AFRICOM DEPUTY COMMANDER MUELLER MEETS WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000669

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: MARR ML PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: AFRICOM DEPUTY COMMANDER MUELLER MEETS WITH
AMBASSADOR

Classified By: Classified By: DCM Peter Henry Barlerin per 1.4 (b) and
(d).



1. (S) On October 14, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller,
Deputy Commander of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) met
with the Ambassador to discuss U.S. security assistance to
the government of Mali.


2. (S) Admiral Moeller noted that, after CENTCOM,
counterterrorism priorities currently make AFRICOM the
busiest command in the world. The Ambassador said that the
U.S. Mission in Bamako and the interagency, including AFRICOM
has paid careful attention to the needs of Malian President
Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT). The hostage crises earlier in
the year have propelled Mali to the forefront of U.S.
counterterrorism attention in Africa. Overall, however, this
is a long haul issue. The U.S. Government strategy should be
the progressive building up of Mali's security capacity. One
of Mali's biggest assets is that it is a stable, multiethnic
democracy, with a free press, and a security apparatus that
does not overreact in the face of peaceful protests. The
USG needs to enhance Mali's security capacity, with the
recognition that security has a vital, legitimate role to
play in the maintenance and development of a democracy.


3. (S) She noted that U.S. security assistance is embarking
on a new path. The 10th Special Forces Group has just
completed the training of one Echelon Tactique Interarme
(ETIA) in Gao, and the Office of Security Cooperation is
preparing for the handover of vehicles and equipment, some of
which has been promised for over two and a half years but
which is just now arriving. Progress has been made,
reflecting a practical response to a specific request for
assistance from ATT. She noted that Mali is not some
ungoverned space. ATT has asked the French, the United
States, and possibly others for feedback on his plan but not
to present their own plan. AFRICOM military planners
responded and their product, in collaboration with the
Malians, has been at the core of the U.S. plan thus far.


4. (S) The Admiral noted that pre-AFRICOM assistance to
Africa was episodic. In his previous position as Director of
Strategic Plans and Policy at CENTCOM, he noted that he was
rarely able to focus on Africa and even then as an
afterthought. By contrast, Africa is not the first priority
for AFRICOM, it is the only priority. AFRICOM seeks to
support what the President of Mali wants to do.


5. (S) The Ambassador noted it is important to have the
Malian military be seen as helpful to the local populace. It
is already a good thing that villagers do not have to worry
about hiding away their daughters or locking up their food
stores when they see the military coming, as has often been
the case in other parts of Africa. In Mali, people
generally have a neutral impression of the military and they
trust them to behave correctly. Medical Civic Action
Programs and Veterinary Civic Action Programs, tied into
bilateral or joint exchange training exercises, reinforce
that goodwill. She noted that obtaining the two Cessna
Caravan aircraft under Embassy Bamako's FY 2010 Section 1206
proposal would help provide Mali with the eyes to oversee its
own country.


6. (S) The Admiral raised the Oasis Enabler concept of
operations. The Ambassador stated that she had never been
formally briefed on the concept, and only informally found
out about it on the margins of the Africa Bureau's Chiefs of
Mission conference in Washington the preceding week. She
said the notion of embedding advisors with the ETIAs is
extremely problematic. It is conceivable that such a plan
might be entertained in the future if the Malians repeatedly
confront Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
find they cannot manage it alone and ask directly for USG
help. For the present and foreseeable future, however, the
guiding approach should be the Malian President,s approach.
ATT has said repeatedly that he has the people, is not asking

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for foreign troops, and is in need of training and equipment
only.


7. (S) There are other problems with embedding advisors.
She noted that it is good the Algerians have decided to begin
to cooperate, at least on some level, with the Malians. The
Algerians do not want the United States involved, and if we
did something like embed advisors, it would risk infuriating
them and correspondingly diminishing their willingness to
help. In addition, AQIM and the smugglers will know
instantly there are U.S. advisors present and can be expected
to try something. U.S. advisors would likely serve as
lightening rods, exposing themselves and the Malian
contingents to specific risk.


8. (S) This unnecessary risk raises the problem of adequate
force protection, which in itself carries the downside of
increasing significantly the number of U.S. forces on the
ground in Mali. Such a significantly increased footprint
could easily be perceived as evidence that AFRICOM does
intend to install itself physically on the continent --
specifically in a compliant Mali -- a misperception the
Command has worked hard to dispel. The Admiral said he
understood and regretted that the Ambassador had not been
kept better informed. He noted that Oasis Enabler is still a
work in progress and started from the planning order to
disrupt AQIM. He offered to brief the Ambassador and select
members of the country team via DVC, which the Ambassador
accepted.


9. (S) The Admiral noted that AFRICOM is very interested in
getting other countries on board. In December exchanges with
the Algerians, the latter had been more receptive than
earlier. The USG had explored the possibility of making
Creeksand products available to the Algerians and even giving
them a say as to where Creeksand overflights could be most
useful. He said that AFRICOM is also working to get Morocco
more involved from a perspective of advancing their own
internal security and reducing the flow of foreign fighters,
in spite of their long-standing animus with Algeria. AFRICOM
also hopes to reach out and include Libya and Egypt.


10. (S) The Ambassador said that ATT is relieved other
countries in the region are getting on board to fight AQIM
and smuggling. She likened the problem until now to other
countries dumping toxic waste in Northern Mali, then
complaining about the stench and bidding Mali to clean it up.
Unfair or not, however, Mali is taking the hit in terms of
the falloff in revenues from tourism, the inability of
foreign aid agencies to conduct development projects in the
north, the shame of having hostages held on Malian territory,
no less than having one of the hostages killed, and the lost
potential from oil and/or natural gas exploration. All this
has made ATT decide to begin to take action. She said the use
of the expression "Tamanrasset process" to describe a meeting
of area chiefs of defense in the southern Algerian town by
the same name is premature. There is no "process" as of yet.
So far, it is only a small, positive move in the right
direction. Even if the long-planned summit meeting of heads
of state in Bamako does not result in much substance, the
symbolic recognition that terrorism is a shared problem of
Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and others in the region is a good
thing. She noted that, for the time being, the United States
should remain on the sidelines but should encourage the
region to act and act collaboratively.


11. (S) In conclusion, the Ambassador noted that the USG
should not see counterterrorism as the raison d'etre of U.S.
presence in Mali. Development will continue to be a problem
so long as the average number of children per woman remains
close to seven. Building Mali's security capacity and
encouraging Mali as a multi-ethnic democracy are equally
important. A significant majority of Malians, regardless of
their ethnicity or location, see the country as a unified
whole and identify themselves overwhelmingly as Malians
first, some ethnic group or religion second. This is a
valuable commodity worth preserving. We have no indications

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that ATT is seeking to change the constitution to allow him
to run for a third term, and the talk is focused on who will
run to replace him in 2012.


12. (S) Admiral Mueller cleared this message.
MILOVANOVIC