Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO63
2009-01-29 17:13:00
SECRET
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

(S) OBSERVATIONS ON UNFOLDING HOSTAGE CRISIS IN

Tags:  PTER PREL PINS PINR ML GM SZ UK CA 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9961
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0550
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0031
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0003
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0102
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0014
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0474
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000063 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PINS PINR ML GM SZ UK CA
SUBJECT: (S) OBSERVATIONS ON UNFOLDING HOSTAGE CRISIS IN
NORTHERN MALI

REF: BAMAKO 00052

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000063

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PINS PINR ML GM SZ UK CA
SUBJECT: (S) OBSERVATIONS ON UNFOLDING HOSTAGE CRISIS IN
NORTHERN MALI

REF: BAMAKO 00052

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(S) Summary: On January 28 and 29 the Embassy spoke to two
Bamako-based Tuaregs who have had direct contact with those
believed to be implicated in the January 22 abduction of four
European tourists along the Mali-Niger border. These
discussions provided a clearer view of the status of the
tourists and the handful of individuals previously identified
as having played a role in the kidnappings. Since the
kidnappings, we have also been invited by the British, German
and Swiss to provide several briefings to various
counter-terrorism and hostage negotiation specialists
dispatched to Mali from London, Berlin and Bern. Our level
of concern regarding the European consortium's inability to
agree on specific modes of action and refusal to engage the
Malian government at any level other than President Amadou
Toumani Toure, his Secretary General Django Sissoko, and
Director of Security Mamy Coulibaly, escalates substantially
after each of these briefings. Since those on the ground in
Bamako appear unable to take even minor decisions without the
approval of all three home capitals, we recommend that the
Department instruct Embassies London, Berlin, and Bern to
inform counterparts of our information and to present what we
believe is a highly time-sensitive course of action. The
crisis teams now in Bamako face a short window of opportunity
to try to negotiate the release of the captives before they
are turned over to a "buyer" - likely AQIM. We believe they
must immediately engage local Tuareg leaders from the Gao and
Menaka areas to solicit advice and request assistance; the
Europeans must broaden their contacts beyond President Toure,
Sissoko and Coulibaly to certain individuals at other levels
of the Malian government who have both the ability to
influence events on the ground in Gao and Menaka and also
affect decisions ultimately made by President Toure. Embassy
Bamako has been deeply involved in the still unfolding

hostage crisis due in large part to an extensive network of
northern Mali Tuareg contacts. Since the tourists were taken
on January 22, we have shared with our European colleagues
the bits of reporting we can provide, observations on how to
navigate the Malian government, and advice on potential ways
forward. Since, thankfully, no American Citizens are among
the hostages, the decision on whether to use any of this
information as a basis for action is ultimately a European
decision. End Summary.

--------------
More Contact with Alleged Kidnappers
--------------

2.(S) On January 28, sometime after 12h00 GMT, Sikabar ag
Ouefene and Nabi ag Meyda, both Taghat Melet Tuaregs based in
Bamako, had several brief telephone conversations with
"Mohamed" who is one of the two Chamanamas Tuaregs allegedly
implicated in the January 22 abduction of four European
tourist along the Mali-Niger border (Ref. A). Ag Ouefene and
Ag Meyda reached Mohamed over Mali's local cell phone
network. Ag Ouefene is a local businessman in Bamako who has
had prior contact with the Embassy. We know very little
about ag Meyda beyond that he appears to be one of the few
individuals actually able to raise Mohamed by phone. Ag
Ouefene said Mohamed had moved toward the northern town of
Gao and was therefore able to use a local cell phone as
opposed to the satellite phones employed by most of northern
Mali's traffickers and bandits. Ag Ouefene said Mohamed
relayed two questions: how much will the Europeans pay for
the tourists and what measures will be taken to assure the
security of the hostage takers once the tourists have been
liberated? Mohamed said it would be too dangerous for him to
cooperate with officials in Bamako as this would compromise
his chances of escaping the hostage crisis unscathed.
Mohamed told ag Meyda and ag Ouefene that he distrusted
telephones and would rather talk face to face, presumably
somewhere near Gao and Menaka in northern Mali.

4.(S) Ag Ouefene repeatedly described Mohamed as scared,
saying he would talk for a few moments on the telephone and
then hang up, forcing ag Meyda to call again. Ag Ouefene
said he and ag Meyda attempted to reassure Mohamed and
encourage him to work toward releasing the hostages for his
own sake and that of fellow Tuaregs who fear that Mali or

BAMAKO 00000063 002 OF 004


westerners will use this crisis to portray all Tuaregs as
sympathizers of Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Mahgreb
(AQIM). Ag Ouefene reportedly told Mohamed to try to find a
solution that did not involve passing the tourists to AQIM
and to focus not on an eventual pay-off but on his own future.

5.(S) During a subsequent meeting with Embassy on January 29,
ag Ouefene and ag Meyda stressed the urgent need for Mali to
dispatch a quiet delegation of two or three hand-picked
Tuareg leaders to the Gao-Menaka area, not to open
negotiations but rather to gather facts in order to know
whether Mohamed and the other potential suspects are indeed
holding the tourists. Like other Malian Government and
Tuareg leaders in Bamako, ag Ouefene said this delegation was
especially urgent because the longer one waits, the more
likely the tourists will be passed to AQIM. Ag Ouefene
described Mohamed and the other alleged captors as "amateurs"
who responded to AQIM's recent offer to pay, according to ag
Ouefene, 3 billion Algerian Dinars or slightly more than USD
100,000 for each westerner captured anywhere but on Malian or
Algerian soil.

--------------
The Unusual Suspects
--------------

6.(S) Our meeting with Ag Ouefene, and a separate discussion
with the influential National Assembly Deputy from Kidal,
Alghabass ag Intallah, provided a somewhat clearer picture of
those suspected of orchestrating the kidnapping. Both ag
Ouefene and ag Intallah believe that Intewika ag Ahmayed (aka
Ousmane) is a Taghat Melet Tuareg trafficker based in the
Algerian town of Tamanrasset. Ousmane's name was the first
given to the Embassy by another Taghat Melet Tuareg on
January 24 after nomads reported seeing 4 westerners covered
with hoods in the back of a truck north east of
Anderamboukane. Ag Ouefene said he spoke to Ousmane by
satellite telephone during the weekend of January 24-25.
According to Ag Ouefene, Ousmane denied involvement and said
another group of Chamanamas Tuaregs was responsible for
taking the four hostages. Both Mohamed and the other
individual identified to the Embassy, who we now believe to
be Tibla ag Tinfane, are Chamanamas Tuaregs.

7.(S) Like Mohamed, Tibla also seems to have moved closer to
the town of Gao. On January 28, a Tuareg dispatched by yet
another Embassy contact reported that Tibla was 30 KM from
Gao and therefore questioned whether Tibla was really
connected to those believed to have abducted the four
tourists. However, later in the day on January 28 a Malian
government official close to President Toure and the
influential Minister of Territorial Administration, General
Kafougouna Kone, told the Embassy that Mali had already put
Tibla under surveillance and that Tibla had broken away from
the main group of alleged hostage takers north of Menaka
during the weekend of January 24-25 and traveled toward Gao.
Ag Ouefene said he also believed Tibla, like Mohamed, was now
in the general vicinity of Gao, and speculated that the two
had left the four tourists in the hands of other, as yet
unnamed, Chamanamas Tuaregs north of Menaka and
Anderamboukane.

--------------
A Need for Speed
--------------

8.(S) Ag Ouefene, ag Intallah, and several other Tuareg
contacts in Bamako have repeatedly stressed the need for a
rapid fact-finding mission of Tuareg leaders to assess
whether those suspected of holding the Europeans do in fact
have the tourists in their custody. Ag Ouefene said he was
uneasy about positively identifying Mohamed, Tibla and
perhaps Ousmane as the kidnappers without traveling to Menaka
to know for sure. We share this uneasiness. Ag Intallah
told the Embassy that as long as the tourists remain in
Tuareg hands, he and other Tuareg leaders can exert "a lot"
on influence on the hostage takers to release the tourists.
Ag Intallah stressed that this influence only lasted as long
as the tourists were in the hands of fellow Tuareg and would
evaporate the moment the individuals were passed to AQIM. Ag
Intallah observed that this was the first time he had heard
of Tuaregs abducting westerners and expressed concern that
Mali or western nations would wrongly interpret this incident

BAMAKO 00000063 003 OF 004


as evidence of Tuareg affinity for AQIM. He said that the
Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) could
easily send some of its members to locate the hostage takers
- provided they secured a laissez passer from the Malian
military that would ensure that no Malian forces fired upon
them while traveling south from Kidal. We know of one ADC
commander, Ada ag Massamad, who has been dispatched by other
Taghat Melet Tuaregs from Kidal to gather information about
the tourists, but we have no information regarding ag
Massamad's findings.

--------------
Mali Ready to Approve Tuareg Delegation
--------------

9.(S) Kader Bah, who is a close confident of both President
Toure and Minister Kone, has also repeatedly contacted the
Embassy, at times pleading with us to convince the Europeans
to ask Mali to quietly commission a group of Tuareg community
leaders to travel to Menaka. On January 25 Bah told the
Embassy that Mali was ready to dispatch a Tuareg group but
needed an official request from one of the governments
concerned. We relayed this information to the German, Swiss
and British later the same day, and reiterated this
recommendation on January 26. On January 29 Bah contacted
the Embassy again to say that it was imperative for the
Europeans to reach out immediately to several key Tuareg
leaders from Gao and Menaka and that they could do this by
simply notifying the Malian Presidency of their intention and
then inviting the individual leaders to a meeting with
assembled European representatives. Bah provided a draft
list of potential invitees. Obviously frustrated by the
inaction within the Malian presidency - which was consumed
for two days with a visit by President Abdoulaye Wade from
neighboring Senegal - Bah also provided one suggested talking
point: tell the local leaders to get involved or Europe will
withdraw all aid for northern Mali. While we do not agree
with Bah's proposed ultimatum, we do believe that speaking
directly to the leaders of the zones where the hostage crisis
appears to be unfolding is imperative.

10.(S) Bah also expressed concern that the British position,
which he described as "the hostages would die before the U.K.
agreed to pay a ransom" had been leaked by a Tuareg official
within the presidency to Tuaregs on the ground in Menaka and
Gao. Bah indicated that this leak could short circuit any
attempt to establish contact with the hostage takers before
such an attempt even got underway.

--------------
Specific Recommendations
--------------

11.(S) One cannot overstate the need for quick action in
order to prevent the four tourists from being passed to AQIM,
assuming that this transfer has not occurred already. We
seem to have had a least one stroke of luck - the
identification of three potential suspects by local nomads
north east of Anderamboukane - which may have potentially
delayed this hand over and provided several new options that
were not on the table following the abduction of the two
Canadian diplomats in Niger in December. We fully agree with
ag Intallah, ag Ouefene, Kader Bah, and several other Tuaregs
who have argued that the hostage situation, however
difficult, remains manageable as long as the tourists are in
Tuareg hands. The Scotland Yard representatives now in
Bamako appeared to be swayed by our analogy of a grappling
hook: each local Tuareg leader who manages to make contact
with one of the presumed hostage takers represents a hook
that is preventing the kidnappers from moving toward AQIM's
orbit. The more hooks we can sink into this group, the
better the chances of preventing or delaying a hand over and
the greater the likelihood for a successful resolution.

12.(S) On January 28 our primary contact on the German
investigation team said that he, too, was now convinced that
someone needed to dispatch a group of Tuareg leaders to Gao
and Menaka to at the very least ascertain whether this lead
is valid or simply a dead end. If it is valid, there is
nothing to lose in sending a mission to Menaka. If it is a
dead end, then we should know within the space of two or
three days. The German representative, however, said he
would now have to convince not only the other members of his

BAMAKO 00000063 004 OF 004


team, but those pulling the strings from Berlin.

--------------
Expanded Lines of Communication to GOM
--------------

13.(S) The British, German and Swiss Embassies in Bamako
appear to be working only though President Toure, his
Secretary General Django Sissoko, and Security Chief Mamy
Coulibaly. While it is extremely important to have open
lines - and we are not sure any of the Europeans have direct
lines open - to each of these individuals, restricting
interaction to only the very highest level of the Malian
government is a recipe for inaction, which in turn is a
recipe for allowing the hostage takers to pass the four
tourists to AQIM. It is an open secret within the Malian
government that the best way to get President Toure to take
action is by leading him to the decision that needs to be
made. The Europeans, however, appear content to await a
decision from the Presidency, or worse, the notoriously
unreliable Mamy Coulibaly. We fear that without some careful
prompting - that would begin via discreet discussions with
certain well placed individuals at other levels ranging from
Minister Kafougouna Kone to Kader Bah to certain elected
Tuareg officials from northern Mali - no such decision is
forthcoming.

14.(S) Many blame the Austrian government for fueling what
now seems to be a cottage industry of hostage taking in
northern Mali. The Austrians, however, proved adept at
cultivating Tuareg and Arab leaders in northern Mali. Recent
discussion with the Canadians indicate that Canada is
beginning to take a page from this play book as they start to
actively reach out to a broad array of northern Malian
elected officials and community leaders. We find it
difficult to understand why it is taking so long for the
British, Swiss and Germans to come to the same conclusion.
This is that much more frustrating because, unlike the
Canadians and the Austrians, there is credible information
indicating that the four tourists are in a specific area
which would enable our European colleagues to target a very
specific and very small group of Tuareg leaders.

15.(S) Our specific recommendations are the following: (1)
Urge the three European governments to instruct their
representatives on the ground here in Bamako to (a) either
immediately meet, with the permission of the Government of
Mali, with key local Tuareg leaders to seek advice and
request their personal involvement in order to dispatch a
discrete group of Tuareg leaders to the Menaka area, or (b)
ask Mali to officially commission a group of trusted Tuareg
leaders to travel to Menaka to identify whether reports
regarding Mohamed, Tibla ag Tinfane and other Chamanamas
Tuaregs are correct; (2) Advise the British, German and Swiss
governments to instruct their representatives in Bamako to
open new, additional channels of communication within the
Malian government in order to accelerate the decision making
process within the Presidency.

16.(S) The decision to proceed clearly falls squarely on the
European nations whose citizens disappeared south of
Anderamboukane. Yet we would be remiss in not informing
capitals of our deep concern for the cost of inaction and
narrow lines of communication.
MILOVANOVIC