddafi.

3. (C) In a recent conversation with the Embassy, Moussa
said he does not consider the Salafists true muslims. He
noted that, in his opinion, AQIM and its Salafist adherents
violate Islamic law by killing muslims and non-muslims alike
without provocation, i.e. without a direct threat to their
existence or their religious practice.

DIVERSITY AND TENSION


3. (SBU) The Malian press tends to characterize the HCI as a
disciplined organization with only one point of view.
However, Moussa explained that the HCI's member rolls
generally reflect the ethnic and religious composition of the
country, and most ethnic groups are represented. The
Tijaniyya Sufi order holds the greatest religious influence,
followed by the Al-Sunna (reformists),and the Qadiriyya.
Moussa said the HCI at the national level is a political
bureaucracy, with an executive, a religious, and an
administrative committee, which are replicated at the
regional and county levels. He noted that elections to the
largest and most important executive committee are extremely
competitive and political.

4. (C) Moussa told the Embassy that ethnic tensions within
the HCI tend to run north-south. He expressed frustration
that that the Tuareg community has not been able to place a
representative on the national executive committee, despite
the fact that he and other Tuaregs are members of the HCI at
both national and local levels. Tensions also exist between
the national and local levels. Moussa attributes the
apparently sudden opposition to the Family Code to poor
communication from the national level to the provinces, both
on the part of the government but also of the HCI. Just as
the GOM did not appear to sufficiently explain the Family
Code to regional assemblies and municipalities, neither did
the national HCI explain it to the regional and county level
HCIs; if they had, Moussa said, they would have understood
the groundswell of opposition.

5. (C) Moussa said he believes the executive committee had
spoken with the GOM about the Family Code before it was sent
to the National Assembly and simply did not take the
opportunity to relay the information to the interior of Mali
or, for reasons he did not provide, bother to express any
opposition to the Code. He commented that after the National
Assembly approved the Code and it was made public, the local
councils became the driving force behind the national
council's forceful and overt opposition to the Family Code.
MILOVANOVIC