Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAMAKO3
2009-01-05 16:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bamako
Cable title:  

A NORTHERN MALI NEW YEAR'S SPECIAL: GRENADES,

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL PINS ASEC ML 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0648
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0003/01 0051642
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051642Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9880
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0528
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000003 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PINS ASEC ML
SUBJECT: A NORTHERN MALI NEW YEAR'S SPECIAL: GRENADES,
GUNFIRE, AND THE "GUIDE"

REF: A. 08 BAMAKO 00800

B. 07 BAMAKO 01356

C. BAMAKO 00968

D. BAMAKO 00482

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000003

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL PINS ASEC ML
SUBJECT: A NORTHERN MALI NEW YEAR'S SPECIAL: GRENADES,
GUNFIRE, AND THE "GUIDE"

REF: A. 08 BAMAKO 00800

B. 07 BAMAKO 01356

C. BAMAKO 00968

D. BAMAKO 00482

Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson, Embassy Bamako, for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: Northern Mali rang in the new year with
grenade attacks targeting three Tuareg leaders in Gao, a
faux-offensive against Ibrahim Bahanga near Tessalit, an
impromptu visit by the "frere guide" Muammar Qadhafi that
caught even President Amadou Toumani Toure off-guard, and a
meeting of the Algiers Accords oversight committee in Kidal
intended to pave the way for an estimated 300 fighters loyal
to the Tuareg rebel Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC)
to return to their barracks in Kidal. Meanwhile, on northern
Mali's eastern frontier, Arabs in Timbuktu began organizing a
self-defense militia of their own, ostensibly to defend
members of Mali's Arab communities from threats posed by
Tuareg rebels and AQIM. End Summary.

--------------
Grenades in Gao
--------------

2.(C) Unknown assailants threw hand grenades at the
residences of three separate Tuareg leaders in the town of
Gao on New Year's Day. Three individuals, including one
attacker, were killed and two others wounded. Among the dead
were an elderly woman and a young girl working as a domestic
servant. None of the targeted Tuareg leaders, which included
the second vice president of Mali's National Assembly,
Assarid ag Imbarcaoune, were injured. The other residences
attacked belonged to High Council of Collectivities
representative, Azaz ag Doudagdag, and the Malian Agency for
Northern Development's (ADN) Director, Mohamed ag Mahmoud
Akiline. After the attacks, the Governor of Gao, General
Amadou Baba Toure, told the Embassy that the attackers
belonged to the Songhai/Peuhl militia known as the Ganda-Izo.
General Toure said he believed those responsible for
throwing the grenades were among those caught during Mali's
sweep of the Ganda-Izo in September 2008 and later released
(Ref. A).

3.(C) Imbarcaoune, ag Doudagdag, and Akiline are all Imghad

Tuaregs aligned with President Toure. As core members of the
Tuareg nobility in the region of Gao, they exert considerable
influence over local government affairs. In November 2007
Akiline claimed he, the Governor of Gao, and the Algerian
Consul to Gao were the targets of another assassination
attempt allegedly hatched by the Gandakoy (Ref. B). As the
Director of the ADN in Gao, Akiline manages a large amount of
money intended to serve as economic reinsertion projects for
former Tuareg combatants from northern Mali's 1991-1996
rebellion.

--------------
Gunfire Near Kidal
--------------

4.(C) On January 2 the Malian army launched an "offensive"
against Tuareg rebels loyal to Ibrahim Bahanga north of Kidal
near Tessalit. One local newspaper described the operation
as the Malian military's "New Year's gift" to Bahanga and
reported several hours of serious fighting. Information
acquired from more reliable sources, however, indicate that
the "offensive" was nothing more than a long-distance
exchange of gunfire. Hama ag Sid'Ahmed, spokesman for
Bahanga's Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC),
released a statement after the incident claiming that Malian
troops had attacked the ATNMC's base in Telakak, east of
Tessalit. The statement claimed that four Malian solders
were wounded and that the Malian military later used its
ultra-light planes to evacuate injured personnel from the
town of Tinzawaten. Sid'Ahmed ended his statement with a
warning that additional "offensives" were likely within the
coming days.

5.(C) It is unclear whether Bahanga was among those involved
in the January 2 faux-offensive. After harassing the Malian
military and civilian population in western-central Mali
during the final week of December 2008 (Ref. C),Bahanga's
group reportedly split into two or more columns with one of
these retreating into Mauritania and another - perhaps with
Bahanga aboard - headed for the region of Kidal. One Malian
official told the Embassy on January 2 that Mali believed
Bahanga was among those engaged by Malian troops led by Col.
Elhadj Gamou north of Kidal, and that Malian forces on the

BAMAKO 00000003 002 OF 003


other side of northern Mali had cut off a separate group of
rebels loyal to Bahanga somewhere along the Mauritanian
frontier. On December 31 a Malian newspaper republished a
report entitled "Mauritanie-Mali, ca se gate!" originally
posted by Mauritanian internet site, www.taqadoumy.com,
regarding alleged Mauritanian support for Ibrahim Bahanga.
Although we have no way of evaluating this report, it appears
to corroborate information previously provided the Embassy
(Ref. D.).

--------------
"Frere Guide" Descends
--------------

6.(C) So-called "frere Guide" Muammar Qadhafi arrived in
Bamako with almost no advance warning on January 3. Less
than two hours before Qadhafi's arrival, a senior government
official told the Embassy that Mali had only just learned of
the Guide's intention to divert to Mali and that President
Toure was in the southern town of Koutiala and would
therefore be unable to make it back to Bamako in time for
Qadhafi's arrival. The task of "welcoming" Qadhafi therefore
fell to Prime Minister Modibo Sidibe.

7.(C) True to form, the self-styled "King of African Kings"
popped in without advance notice to delve into Mali's
internal affairs. In Bamako, Qadhafi issued a statement to
the press urging Mali to help keep Africa free from western
"guardianship" through opposition to the presence of
international forces on the continent. Qadhafi also
delivered a message of support for negotiations with the
Tuareg rebel ADC. In addition to meeting with President
Toure (who sped back to Bamako from Koutiala),Qadhafi
reportedly met with unknown Tuareg leaders in Bamako. He
also visited a number of Libyan financed projects, including
the cultural center next to the U.S. Embassy, the shell of
recently purchased high-rise hotel project situated within
shouting distance of Bamako's two other Libyan-owned hotels,
and the work site of the enormous "MALIBYA" Ministerial city
complex which has enjoyed no tangible progress since 2005.

--------------
ADC Fighters Return to Kidal
--------------

8.(C) Qadhafi's arrival was particularly inopportune as it
coincided with preparations by Mali, Algeria, and the ADC to
welcome an estimated 300 members of the ADC back to their
barracks in Kidal. The return festivities were originally
scheduled for mid-December, then January 3, then January 4,
and now January 5. Minister of Territorial Administration,
General Kafougouna Kone, left Bamako for Kidal on the morning
of January 5 along with the Algerian Ambassador to Mali and
ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali. Any Libyan involvement currently
appears to be limited to words of support formulated from
afar. One Malian official told the Embassy that Mali
believed Qadhafi was on the point of expelling Bahanga's
family from Libya, although it is unclear how such a move
would help Mali corral Bahanga himself. Several former
members of Bahanga's ATNMC, including Hassan Fagaga, are
expected to be among those returning to Kidal. In a
particularly disingenuous bit of spin, even for the ATNMC,
Bahanga's father-in-law and spokesman Hama ag Sid'Ahmed told
an Algerian newspaper that the ATNMC had not received an
invitation to attend the meeting in Kidal and therefore would
not participate.

--------------
Et tu, Timbuktu?
--------------

9.(C) As Malian, Algerian, and Tuareg leaders were working
to demilitarize the region of Kidal, Malian Arabs in Timbuktu
moved in the opposite direction. On December 31 Danna
Moulaye, an Arab Berabiche leader from Timbuktu, told the
Embassy that Malian Arabs around Timbuktu were in the process
of forming a self-defense militia under the command of Malian
Army Col. Lamana Ould Bdou. On December 26 Moulaye called
the Embassy to report that Tuareg rebels presumably loyal to
Bahanga were meeting with members of AQIM along the
Malian-Mauritanian frontier and that Malian Arabs were
"taking necessary precautions" but did not elaborate on what
these "precautions" entailed. It now appears that
"precautions" means the formation of one or more Arab
self-defense militias. Moulaye said this militia would
protect members of the Malian Arab community from Tuareg
rebels and AQIM. "We've had enough of both of them," said
Moulaye. Although Moulaye claimed the militia was comprised
of Arabs from Timbuktu to Gao (meaning not only Berabiche but

BAMAKO 00000003 003.2 OF 003


also Kounta and Telemsi Arabs),it is likely that the militia
to which Moulaye was referring is primarily Berabiche.

10.(C) When asked if the militia would work with the Malian
military, similar to the Imghad Tuareg militia created by
Malian Col. Elhadj Gamou in May 2008, Moulaye said he did not
know and suggested asking the Malian military directly. He
then passed the telephone to Col. Lamana. Lamana, who works
for the Malian intelligence services and is deeply implicated
in northern Mali's smuggling trade, confirmed that he was
organizing a Malian Arab self-defense militia around Timbuktu
and said the militia's organization was modeled after "what
the Americans did in Iraq." On January 5 the Malian
newspaper le Republicain reported that Malian Arabs were
forming a militia under the command of another Malian army
officer, Col. Abdrahmane Ould Mehdou.

--------------
Comment: All Not Quiet on New Year's Day
--------------

11.(C) The grenade attacks in Gao appear to have been
targeted attempts to settle scores with specific Tuareg
leaders. While the incidents themselves do not indicate a
serious degradation of security within the city of Gao, the
brazenness of the attacks suggests that, for an increasing
number of northern Malian malcontents, the potential benefits
of taking matters into their own hands are beginning to
outweigh the risks. Mali's catch-and-release policy
vis-a-via Ganda-izo members does not seem to have helped
matters. The successful return of the ADC to barracks in
Kidal would go a long way towards reducing these levels of
impunity - provided the return goes as planned. Although the
"offensive" of January 2 was hardly worthy of the name, the
Malian military does appear to be beefing up its presence in
Gao and perhaps Kidal. This shift, however, may have
exacerbated the security void in Timbuktu. The creation of
an Arab self-defense militia in Timbuktu is a direct response
to Bahanga's recent movements along the Mali-Mauritania
border and signifies a serious step in the wrong direction.
Instead of complimenting the Malian military, as Danna
Moulaye and Col. Lamana claim, another ethnic-based
paramilitary group led by active duty Malian military
officers will only increase levels of uncertainty in the
north.
LEONARD