Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO387
2009-06-12 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT TOURE READY TO TARGET AQIM, WITH HELP

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV PINS PINR ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7559
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0387/01 1631116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121116Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0456
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0655
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000387 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TOURE READY TO TARGET AQIM, WITH HELP

REF: BAMAKO 00186

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic, Embassy Bamako, for reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BAMAKO 000387

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINS PINR ASEC ML
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TOURE READY TO TARGET AQIM, WITH HELP

REF: BAMAKO 00186

Classified By: Ambassador Gillian Milovanovic, Embassy Bamako, for reas
ons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: Ambassador Milovanovic met with President
Toure for one hour on June 10 to relay concerns expressed on
the margins of
The recent TSCTP conference about Mali's engagement vis-a-vis
AQIM. The Ambassador noted that AQIM's continued use of
northern Mali as a safe haven, and the recent execution of
British hostage Edwin Dyer, are rapidly tarnishing Mali's
image and sapping political capital Mali has accumulated
since its 1991-1992 transition to democracy. The
Ambassador encouraged President Toure to take steps to show
that Mali was indeed serious about eradicating AQIM from
Malian soil. In response President Toure observed that the
recent lull in hostilities with Tuareg rebels enabled Mali
to focus entirely on AQIM and proclaimed that Mali was
prepared to go after AQIM militarily provided partner
nations provided required military equipment and assistance
refurbishing several northern military outposts. He also
invited U.S. military planners to work directly with Malian
military counterparts on plans to remove AQIM. A deep
sense of frustration and disappointment with neighboring
nations, and Algeria in particular, colored nearly all of
the President's remarks during the meeting. He repeatedly
blamed Algeria, Niger, and Mauritania for failing to follow
through with his proposed Head of State summit and for
abdicating their responsibility for policing the Sahel to
an under-manned, under-equipped and under-trained Malian
military.
Toure said that he now understood that the only person he
could
count on to address AQIM was himself. We believe we
can count on Toure, but that he needs substantial
help to actually move on AQIM. End Summary.

--------------
AQIM Destroying Mali's Model Image
--------------

2.(C) The Ambassador gave President Toure a brief
summary of her recent consultations in Washington as part
of the June 1-3 TSCTP conference and also shared concerns

stemming from AQIM's execution of British hostage Edwin
Dyer. Underscoring our shock at Dyer's murder, the
Ambassador said the execution represented a very serious
step in the wrong direction. Acknowledging President
Toure's oft-stated argument that AQIM is a regional problem
which demands a regional - as opposed to a Malian -
solution, and noting that we were exploring ways that
Washington could
encourage others in the region to cooperate (which ATT
welcomed warmly),
the Ambassador noted that AQIM was nevertheless on Malian
soil and therefore a
very distinct Malian problem that is now undermining Mali's
hard-won and
valuable image as a model West African democracy. The
Ambassador expressed
concern that all of the political capital Mali has
accumulated over
nearly two decades of democratic success could be
overshadowed by a handful of terrorists using northern Mali
as a safe haven. To protect its image, guard against the
locally
corrupting influence of AQIM, and quell troubling
doubt about Mali's interest in combating AQIM, Mali needs
to show clearly that it is serious about eliminating AQIM.

--------------
President Toure: AQIM Is Top Priority
--------------

3.(C) President Toure, somewhat agitated about this
apparently growing
mistaken picture of Mali, assured the Ambassador that AQIM is
a top priority. He described Mali's willingness to
confront AQIM as "manifest" and Mali's engagement as
"total." At another point the President declared that Mali
is "honestly" and "fully engaged in the fight against
terrorism." He agreed that AQIM's presence had "stained"
Mali's reputation, however unjustly, given the
co-responsibility and
greater capacity of Mali's neighbors. He remarked that
Tuareg unrest had
diverted Malian attention away from AQIM for several years.
"We are no longer distracted by Tuaregs," said the
President, "but we can't do this on our own." In another

BAMAKO 00000387 002 OF 004


part of the
conversation ATT remarked "AQIM are not choir boys."
President
Toure repeatedly argued that Mali is unable to secure vast
expanses of isolated desert on its own and must therefore
rely on the support of neighboring nations. He urged what
he described as "synergy" between Mali, Algeria,
Mauritania, and Niger to close down AQIM supply routes and
roll up AQIM bases in Algeria.

--------------
Unhelpful Neighbors
--------------

4.(C) Toure professed profound disappointment with Algeria
and others' eagerness to hold Mali alone responsible for
AQIM's continued existence. "Everyone is fleeing their
responsibilities," said Toure of his neighboring Heads of
State. This disappointment bordered on anger when Toure
argued that AQIM is composed nearly entirely of Algerians
and is therefore an Algerian export to northern Mali. "You
need to tell Washington," he said, "that AQIM comes from
abroad. Mali is not their home." He denied that AQIM
received any significant support from local Malian
populations -
beyond the odd goat or peanuts sold to the salafists for
profit by
northern villagers. He maintained that AQIM survived
off assistance garnered outside Malian borders, saying "we
know where they
get fuel and other things across the Algerian border."
Toure said Mali had given the Algerian military permission
to pursue AQIM as much as 1,000 KM into Malian territory
but that Algeria inexplicably chose to do nothing.
Similarly, the offer to
create joint border patrols with Algeria has not been taken
up by Algiers.
"We can't talk to them," said Toure of the Algerians. "We
solve
our problems in little newspapers," he commented, referring
to attacks on
him by Algerian press, to which he responded in the Malian
media. At
another point President Toure observed that the Maghreb
doesn't listen to
Mali.


5. (C) ATT did give Algeria credit for being willing to work
with Mali on
development in the north, pursuant to the Algiers Accords.
"This is the
only thing we are able to talk with them about now," he
remarked, saying
that it is a priority for him to move to provide some
economic perspectives
to northern youth, without which they will be attracted to
smuggling at a
minimum, that being one of the few economic pursuits
available.


6.(C) Responding to the charge that Mali is perceived in
some quarters as not doing enough to counter AQIM,
President Toure relayed snippets of his recent conversation
with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who apparently
pressed Toure to acknowledge that the British hostage was
killed on Malian soil. President Toure said he urged Prime
Minister Brown not to wait for the next hostage crisis and
stated
that Mali was ready to engage AQIM - if only Mali were not so
completely overwhelmed militarily and financially.
Referring to the March 2009 capture of individuals
suspected of participating in the kidnappings of the
European tourists along the Mali-Niger border (Ref. A) and
Mali's April 26 arrest of four AQIM members north of
Tessalit, President Toure said Mali planned to prosecute
these suspects. He also denied once again that Mali
paid or received any ransom money for hostages - whether
Austrian or Canadian - and blamed family members of the
Austrian hostages for bypassing official channels to
involve the Libyans in direct negotiations with AQIM.

--------------
U.S. Cooperation
--------------

7.(C) Emphasizing several times that he feels he has the
troops to carry
out the job (apparently "unites specials" which he said would
be composed in

BAMAKO 00000387 003 OF 004


part of the former rebels re-integrated into the army ; men
who know the
desert well),the President requested a team of U.S. military
planners to travel to Mali to help review and refine Mali's
plan to
engage AQIM and to confirm what training and equipment and
support would be
needed to implement it. He said he had the basic plan. Mali
would like to
assign two regiments to a refurbished military base in
Tessalit - provided
donors provide the required renovations funds - and two other
smaller
military outposts strategically placed in the desert to allow
troops to have
a small permanent base from which to patrol. He also
recommended basing one
Algerian unit in Tessalit and said he had proposed this to
Algiers so far to
no avail. Also essential is the provision of sufficient
functioning
transport and equipment to get the people where they need to
go and get the
job done. He called this a Malian solution to AQIM, which he
contrasted with
an apparent French offer to help Malians strategize about
security in the
Sahel. ATT said the Malians accepted the French offer on
condition that
discussions were about the Malian plan, not one the French
might try to
impose. ATT remarked "I don't take orders from others."

8.(C) Toure said the execution of Edwin Dyer had convinced
him of the need for Mali to establish some permanent and
regular presence in
the north to impose security. To achieve this, and achieve
it quickly ?
something he saw as essential given the negative developments
with AQIM,
Mali needed partner nations to furnish donate the required
military hardware
including logistics. If we had the equipment, said the
President, Mali
would move on AQIM "tomorrow morning."

9.(C) President Toure expressed some frustration that,
despite
conversations with Ambassador McCulley, Ambassador
Milovanovic, and several
with General Ward, his standard request for practical support
including
equipment remained both unchanged and unfulfilled. He
stressed that the
situation requires rapid action and requested this message be
clearly stated
in this report. ATT also asked the U.S. to help encourage
neighboring
nations, and Algeria in particular, to ratchet up their own
efforts to curb
AQIM activities and play better with their neighbors by
attending a regional
summit on Sahel-Saharan security. The summit would be short,
but would commit
neighbors to work together on shared problems and provide a
basis for
working out the modalities of cooperating, notably to squeeze
AQIM suppliers
and constrain the terrorists' ease of movement across
borders. He stressed
that this was something Mali could not do alone. The
Ambassador noted that
the Washington discussions included the decision to enlist
partners to
encourage regional neighbors to participate in a summit,
something that ATT
warmly welcomed.

--------------
Comment: An Isolated President
--------------

10.(C) Throughout the meeting, President Toure returned to
several core themes: Mali is ready to move on AQIM if only
partner nations provide the means; AQIM is an Algerian
export to northern Mali and it is unrealistic to expect
Mali alone to be held responsible for an Algerian terrorist
group; and the region has effectively hung Mali out to dry
by denying any responsibility for addressing AQIM.
President Toure also appeared to be grappling with a growing

BAMAKO 00000387 004 OF 004


sense of isolation as AQIM's activities in Mali increase
while regional support for
Malian counter terrorism efforts continues to subside. At
the very end of
the meeting President Toure said: "I don't count on
Algeria. I don't count on the region. All I can count on is
myself." We believe that we can also count on President
Toure's good faith efforts to counter AQIM, despite Mali's
well-known military and financial limits. ATT is ready to do
something about
this. It is essential, however, that the US (and others)
move forthrightly
and swiftly to take up ATT on his request for military
planners and his
request (if validated by the planners) for what he needs to
allow his forces
to act. Rapidly boosting Mali's military capacity would well
serve both our
interests and, if successful, speed AQIM's exit from northern
Mali.

MILOVANOVIC