Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO36
2009-01-16 14:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

TUMULT WITHIN TUAREG REBEL ADC FOLLOWING FAILED

Tags:  PREL PINR PINS ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8982
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0036/01 0161426
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161426Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9921
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0535
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000036 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS ASEC ML
SUBJECT: TUMULT WITHIN TUAREG REBEL ADC FOLLOWING FAILED
TALKS IN KIDAL

REF: A. 08 BAMAKO 00968

B. NOUAKCHOTT 00009

C. BAMAKO 00960

D. BAMAKO 00012

E. 08 BAMAKO 00779

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000036

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR PINS ASEC ML
SUBJECT: TUMULT WITHIN TUAREG REBEL ADC FOLLOWING FAILED
TALKS IN KIDAL

REF: A. 08 BAMAKO 00968

B. NOUAKCHOTT 00009

C. BAMAKO 00960

D. BAMAKO 00012

E. 08 BAMAKO 00779

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: The capture of eight Tuareg rebels near the
town of Tin-Essako on January 12 has revealed new divisions
within the Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change
(ADC). Although press reports portrayed the incident as a
planned operation by the Malian military against Bahanga,
Tuaregs claim the rebel vehicle and Malian patrol simply ran
into each other with the Malian military - for the first time
in recent memory - coming out on top. Nor is it clear
whether the captured Tuaregs belonged to the ADC, Bahanga's
Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC),or some
combination of the two. The leader of the captured Tuareg
rebel patrol - Ahmed Anakib - reportedly accompanied Bahanga
on his return to Mali from Libya via Mauritania in November

2008. However, on January 14 a new spokesman for the "armed
branch" of the ADC said Anakib belonged to the ADC. The
confusion over Anakib's shifting allegiances appears to
reflect greater shifts within the ADC itself. In addition to
the apparent resignation of previous ADC spokesman and
signatory to the Algiers Accords Ahmada ag Bibi, two of the
ADC's three seats on the Algiers Accords steering committee
have changed hands, with one of these seats going to the
notoriously unreliable Hassan Fagaga. Before news of the
January 12 incident broke, Minister of Territorial
Administration Kafougouna Kone told the Embassy that internal
disagreements within the ADC led to the breakdown of talks in
Kidal. Minister Kone attributed this to ADC leader Iyad ag
Ghali and said the ball was now in the ADC's court. "We're
waiting," said Kone, "for them to telephone us." End Summary.

--------------
Mali Captures Eight Tuareg Rebels
--------------

2.(U) On January 12 Ibrahim Bahanga released two employees
of the Kidal branch of the Malian Electric Company (EDM).
Rebels believed to be linked with Bahanga carjacked and
captured the two EDM workers on January 7 on the road between

Gao and Kidal. The rebels also briefly detained the EDM
vehicle's driver, a female passenger, and her ten year old
daughter. It was not clear why Bahanga, who normally does
not capture civilians, held the two EDM employees for five
days.

3.(C) Later in the day on January 12 a Malian army patrol
led by Col. Mohamed Abderahmane ould Meydou briefly engaged
and captured a Toyota Landcrusier with a mounted gun carrying
eight Tuareg rebels near Tin-Essako about 200 KM east of
Kidal. According to a statement released by the Malian
Ministry of Defense, two Malian soldiers were wounded during
the incident. Tuareg contacts have reported that, in
addition to the two Malian soldiers wounded, one member of
the Malian military was killed. It appears that the
individual who was killed, Tanato ag Ekhya, was not a regular
soldier but rather a member of the Tuareg Imghad militia
constituted by the Malian government and Col. Elhadj Gamou to
counter Tuareg rebels. Although Col. Meydou is an ethnic
Arab, he appears to be one of the Malian officers working
with Col. Gamou's Imghad militia. Two rebels were also
wounded.

4.(C) International and Malian media have reported that the
January 12 incident stemmed from a planned operation by the
Malian army against Tuareg rebels aligned with Bahanga.
Tuareg contacts, however, report that Col. Meydou came upon
the rebel vehicle by chance. Either way, the contingent of
Malian forces clearly won this round and the eight prisoners
arrived in Bamako on January 14. French press reported that
the Red Cross had demanded access to the prisoners, declaring
that the group of eight were captured during combat and are
therefore prisoners of war. On January 15 a local
representative of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) confirmed to the Embassy that the ICRC had
indeed requested access to the prisoners but had encountered
certain undefined "difficulties". The prisoners were examined
by a Malian military doctor upon arrival in Bamako, but there
is as yet no indication that the Malians will allow the ICRC
to see them, possibly because Mali regards the prisoners as
criminals and bandits rather than POWs.

--------------

BAMAKO 00000036 002 OF 003


Who is Ahmed Anakib?
--------------

5.(C) The leader of the captured rebel contingent was Ahmed
Anakib. Anakib reportedly traveled with Ibrahim Bahanga by
air from Libya to Nouakchott in November 2008. He and
Bahanga are believed to have returned to Mali overland,
perhaps with help from members of the Mauritanian government
(Ref. A and B). Anakib also reportedly participated in the
ATNMC's December 20 attack against the Malian base at Nampala
on December 24 (Ref. C).

6.(U) It would therefore appear that Anakib and the other
captured Tuaregs belonged to the ATNMC and many Malian
newspapers have described Anakib as Bahanga's "right hand"
man. However, on January 14 Alkhader ag Faki, whom Radio
France (RFI) described as the spokesman for the "armed
branch" of the ADC, told RFI that Anakib belonged to the ADC.
"They are not Ibrahim Bahanga's men," said ag Faki of the
eight captured rebels, "they are ADC members who were on a
directed mission to pick up soldiers who had reached the end
of their vacations in the area of Tin-Essako, and were
encircled 40 KM from Tin-Essako by military convoys which
opened fire on them." Asked by RFI to clarify whether the
captured Tuaregs were with the ADC or Bahanga, ag Faki said:
"Even Kidal, the Kidal authorities, know that Ahmed Anakib
belonged to the Alliance (ADC) and I don't know why, all of a
sudden, everything has changed and now we are talking about
Bahanga's men. This is a confusion we need to avoid and we
are waiting for clear explanations from Bamako and an update
on the health status of these individuals."

7.(C) Since membership in the ATNMC and ADC is not mutually
exclusive, Anakib may be one of several Tuaregs playing both
sides of the rebel fence. Tuareg contacts appear divided on
Anakib's allegiance, with some siding with ag Faki and others
citing his trip through Libya and Mauritania as conclusive
evidence of his ties to Bahanga. Eventual identification of
the seven other prisoners may provide a better indication of
what rebel flag Anakib was flying when captured by Col.
Meydou.

--------------
Turmoil within the ADC
--------------

8.(C) Ag Faki's claim of ownership over Anakib could be a
product of confusion, or outright division, within the ADC.
It could also stem from the ADC's refusal to acknowledge
Bahanga's ATNMC as a legitimate, stand-alone rebel group.
This is the first we have heard of Alkhader ag Faki, who is
an Iwellemmeden Tuareg from Menaka. During northern Mali's
1991-1996 rebellion ag Faki belonged to the Movement pour
l'Azawad (MPA) led by Iyad ag Ghali. It appears that ag Faki
was fairly close to ag Ghali during the 1990s, but we have no
information on what ag Faki has been up to since the last
rebellion ended in 1996.

9.(C) Although RFI introduced ag Faki as the spokesman for
the "armed branch" of the ADC, ag Faki seems to have taken
over for National Assembly Deputy Ahmada ag Bibi as the ADC's
official spokesman. Ag Bibi, who signed the Algiers Accords
in 2006 on the ADC's behalf, ascended to the post of
spokesperson largely through his prior role as one of ag
Ghali's two business partners in a Kidal-based travel agency
called Affala voyages. Since winning election to Mali's
National Assembly in 2007, ag Bibi has become increasingly
detached from ADC decision-making. Several Tuareg sources
have told the Embassy that ag Bibi resigned as spokesman out
of frustration following Mali, Algeria and ADC leaders'
failure to convince the ADC's rank and file to return to
their barracks in Kidal, January 5-7 (Ref. D).

10.(C) On January 12 Kidal Chamber of Commerce president
Abdousalam ag Assalat told the Embassy that he too had
resigned his position as an ADC representative. Since 2006,
ag Assalat has held one of the ADC's three seats on the
nine-member Algiers Accords steering committee. Ag Assalat,
who represented Kidal's Taghat Melet Tuareg community on the
steering committee, said he decided to quit in late December,
shortly after Iyad ag Ghali returned to Mali. Ag Assalat
said he was equally frustrated with both the ADC and Mali and
said neither was a good-faith negotiating partner. Prior to
the January 5-7 fiasco in Kidal, the ADC gave ag Assalat's
seat to another Taghat Melet Tuareg, Sidi Mohamed Ougana.

11.(C) In addition to Ougana, the January 5-7 meeting of the
Algiers Accords committee included another familiar but
likely not entirely welcome member: Hassan Fagaga. Fagaga

BAMAKO 00000036 003 OF 003


reportedly replaced Mohamed ag Aharib on the steering
committee. Ag Assalat, ag Aharib, and Haroun ag Saghid were
the ADC's three original representatives to the Algiers
Accords committee (Ref. E). It is unclear why the ADC
replaced ag Aharib. Ag Aharib represented the Ifergoumessen
fraction of Kidal Tuaregs, which includes Bahanga, and was
known for flip flopping between the ADC and the ATNMC.
Fagaga is also an Ifergoumessen with a similar history of
moving between the two rebel movements.

--------------
Minister Kone Blames Iyad
--------------

12.(C) On January 12 Minister of Territorial Administration,
General Kafougouna Kone, told the Embassy that the ADC had
agreed to disarm prior to entering Kidal on January 5 and
that ADC leaders changed their minds at the last moment.
Minister Kone said he did not believe the January 5-7 failure
meant the end of the Algiers Accords. He did, however, lay
the blame for this failure squarely on ADC leader Iyad ag
Ghali, who Kone accused of working to undermine the peace
process. "And to think," said Kone of ag Ghali, "that I flew
him to Kidal in my own airplane." Minister Kone said
National Assembly Deputy Alghabass ag Intallah was still
trying to convince the ADC to return to Kidal and that the
ADC had promised to call Bamako when the rebel group was
ready to meet once again with the Malian government. "We're
waiting for them to telephone us," said Kone.

--------------
Comment: New Faces, New Uncertainties
--------------

13.(C) Ag Bibi and ag Assalat were both dedicated to a
peaceful solution to the Tuareg conflict. As a result, they
often found themselves out ahead of the rest of the ADC,
advocating for concessions or agreements that the group's
gun-toting rank and file were not ready to accept. Their
decision to resign their posts within the ADC hierarchy do
not bode well for the Algiers Accords or further negotiations
with Mali. While we know very little about ag Faki or Sidi
Mohamed Ougana, the ADC's decision to appoint the notorious
Fagaga as one of its three representatives to the Algiers
Accords steering committee was likely not well received by
Malian civilian or military leaders who traveled to Kidal for
the ADC's supposed return to its barracks on January 5. Seen
from this angle, it is somewhat easier to understand how the
ADC's return to Kidal, which was supposed to have been a
done-deal, ended in complete disarray two days later.
LEONARD