NORTHERN MALI'S REACTION TO EXECUTION OF BRITISH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000355

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: PTER PINR PINS PGOV ML
SUBJECT: NORTHERN MALI'S REACTION TO EXECUTION OF BRITISH
HOSTAGE

REF: BAMAKO 00071

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary. On June 4 the Embassy sounded out several
northern leaders for their reaction to AQIM's apparent
execution of the British national kidnapped on January 22
along the Mali-Niger border. We spoke to four Tuareg leaders
from northern Mali, one Telemsi Arab leader from the region
of Gao, and one Berabiche Arab leader from Timbuktu. All
described the killing as reprehensible. Angered by the
murder and fearful of a potential backlash against their own
interests, at least two Tuareg groups are considering
communiques condemning the execution and urging the Malian
government to assume responsibility for securing Malian
territory. The Telemsi Arab leader we contacted, who also
served as one of the many intermediaries working for the
British hostages' release, appeared indifferent to any
potential ramifications for his community, stating flatly
that Malian Arabs had nothing to do with AQIM and were simply
observers interested only in minding their own business. On
the evening of June 4, however, perhaps as news of impending
Tuareg statements began to circulate, he contacted the
Embassy to state that Telemsi Arabs would indeed issue a
statement condemning the murder. An Arab Berabiche leader
from Timbuktu blamed the killing on previous ransom payments
to AQIM, expressed concern that development assistance to
northern Mali would now understandably dry up, and said the
Berabiche were mulling over issuing a condemnation statement
of their own. End Summary.

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Tuareg Reaction: Damage Control
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2.(C) Kidal Chamber of Commerce President and Taghat Melet
Tuareg leader Abdousalam ag Assalat described the murder of
the British tourist as horrible and said there was a
considerable amount of outrage within the Tuareg community
that AQIM could commit such an act on Malian soil. Ag
Assalat speculated that someone should, in his words,
"exploit" this anger as a way of solidifying public opinion
against AQIM. Ag Assalat also expressed concerns of a
potential backlash against local Tuareg populations as
governments looking at northern Mali from afar may
incorrectly assume that Tuareg populations were somehow
complicit with the kidnapping and the murder of the British
hostage. He said he feared that the murder would have a
seriously adverse impact on the development of northern Mali.

3.(C) In the past ag Assalat has worked with other Tuareg
leaders to issue statements condemning violence between
Tuareg rebels and the Malian military. Several years ago ag
Assalat also had a hand in statements asking what was then
the GSPC to clear out of northern Mali and Tuareg territory.
Ag Assalat said he intended to speak with fellow Taghat Melet
leaders and Kidal based Imams about issuing a statement
condemning the murder.

4.(C) National Assembly Deputy and Ifoghas Tuareg leader
Alghabass ag Intallah also said he was shocked and saddened
by the execution. He held the Malian government partly
responsible for the murder, and complained that local
communities could have rid northern Mali of AQIM's presence
had the central government not sapped all of local
communities' power. He lamented the Malian government's
unwillingness to created mixed military units per the Algiers
Accords as these units would be well-placed to provide the
sort of security currently absent in northern Mali.
Alghabass said he was working with fellow Ifoghas leaders to
draft a statement that would condemn the execution and urge
the Malian government to take measures needed to properly
secure northern Mali.

5.(C) National Assembly Deputy and spokesman for the Tuareg
rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) Ahmada ag Bibi
described the execution as a bad sign for northern Mali and
indicated that he was working with his fellow Assembly Deputy
Alghabass on a statement of condemnation.

6.(C) A senior leader of the Chamanamas Tuareg community,
Sikaye ag Ekawel, had a slightly different approach. Sikaye,
who is from the eastern part of the region of Gao near the
town of Menaka, said he was saddened by the murder but that
AQIM and the murder were located a long ways from where
Chamanamas Tuaregs reside. He said only a change in the
Malian government's handling of AQIM could resolve the
problem in northern Mali and that only a very small minority

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of Tuaregs had contact with the terrorist organization.

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Telemsi Arabs: It Ain't Me
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7.(C) On the morning of June 4, Telemsi Arab leader and
former National Assembly Deputy from Bourem in Gao, Mohamed
ould Mataly, indicated that a statement of condemnation was
not Malian Arabs' affair. Ould Mataly was deeply involved in
negotiations over the fate of the British hostage (reftel).
In January ould Mataly offered to put British officials in
telephone contact with the British hostage - an offer the
British apparently never accepted out of fear that speaking
to the hostage could put them into a position of having to
negotiate with terrorists. Obviously angered by British
handling of the crisis, ould Mataly said the execution was
"deplorable" but had nothing to do with Mali's Arab
community.

8.(C) He described northern Mali as an open space, a separate
country between Mali and Algeria run by Islamists and
traffickers. He said that while Malian Arabs wanted peace in
the north, they are nothing more than observers when it comes
to AQIM and have no ability to influence the terrorist
group's use of northern Mali as a safe haven. When asked if
he feared that the execution could impact northern
populations by scaring away development opportunities, ould
Mataly questioned whether northern Malians would notice the
difference given the limited number of development projects
in the north currently underway. He then made a pitch for
more well projects north of Gao near Bourem. On the evening
of June 4 ould Mataly contacted the Embassy to say that his
community did indeed plan on issuing a statement regarding
the execution.

-------------- Q --------------
Berabiche Arabs: We Saw It Coming
--------------

9.(C) Timbuktu based Berabiche leader Danna Moulaye said the
execution was shameful and barbarous. He blamed the hostage
crisis and its fatal outcome on countries that previously
ransomed hostages from AQIM. "Ransom payments," said
Moulaye, "created all of this. If no one had given money at
the start, they wouldn't have taken any other hostages."
Moulaye said Berabiche in Timbuktu were very disturbed by the
killing, not only because it is anathema to Malian and
Berabiche culture but also because it occurred on what he
regards has his land in northern Mali. He said news of the
execution was still sinking in but that the Berabiche were
discussing whether to issue a statement of condemnation.
Moulaye also expressed concern that the killing would
adversely impact innocent northern populations. Noting that
he has been warning of this kind of backlash for years,
Moulaye said northern Mali had not reached the point where
western development workers will decide that it is not worth
risking their lives for nothing to travel northward. He then
added that he couldn't blame international development
workers for making this calculation and that he would do the
same were he in their position.

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Comment: Shock and Concern in Northern Mali
--------------

10.(C) Northern leaders are shocked and saddened by news
that a western tourist's trip to Mali to attend a festival
celebrating Malian and Tuareg culture ended in a brutal
murder, at the hands of Islamic extremists, on Malian soil.
They all stressed that neither religious fanaticism nor
violence have any place in Malian culture and that Malian
citizens would have never sponsored such an act. Tuaregs,
who have perhaps the most to lose given the international
community's misguided propensity to assume that two armed
groups - Tuareg rebels and AQIM - who occupy the same
geographical space must therefore also be linked
ideologically, are clearly concerned that Malians or
international donors will conclude that they were in some way
complicit with both the hostage takings and the murder. The
Tuareg communiques that are apparently forthcoming are
intended not only to express a genuine sense of horror with
the killing but also publicly distance Tuareg communities
from AQIM.

11.(C) Telemsi Arab leader ould Mataly's reaction was
slightly more curious. It may be that ould Mataly truly
believes that hostage crises are not his problem and that
there is nothing he can do to undermine AQIM's position.

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Malian Arab communities are not as organized as their Tuareg
brethren, however, and it may be that neither ould Mataly nor
any other Telemsi leader has the power to unite fellow
Telemsi Arabs behind one cause. The same may hold for
Berabiche located in Timbuktu. The Berabiche, and perhaps
the Telemsi, may find themselves shamed into publicly
condemning the execution once the Tuaregs have released
statements of their own. Ould Mataly's subsequent
communication with the Embassy on the evening of June 4 seems
to indicate exactly that.
LEONARD